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Visions and Revisions of Europe offers a multidisciplinary debate on the vari-ous political, social, and cultural issues that are at the heart of contemporary 
European discourse, with a focus on the relations between the so-called “New” and 
“Old” Europe. A range of possible scenarios for the future of the EU, as well as a 
discussion of the factors affecting current crises are at the forefront of the debate, 
which lead the reader to reflect upon often overlooked aspects of European inte-
gration, such as Germany’s hegemonic role in the Union, or historical narratives 
and myths that need to be deconstructed and critically analysed. Contemporary 
populist movements also play a key role, as do the often difficult processes of 
migration and EU mobility, which reveal the tensions, fears, and lines of exclusion 
in contemporary European societies. Finally, the role of values – namely an adher-
ence to human rights and responsibility over the global social order – which in 
the 1970s was a cornerstone of EU discursive action and identity building, serves 
as a lasting point of reflection on the uncertain future of the EU’s axio-normative 
direction(s).
ISBN: 978-3-86395-382-9
ISSN: 2196-3851
Visions and Revisions 
of Europe 
Edited by Karolina Czerska-Shaw, Marcin Galent, 
Bożena Gierat-Bieroń 
Studies in Euroculture, Volume 4
 4
 
 
 
Karolina Czerska-Shaw, Marcin Galent, Bożena Gierat-Bieroń (Eds.) 
Visions and Revisions of Europe 
 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 
International License. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Published in 2018 by Universitätsverlag Göttingen 
as Volume 4 in the series “Studies in Euroculture” 
 
 
 
  
Visions and Revisions  
of Europe 
 
 
Edited by  
Karolina Czerska-Shaw,  
Marcin Galent,  
Bożena Gierat-Bieroń 
 
 
Studies in Euroculture 
Volume 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Universitätsverlag Göttingen 
2018 
Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek 
The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche 
Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at 
http://dnb.dnb.de 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
„Studies in Euroculture“ Series Editors 
Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. mult. Martin Tamcke, Georg-August-Universität Göttingen;  
Prof. Dr. Janny de Jong, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen;  
Dr. Lars Klein, Georg-August-Universität Göttingen; 
Prof. Dr. Margriet van der Waal, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen  
 
Editors of Volume 4 
Dr. Karolina Czerska-Shaw, Jagiellonian University in Krakow; 
Dr. Marcin Galent, Jagiellonian University in Krakow; 
Dr. Bożena Gierat-Bieroń, Jagiellonian University in Krakow 
 
 
This work is protected by German Intellectual Property Right Law.  
It is also available as an Open Access version through the publisher’s homepage and 
the Göttingen University Catalogue (GUK) at the Göttingen State and University 
Library (http://www.sub.uni-goettingen.de).  
The license terms of the online version apply. 
 
 
 
 
 
Set and layout: Lars Klein 
Cover design: Jutta Pabst 
Cover picture: https://www.istockphoto.com/nl/foto/close-up-van-veelkleurige-verf-
gm686488334-126334373 
 
 
© 2018 Universitätsverlag Göttingen 
https://univerlag.uni-goettingen.de 
ISBN: 978-3-86395-382-9 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.17875/gup2018-1115 
eISSN: 2512-7101 
Table of  Contents 
Introduction: Visions and Revisions of Europe 
Karolina Czerska-Shaw, Marcin Galent, Bożena Gierat-Bieroń 3 
Germany’s Strategy and Tactics towards the Crisis 
in European Integration 
Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse 9 
The Death of the “Community Method” 
…and the Immediate Future of the EU 
Herman Voogsgeerd 25 
Reframing the Past? Myths, Amnesia and the Role of Historians in 
Contemporary Europe 
Janny de Jong 39 
Has the Economic Crisis Eroded Trust in Political Institutions in Europe? 
A Comparative Analysis from 2008 to 2012 
Lluís Coromina, Edurne Bartolomé Peral 57 
Refugees Not Welcome. The Populist Radical Right in Poland and 
the Migration Crisis 
Natasza Styczyńska 75 
Europeanisation of Culture as an Effect of EU Cultural Policy. 
Wrocław ECOC 2016 Research 
Bożena Gierat-Bieroń 91 
Young Italians in Search of Opportunities: 
The Image of Europe as a Lifeline 
Monica Pascoli 113 
Making Precarious Lives Visible: 
Imagining Europe’s Marginalized “Others” 
Margriet van der Waal 129 
 Visions and Revisions of Europe 
 
2 
Calling on European Responsibility to Shape the Vision of Europe?  
Human Rights, Development Assistance and European Identity in the 1970s  
Ilaria Zamburlini 143 
Biographies of Editors and Authors 161 
 
  
Introduction: Visions and Revisions of  Europe 
Karolina Czerska-Shaw, Marcin Galent, Bożena Gierat-Bieroń 
 
 
 
 
 
In March 2017, on the occasion of a speech at the Sorbonne, French President 
Manuel Macron proposed a ‘relaunching’ of European integration. This call to 
action was a clear response to the crisis that has descended upon Europe and the 
EU since at least 2008 and the pressing need to redefine the Community as a polit-
ical project in view of contemporary integration processes.  
The present atmosphere of ‘stalemate’ is the consequence of political (migra-
tion) as well as economic (eurozone, financial) crises. Today we talk about the need 
to rebuild trust in EU institutions and European-level politicians, who forecast and 
build the strategies for the future of the European Union. The crisis was, and still 
is a fact. The effects are tangible today: in the financial and banking sector, on the 
labour market, in social movements, social policies and foreign relations. The dom-
inant side-effect of the crisis has been a loss of faith in the EU, the stirring of Eu-
rosceptic attitudes, a rise in populist movements, symptoms of re-nationalisation, 
separation and a deepening of schisms within EU member states, and finally, a 
decision by a Member State to leave the Union. 
The Visions and Revisions conference sought to create a space of dialogue 
about the juxtapositions present in contemporary European societies, which are 
pitting many visions of what was, is and will be, and the many revisions that are 
being proposed and in some cases, carried out. From a sociological and anthropo-
logical perspective, what are the images that Europeans have of themselves, their 
societies, and how do these images differ from the outside? What is represented on 
mental maps and which parts remain blank? Where are the borders of such maps? 
Which images form a part of their collective past? What kind of Europe do they 
hope for in the future? What are the different voices in the debate, who is being 
heard and which voices are being excluded? 
Visions and Revisions of Europe also refers to representations of Europe in 
the media and arts. The lack of images consolidating a European identity, the al-
ternative images and proliferation of social media and dubious reality, or fake 
news, has given way to a fragmented, sometimes warped, alternative or simply 
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misleading image of facts and reality. How are these images impacting the social, 
cultural, artistic and political landscapes of Europe?  
In addition, we are interested in analyses of political, legal and institutional dis-
courses on Europe. What images and values are being represented as particularly 
European? What are the strategies in place to revise the political, legal or institu-
tional frameworks within Europe to adapt to a rapidly changing global context? 
Finally, the present volume invited visionaries and (re)visionaries to share their 
ideas, discuss the concept of Europe and its future, its past and its constant state of 
becoming. What possible scenarios can we foresee post-crisis, what political and 
economic possibilities are there out of the impasse of 2008 and 2014/15 and how 
will these changes affect the mechanisms of the functioning of the EU?  
The European Union functioned for many decades on the basis of an econom-
ic and political consensus between the precepts of federalism and intergovernmen-
talism.  Without a tangible corps politique, it found itself between a rock and a hard 
place. While the Lisbon Treaty of 2009 reformulated some of the spheres of com-
petences of the Member States and EU Institutions, which had a considerable 
influence on the building of a political order within the EU (especially after its 
enlargement in 2004), the new rules were not robust enough to avoid a stalemate 
situation.  
The articles in this volume deal with the political, social, and cultural issues af-
fecting the EU, with a focus on the relations between the so-called ‘New’ and ‘Old’ 
Europe, and differences in the acceptance of various solutions to the crises at 
hand. From a political science and European Studies perspective, G.T. Grosse 
presents many scenarios for the EU and highlights the most important factors 
affecting the current crisis. He sees them in the stagnation of the Eurozone, the 
weakness of a common defence policy, the issue of migration, but above all the 
dominant role of Germany in the most important (and tactically flawed) political 
decisions within the EU. Germany, as the biggest net contributor to the EU budg-
et and the leading country in the Eurozone, has over the years grown into the un-
official leader of Europe, destabilising the balance of political power within the 
EU, weakening the integration project, strengthening populist parties and deepen-
ing divisions within Europe.  
Herman Voogsgeerd offers a critical historical analysis of the process of Eu-
ropean integration and the Community Method, which in the end has not proven 
successful in light of the current crisis. This crisis is not new, however – scepticism 
about the EU was already present when France and the Netherlands voted no in 
the referendum for the Constitution of Europe in 2004 and the source of this cri-
sis, argues Voogsgeerd, is in the vagueness of the European project.  The article 
critically analyses the possible scenarios postulated in the 2017 White Paper on the 
Future of Europe, and questions the role of the nation-state in the process of inte-
gration and its conflict-inducing function.  
Introduction 
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Drawing on the historical perspective, Janny de Jong analyses and decon-
structs the historical narratives and myths of the process of European integration, 
using the backdrop of the 20th century as her palimpsest. The author highlights the 
analogies used by historians of the interwar period and the contemporary social 
context, particularly in the context of the economic crisis, nascent populisms and 
collective amnesia about the past. The history of the Holocaust takes centre stage 
here as a contested memory that we are reminded of in the Resolution of the Eu-
ropean Parliament from April 2, 2009 on European conscience and totalitarianism, 
calling on the need of a common view of Europe’s history, which de Jong puts to 
the critical test.  
Lluís Coromina and Edurne Bartolomé Peral on their part offer a detailed 
analysis of the democratic system in which trust towards institutions plays a pivotal 
role. Just like other important foundations of social order that have been seriously 
put into question in the context of Europe’s contemporary crisis, citizens’ trust in 
the institutional order has been put to its most serious test yet. The authors’ sub-
ject of analysis are political institutions in eight different European countries which 
have been affected by the financial crisis in different ways. This allows us to com-
pare the influence of the recession on societal reactions to the crisis not only in the 
Eurozone, but also in those Member States who did not adopt the common cur-
rency, taking into consideration several variables. As it turns out, this type of com-
parison helps to explain the dynamics of the social phenomena lying at the base of 
political behaviours in contemporary Europe.  
Natasza Styczyńska continues along the political thread presented in this 
volume, bringing a political discourse analysis to the context of contemporary Po-
land. She analyses the political postulates of the Polish radical far-right in the con-
text of the European migration crisis, and the increased voice of the Congress of 
the New Right and Kukiz’15 in political discourse on this topic. Styczyńska high-
lights the problem of the Polish government’s acceptance and then subsequent 
withdrawal from the quota system within the EU’s refugee relocation programme, 
and how far the radical right’s discourse on the topic was based on stereotypes, 
stigmatisation and the exclusion of refugees from the national sphere of belonging, 
which in turn gave the Polish government a strong basis to reject the decision of 
the European Commission.  
Whilst staying in the Polish context, we take a cultural (policy) turn in the vol-
ume with Bożena Gierat-Bieroń, who offers an analysis of cultural institutions in 
Poland and their participation in EU cultural programmes, focusing on the bid for 
the European Capital of Culture 2016. The author points out that despite the cur-
rent crisis, Polish cities enthusiastically applied for the ECOC bid, seeing in it the 
value of a common cultural space. For Polish cultural operators and artists alike, 
participation in EU programmes – despite Europe-wide problems –  was an op-
portunity to initiate the process of Europeanisation in the sphere of management 
and promotion of institutions, to uncover the cultural identity of cities, as well as 
 Visions and Revisions of Europe 
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to participate in various types of platforms of cultural exchange. The ECOC com-
petition in Poland thus became a propitious space for the building of an open soci-
ety which stills believes in the European project.  
We then take a geographical shift with Monika Pasolini, who focuses on Eu-
ropean integration in the Eurozone through the prism of life chances of young 
people living in Italy, who were particularly affected by the euro crisis. One of the 
ways of dealing with the economic stagnation in the South has been for young 
people to migrate to so-called Northern Europe. The feeling amongst young Ital-
ians of the lack of opportunities on the domestic market outlasted the height of the 
crisis; the rate of out-migration was still climbing six years after the onset of crisis. 
What is most disconcerting in this trend is the exodus of the most highly-qualified 
young adults, which begs the question of the consequences of this migration for 
the long-term development of the country. The author thus poses the question to 
what extent migration within the EU has a circulatory character, or is rather be-
coming one-way from periphery to centre, taking on the classic characteristic of 
brain drain. The author then presents us with an interesting analysis of Italian me-
dia and their unilateral portrayal of the out-migration as brain drain, in contrast to 
interviewed young Italians, who see the space of Europe as an extension of their 
own sphere of belonging, a natural horizon of activity and experience which does 
not require a transgression of sorts experienced by previous generations of Italian 
migrants. International mobility is seen as one of the many possibilities of building 
one’s career, and is considered a choice, not a necessity.  
Margriet van der Waal presents yet a different vision of migration in Europe, 
this one involuntary in nature. In her article she focuses on those aspects of migra-
tion which accompany migrants forced out of their homes because of difficult life 
conditions, where mobility is devoid of its human agency.  In the case study of a 
novel based on real events by a Dutch-Romanian author, van der Waal highlights 
the stereotypes of migration from Eastern Europe: a young woman in the grips of 
a smuggling ring, forced to work in the sex industry. The history of this young 
woman becomes a metaphor for the life of Europeans living on the margins of 
society, a symbol of a wider phenomenon of precarious existence of a growing 
number of people on the move. This is another sort of Europeanisation than the 
one we see through the institutional lens, the effect of which should be economic 
prosperity and socio-cultural development. Europeanisation is also in those un-
wanted and undesirable corners, not only in the darkest ones of pimping, prostitu-
tion and crime, but also in the more subtle precariousness of the loss of work, 
poverty and homelessness, which three decades ago would have been unimagina-
ble, let alone acceptable. From here surfaces the question – to what extent is the 
breakdown of the welfare state a side effect of Europeanisation? Has the neo-
liberal order become an integral part of the European project, or just a passing 
phase in need of repair? We will not find the answer to this question if we do not 
Introduction 
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give those on the margins of society a voice. In public as well as academic dis-
course, this voice is not given nearly enough.  
Finally, Ilaria Zamburlini returns to the so-called second decade of the 1970s, 
which kicked off early with the social unrest of the spring of 1968 and gave rise to 
numerous social movements which called for a redefinition of the dominant axiol-
ogy in Europe. The period of détente between the main superpowers allowed for an 
opening in the discursive sphere of the European Community, which made efforts 
at an axio-normative integration that would garner a European identity in the pro-
cess of becoming an independent global actor. The author highlights two factors in 
the construction of identity in the global context, namely the adherence to human 
rights and the feeling of responsibility over the social global order, particularly in 
regard to developing countries. This does not mean that the adoption of these 
characteristics ran smoothly. In fact, it quickly became apparent that the two often 
are incompatible; adhering to human rights principles stood in contradiction to 
providing financial aid to less developed countries. But by trial and error and an 
interinstitutional debate on the European level, consensus was reached, thanks to 
which those values that help to define Europe persisted.  
Let us hope that the principle of solidarity with the less fortunate, and the feel-
ing of responsibility for those whose loss has been greater, will return to the centre 
of the European project also in regard to Member States. The eurozone crisis has 
not proven the best example. There needs to be hope, however, that the feeling of 
solidarity will return, and with it the chance to relaunch European integration.  
 
 
  

  
Germany’s Strategy and Tactics towards the Crisis  
in European Integration 
Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
At the extraordinary EU summit held in Malta on 3 February 2017, Chancellor 
Angela Merkel expressed her opinion that the European Union could become 
“multi-speed Europe”, which would consist in enhancing cooperation between 
selected Member States1. This comment was seen as a suggestion of a possible 
division into Western European countries, leaders in integration, and states which 
increasingly distance themselves from integration under subsequent EU policies, 
among others defence and migration policy. This vision, so far perceived rather as 
negotiating pressure on countries (including Poland and Hungary) not willing to 
progress to further stages of integration, is becoming now, after the withdrawal of 
the United Kingdom from the EU, the main political method for halting disinte-
gration processes. Such an approach may of course enhance the flexibility of gov-
ernance in Europe. But it may also lead to deepening permanent division of the 
EU into segments, and thus to introducing hierarchical relations between the states 
forming the integration centre and the ones considered as peripheries.  
The aim of this paper is to analyse the strategy of Germany towards the crisis 
in European integration, especially in response to Brexit (formally triggered in 
2017) and other problems of Europe. To assess this strategy, I first pose the fol-
lowing question: does the leadership of Germany in the European Union effective-
ly prevent crises? I advance the hypothesis that the policy of this country focuses 
insufficiently on solving the two basic crises of the European Union, namely the 
euro area and the migration crisis. This is mainly the result of the German gov-
ernment being guided above all by national interest, trying to minimise its own 
costs of recovery from the European crises. At the same time, German politicians 
inadequately address the roots of the crises and seem to push forward only their 
own ideas on how to solve problems. This policy may increase German benefits in 
                                                     
1 “EU founders speak of possible ‘multispeed’ future after Brexit”, Reuters, 3 February 2017.  
 Visions and Revisions of Europe 10 
the short term, but in the long term will cause a number of major problems. As a 
result, the approach of the German government to solving the two currently most 
important crises is hardly effective. It entails very high political costs and thus 
strengthens disintegration tendencies.  
Germany’s strategic response to various crises was on one hand to make an at-
tempt to solve problems, but on the other to increase interdependencies between 
EU countries in other fields, such as energy and climate policy as well as defence 
policy. This was intended to hinder the disintegration process and “to keep the 
EU27 together”. Therefore the most important strategic aim was to increase inter-
dependencies between states, above all in economic and political areas, so that 
secession from the EU becomes impossible or unprofitable, especially for smaller 
countries or states with a smaller economic and geopolitical potential. Neverthe-
less, focusing anti-crisis policy in this direction entails one significant risk. It is 
difficult to strongly promote the idea of integration at a time of growing opposi-
tion towards it among elites and societies in some Member States. This leads to the 
necessity of differentiating the approach to integration. In a positive scenario, this 
will increase the flexibility of governance and will let some countries hold back 
from the progress of integration, and in a negative scenario, this will lead to con-
solidating the model of multi-speed Europe, and thus to deepening the division 
between the political centre and peripheries in the EU. 
These considerations lead to the basic argument which will be developed in 
this paper. Germany's primary strategic objective was to increase the interdepend-
ence between Member States in several EU policies as a response to Brexit. It was 
supposed to counter other disintegration processes. Berlin's political tactics, on the 
other hand, allowed for a temporary differentiation of integration and for a greater 
flexibility in carrying out of various EU policies, in line with the “multi-speed Eu-
rope” model. In addition, the threat of acceleration of integration in the euro area, 
i.e. the “two speed Europe” perspective, was intended to exert tactical pressure on
those Member States that sought to loosen the European integration. The problem
was that many Western European countries, led by France, were aiming primarily
at a deepening of integration in the monetary union and at the implementation of
the “two speed Europe” scenario. Therefore, this scenario of a further advance-
ment of integration is becoming more and more likely. In this way, Germany’s
tactical actions could lead to a failure of its main strategic objective, weaken the
interdependence between the Member States, and reduce the cohesion of the en-
tire EU27.
Grosse, Germany’s Strategy and Tactic towards the Crisis in European Integration 
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What is Germany’s strategy? 
Scholars underline that for many years a key element in Germany’s European 
strategy has been a model of integration serving the German economy and thus 
building the political position of Germany in Europe and across the world2. It was 
a geo-economic strategy under which economic influence was a tool for building 
political power. During the crisis of the single currency, this economic influence 
was skillfully used to dominate the political scene in Europe3. But already earlier, 
the political power of Berlin resulted in increasingly asymmetric functioning of 
both the currency union and economic exchange on the internal market. It led to 
cumulating benefits on the German side, and at the same time to mounting debt 
and loss of competitiveness in the southern EMU countries. Therefore, it can be 
assumed that the basic goal of Berlin’s strategy after Brexit was to maintain maxi-
mal cohesion within the EU and increasing interdependencies between the Mem-
ber States. Additionally, experience drawn from the crisis in the Eurozone shows 
that Germany would try to benefit economically from inequalities among the EU 
countries. The telling fact that illustrates these differences is Germany’s current 
account surplus of 8,3 per cent of the gross domestic product in 2016 (the biggest 
not only in the Eurozone but in the world), compared to Greece’s deficit of 0,6 per 
cent4. At the same time, in 2016, the government debt in Greece amounted to 179 
per cent of the national economic output, in Italy it reached at 132 per cent, in 
Portugal it stood at 130 per cent, while in Germany it was only 68.3 per cent (well 
below the average in the Eurozone)5. Germany boasted the lowest rate of jobless-
ness at just 3.8 per cent in July 2017 – a record low in the post-reunification era. 
But Greece’s labour market continued to be scarred by its eight-year long depres-
sion, with unemployment rates still the highest in the EU at 21.7 per cent6.  
What should be the ideal strategy to prevent disintegration of the European 
Union? The Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte expressed his opinion on this sub-
ject and said: “if you love Europe, stop dreaming of more Europe and start fixing 
problems”7. His words can be explained by the political situation before the elec-
tions which were to take place in 2017. The polls pointed increasingly often to the 
                                                     
2 Constanze Stelzenmüller, “Germany: Between Power and Responsibility”, in Shaper Nations, 
Strategies for a Changing World, ed. William I. Hitchcock, Melvyn P. Leffler and Jeffrey W. Legro (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 2016), 53-68.  
3 Federico Steinberg and Mattias Vermeiren, “Germany's Institutional Power and the EMU Re-
gime after the Crisis: Towards a Germanized Euro Area?” Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 54, no 
2, 2016, 388-407. 
4 International Monetary Fund, The 2017 External Sector Report (Washington, D.C., July 2017).  
5 Eurostat, Key figures on Europe (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2017).  
6 „Eurozone joblessness and inflation figures add to optimism”, Financial Times, 1 August 2017, 
2.  
7 “Pushing for ‘more Europe’ risks fanning populism”, Financial Times, 10 December, 4; Tomasz 
Grzegorz Grosse, “Kochasz Europę?” (Do you love Europe?), Rzeczpospolita, 30 grudnia 2016, 
A11. 
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victory of the party of Geert Wilders, a fierce critic of Muslim immigration to Eu-
rope. We observed a similar situation in two other important EU countries. In 
France, in the second round of presidential elections in 2017, the candidate of the 
hitherto establishment faced Marine Le Pen, who has a critical approach towards 
integration. The Head of the National Front lost the election but considerably 
increased her electorate base. Meanwhile in Italy, the Five Star Movement – which 
opposes staying in the euro area – overtook the ruling party in opinion polls at the 
beginning of 20178. The third party according to the polls – the party of Silvio 
Berlusconi – has been increasingly critical towards Germany and the euro currency. 
It seemed only a matter of time that Italian elections could be won by a party reluc-
tant towards the single currency9. 
Is the European Union capable of solving its problems? Can the EU do it fast 
enough to stop the progress of eurosceptics in the major EU countries? At the end 
of 2016, the most important problems were economic stagnation in the euro area 
and the migration crisis. The question arises whether the leadership of Germany in 
the European Union effectively prevents these crises. I advance the thesis that this 
is not the case. The leadership of Germany did not appropriately remedy any prob-
lems faced by Europe. Unsolved problems pose a risk of halting the integration 
process (or even escalating disintegration phenomena). Germany’s strategy was 
targeted in another direction. Its aim was (at least until mid-2017) to increase inter-
dependencies between the Member States, which is intended to hinder disintegra-
tion processes. The German government sought also to maintain the hitherto 
asymmetries giving Germany an economic and political advantage.  
 First problem – economic stagnation in the euro area 
The first problem faced by Europe after 2010, in other words the crisis in the euro 
area, should have been resolved by moving away from austerity policy towards 
redistribution of financial resources from the countries with trade surpluses to the 
countries with the biggest structural problems, a high unemployment rate and low 
growth rate. Such a policy could be pleasing for German taxpayers10. Such ideas 
will probably be less and less favoured by Berlin as changes take place on the do-
mestic political scene in Germany, such as significant support for the eurosceptic 
party Alternative for Germany (around 12 per cent in 2017). Another proposition 
appearing in discussions of economists concerned targeting the monetary expan-
sion of the European Central Bank towards fiscal policy, above all towards infra-
“Italy’s Five Star looks to prove its shine to centre ground”, Financial Times, 9 December 2016, 4.  
9 In the 2018 elections the Five Stars Movement and a coalition of right-wing parties (Forza 
aItalia and the Northern League) won. 
10 Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Euro: And its Threat to the Future of Europe (New York: Allen Lane 2016). 
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structure investments in the weakest economies of the euro area11. This idea also 
did not meet with the approval of Berlin. Instead, since the beginning of the crisis, 
German politicians have been trying to curb the loose monetary policy of the ECB. 
Even though this policy was prolonged at the end of 2016, Germany managed to 
force a gradual decrease of the scale of monetary expansion12. 
Although the EU has its cohesion policy and the so-called Juncker Fund (the 
European Fund for Strategic Investments), both these instruments stimulate the 
economy in the euro area relatively weakly. This is why German elites (with the 
support of politicians from other Western European countries) promoted two 
alternative ideas for stimulating the economy. The first one is deepening integra-
tion in energy policy which, through recent regulation changes aimed at decarboni-
sation, could force investments in the economy13. These investments would be 
financed above all by companies and households, with a relatively low level of 
support from public funds. That means that the poorer societies are, or the harder 
companies’ access to loans is, the bigger the costs of this transformation. The 
countries which have a disadvantageous energy balance, meaning a huge amount of 
energy produced from hydrocarbons, will also bear higher costs. In turn, the coun-
tries and corporations in possession of adequate technologies will benefit from this 
transformation and will be able to sell their technologies to the countries going 
through energy transformation. It is thus a policy which can be potentially benefi-
cial for the economic growth in individual EU countries. It does not guarantee, 
however, that the weakest countries of the euro area will rebuild their own econo-
mies; neither does it protect some economies and societies in the EU which might 
encounter difficulties on this occasion. It means that an attempt of economic re-
covery in one part of the EU would be made to the detriment of other Member 
States. 
The second idea on how to stimulate prosperity in Europe brought forward in 
the last months of 2016 was the development of defence policy. One of its ele-
ments has been establishing the European Defence Fund aimed at financing re-
search in the armaments sector and offering loans for armaments acquisition. The 
countries with the most developed defence industries will be the main beneficiaries 
of this type of support. This is shown in the composition of the Group of Person-
alities established at the European Commission in order to advise on supporting 
the armaments industry in the EU through European funds. The Group includes 
heads of the biggest corporations such as Airbus, Saab, BAE systems and Finmec-
canica (companies with German, French, Italian, Spanish, Swedish, British and 
                                                     
11 Lawrence Summers, “Building the case for greater infrastructure investment”, Financial Times, 
11 September 2016, 9. 
12 “Pressure on ECB as eurozone inflation hits 4-year high”, Financial Times, 2 March 2017.  
13 Krzysztof M. Księżopolski, “European Union Climate Policy – the Crisis as a Catalyst for 
Change”, in European Union Policies at a Time of Crisis, ed. Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse (Warsaw: Scholar, 
2017), 233-257.  
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American capital)14. In addition, this direction of reforms will be reinforced by 
changes in the EU regulations which will limit the freedom of the Member States 
to purchase weapons and also eliminate offset possibilities, in other words includ-
ing provisions on necessary investments in domestic defence industry in tenders15. 
Above all, this will strike the countries whose national armaments sectors are 
weaker and who treat them at the same time as an important element of the pro-
cess of increasing innovativeness of their own economy. Another problem is that 
the European Defence Fund will become fully operational only in the new budget 
perspective, that is after 2021. The EU allocated EUR 90 million to a pilot pro-
gramme in 2017-2019, yet it is only a symbolic amount16. In the new financial per-
spective after 2021, the European Defence Fund will have slightly bigger, yet still 
modest resources (ca. EUR 0.5 billion per year for research and EUR 5 billion for 
purchase of weapons) and will in no way support the weakest economies of the 
currency union. 
In this situation, the euro area will remain in the coming period very sensitive 
to external shocks, which is shown by continuing troubles of Italian banks. Alt-
hough some macroeconomic indicators showed improvement in 2016 (unem-
ployment falling below 10% and economic growth amounting to 1.7% in 2016), 
the situation is still not fully satisfactory. Youth unemployment exceeds 20%, in 
some countries unemployment rate increased (e.g. in Italy), and in the whole cur-
rency union, investment and productivity levels were low. Moreover, there is no 
credible plan concerning Greece’s recovery from financial and economic crisis or a 
reduction of the structural imbalances between stronger and weaker economies in 
the currency union. The euro area will thus remain a zone of economic problems 
which can potentially have serious political consequences. Especially as representa-
tives of the new US administration openly encourage the Greeks to leave the 
EMU17.  
14 “MEPs to back multi-million euro military research budget”, EUobserver, 25 October 2016, 
http://euroobserver.com/institutional/135644 [accessed: 30.12.2016]. 
15 It is planned, among others, to use competitive procedures for the procurement of military 
equipment and equipment in accordance with Directive 2009/81 on defense and security procure-
ment and to clarify the interpretation of the provisions of the directive in that way to limit the Mem-
ber States' previous freedom of purchase of armaments. The Commission also wanted to appeal to 
the EU Court of Justice certain decisions by Member States to invoke Art. 346 TFEU, which con-
tains a general provision allowing Member States not to comply with Community law in the field of 
the manufacture and marketing of arms and military equipment. Comp. Marcin Terlikowski, “De-
fence Policy in the European Union: Multi-Speed Security?” PISM Bulletin, 74 (924), 14 November 
2016.    
16 “EU to propose joint defence fund”, EUobserver, 30 November, 
http://euroobserver.com/foreign/136091 [accessed: 29.12.2016]. 
17 “Trump envoy says Greece is now more likely to leave the euro”, Guardian, 8 February 2017. 
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Second problem – migration 
The second problem affecting Europe is migration. In 2015, German elites fo-
cused on an ancillary issue, namely on a system of relocation of asylum seekers in 
the EU. Handling the crisis required in the first place securing the external borders 
of the EU, and not distributing refugees and immigrants inside Europe. All the 
more so as the issue of relocation aroused considerable controversy among the 
Member States. In 2017, this matter still provoked strong feelings and was not 
completely forgotten, neither by officials of the Commission nor German politi-
cians supporting this idea. The attempt was made to wait through the period of the 
biggest disputes, even though the Commission recalled from time to time the ne-
cessity of implementing the decision concerning the relocation of 160,000 refu-
gees. Finally, the Commission launched infringement procedures against the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland for non-compliance with the 2015 Council Deci-
sion on relocation.18 Work on the EU asylum policy was undertaken; under this 
policy granting asylum would become a task of the EU and fall within the compe-
tence (or supervision) of the European Asylum Support Office19. This agency 
would distribute asylum seekers between all Member States. It would also harmo-
nise the conditions of accepting refugees at the level of the European Union. Some 
suggested that the system should cover all economic migrants in the future. Such 
ideas are only deepening the political crisis in Europe. 
Furthermore, other actions were also undertaken. As a result of the actions of 
the individual states and on the basis on the agreement signed with Turkey, the so-
called Balkan route was closed. At the end of 2016, the German minister of inter-
nal affairs proposed that migrants should be sent back from the Mediterranean Sea 
to North Africa and placed there in transit camps in which they could start the 
procedure of applying for asylum in the EU20. The EU agency Frontex made alle-
gations against non-governmental organisations, which save migrants in the Medi-
terranean Sea, concerning their cooperation with smugglers dealing with illegal 
migration into the EU21. The European Union was also considering the possibility 
of restricting these types of rescue actions through regulations. Italy introduced a 
code of conduct designed for NGOs to limit illegal migration from Libya.22 At the 
                                                     
18 European Commission, “Relocation: Commission launches infringement procedures against 
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland”, Press release, Brussels, 14 June 2017.  
19 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Coun-
cil, Towards a reform of the Common European Asylum System and enhancing legal avenues to Europe, 
COM(2016) 197 final, Brussels, 6.4.2016.  
20 “German ministry wants migrants stopped at sea”, EUobserver, 7 November 2016, 
http://euobserver.com/migration/135791 [accessed: 30.12.2016]. 
21 “Migrant Rescue NGOs Deny Human Smuggling Allegations”, The Maritime Executive, 28-12-
2016, http://www.maritime-executive.com/artucle [accessed: 30.12.2016]. 
22 “Italy seizes NGO boat and starts Libyan mission”, Euobserver, 3 August 2017, 
https://euobserver.com/migration/138677 [accessed: 3.08.2017].  
 Visions and Revisions of Europe 16 
EU summit in 2016, the leaders of Member States underlined the need of intensi-
fying Operation Sophia to support the Libyan Navy Coastguard in order to possi-
bly reduce the flow of migrants to Europe. In an effort to curb trafficking, Italy's 
parliament authorised a limited naval mission to help Libya's coastguard curb mi-
grant flows. However, Rome sent only two ships for logistics and patrols into Lib-
yan waters, which could hinder the effectiveness of these actions.23 Migrants stay-
ing in Libya were also offered help in returning to their homelands. Talks were 
held with African countries (Niger, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Mali, Senegal) about holding 
back migration to the EU and increasing the percentage of returns of unwanted 
migrants from the EU. All these actions focused on the direct causes of crisis and 
not only on the methods of defusing the crisis in certain EU countries. However, 
these actions were undertaken too late and their efficiency was very low. It turned 
out that the crisis should have been resolved mostly by closing the EU borders and 
deterring migrants from embarking on the journey. Handling this problem by re-
admission or relocation is very difficult in practice. For instance, the leaders of 
African countries did not want to hear about readmission and the number of re-
turned migrants was smaller than the number of refugees relocated within the EU. 
The lack of cohesive migration policy constitutes a problem for the EU. For at 
least 10 years, 1 to 2 million migrants per year have been arriving to Europe, most-
ly from its former colonies. So far the EU has taken up selective and not very suc-
cessful regulation attempts, for example the Blue Card scheme aimed at attracting 
highly skilled workers to the EU24. Individual Member States have most often 
conducted a liberal policy in this matter. In this manner, this problem became a 
ticking time bomb. 
In 2016, the policy of Western Europe changed, which was illustrated in the 
tightening of criteria for granting asylum in Germany and reducing material sup-
port provided to asylum seekers. Readmission actions were intensified25, also to-
wards Greece where some migrants had crossed the EU border26. Germany thus 
started to close the door to migrants. As a result, more and more migrants started 
looking for alternative places to stay in the EU and “disappeared” from German 
statistics. Furthermore, political controversies surrounding the crisis concern now 
not only migrants from outside of Europe, but also European Union citizens 
23 Ibid. 
24 European Commission, “Delivering the European Agenda on Migration: Commission pre-
sents Action Plan on Integration and reforms ‘Blue Card’ scheme for highly skilled workers from 
outside the EU”, Press release, Strasbourg, 7 June 2016. 
25 The German government has been urged to tighten the rules on failed asylum seekers, includ-
ing to make it easier for authorities to detain asylum seekers regarded as dangerous even if they have 
not been charged or convicted. Comp. “Berlin urged to toughen refugee rules after attack”, Financial 
Times, 1 August 2017, 2.  
26 “Germany wants migrants sent back to Greece and Turkey”, Euractiv, 3.10.2016, 
https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/germany-wants-migrants-sent-back-
to-greece-and-turkey/ [accessed: 30.07.2017]. 
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whose freedoms on the internal market are being increasingly limited. One may 
fear that the migration problem will remain the source of political destabilisation in 
Europe in the coming years. 
 Integration offensive in defence policy 
German politicians have been promoting the idea of developing cooperation in the 
scope of defence policy for a long time. The withdrawal from the EU of the Unit-
ed Kingdom, who had for many years torpedoed attempts to implement such ide-
as, has become an opportunity for Berlin. Thus, the response to Brexit has firstly 
been an acceleration of integration in the scope of the Common Security and De-
fence Policy (CSDP). It ensues from statements made by German and French 
politicians that the turn of integration in this direction resulted from a series of 
threats and risks facing the EU: from the terrorist threat, through destabilisation in 
North Africa and civil war in Syria, to the Russian conflict with the West concern-
ing Ukraine27. 
At first glance the principles of the defence policy adopted at the Council 
meeting in November 201628 and later confirmed at the EU summit in December 
201629 were modest. They come down to four main objectives. Firstly, establishing 
headquarters for non-military missions of a police or training nature. Secondly, 
launching battle groups of approximately 1,000 soldiers from various Member 
States. Similar plans concern the so-called Eurocorps, a military formation that 
currently numbers approximately 7 thousand officers and 60 thousand soldiers. It 
was set up at the initiative of France and Germany but other EU states have also 
joined30. Thirdly, launching the aforementioned European Defence Fund whose 
objective is to offer loans for the purchase of armaments and to develop military 
research. The Fund will probably not have the capacity to prevent real threats to 
European security, at least in the next few years. Fourthly, introducing the so-
called European defence semester, i.e. an annual review of military capabilities and 
their development processes, research and development as well as industrial poten-
tial in individual Member States. The mechanism for financing military operations 
(the so-called Athena mechanism) is to be reviewed in the future31. In addition, the 
                                                     
27 Revitalizing CSDP: towards a comprehensive, realistic and credible defence in the EU, Berlin – Paris, 12 
September 2016. 
28 Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on implementing the EU global strategy in the area 
of security and defence, Brussels, 14.11.2016.  
29 European Council, Conclusions, European Council meeting, EUCO 34/16, Brussels, 15 De-
cember 2016.  
30 Among the so-called framework countries forming Eurocorps are Germany, France, Belgium, 
Spain and Luxembourg. Observers are Greece, Italy, Poland, Turkey and Romania. 
31 Athena is a mechanism for financing common costs related to CSDP military operations. 
Contributions to the Mechanism are specified in art. 41 sec. 2 of the Treaty on European Union. 
Member States contribute an annual contribution according to their gross national income. 
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Permanent Structured Cooperation was initiated in 2017. Considering the chal-
lenges with which Europe is confronted, the scale of the undertaking is rather 
disappointing.  
First of all, it is difficult to consider that such measures could effectively pre-
vent the escalation of tension in eastern Ukraine. It is also difficult to expect that 
two leaders in security policy, i.e. France and Germany, will want to engage Euro-
pean forces in this conflict. Thus, in the coming years, the CSDP will not be able 
to play a deterrent role with regard to potential aggressors at the eastern borders of 
the EU, due to both its small potential and the lack of political consensus between 
Member States. This will be the case even should the USA under the rule of Presi-
dent Donald Trump wish to weaken NATO or to withdraw American troops from 
Central Europe (although, considering appointments to posts in charge of security 
in the Trump administration, this scenario should be deemed rather improbable). 
Battle group units or Eurocorps formations may be used for prevention pur-
poses in North Africa, which has been an objective of the French diplomacy for 
many years. They may also potentially be deployed in the Middle East; however, 
not as a real force in the Syrian war but only when a peace agreement is concluded 
in the country or for putting down other conflicts of a much smaller scale. 
Real action in external conflicts is thus only potential and in the coming years 
limited only to police or training functions. Such is the principle of the reformed 
CSDP according to the French-German document of 2016. According to this 
document, European formations will at first only participate in advisory and train-
ing missions. It is only later that they may be used for strictly military operations, 
e.g. as support for NATO actions32. However, the discussed reforms have a much
greater significance for EU internal policy. Military cooperation is to be an attempt
to counteract disintegration tendencies in Europe and therefore has a purely politi-
cal dimension. The German Minister of Defence Ursula von der Leyen stated that
strengthening the defence policy in the EU is intended to support European unity.
The French Finance Minister Michel Sapin judged that the aforementioned policy
should restore confidence in the euro currency and pave the way for integration in
the scope of the monetary union (sic!)33. Particularly the second statement points
to a significant implication of the discussed political initiative. It may deepen the
differences in the level of EU integration, which is related to the “two-speed Eu-
rope” mechanism. All the more so as European politicians do not hide that the
basis for integration progress under the CSDP is to be permanent structural coop-
eration34 (of some Member States) whose principles were elaborated by mid-2017.
32 Revitalizing CSDP: towards a comprehensive, realistic and credible defence in the EU, 3. 
33 “Ceci n’est pas une EU army“, EUobserver, Magazine, 3.01.2017, 3, 
http://euobserver.com/europe-in-review/136134 [accessed: 27.01.2017]. 
34 Permanent structural co-operation is a mechanism that enables Member States of the Europe-
an Union which meet higher military capability criteria to engage in greater cooperation in the field of 
common security and defense in this field. The power and legal framework give it the art. 42 sec. 6 
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The goal of integration in the scope of the CSDP is ultimately to increase co-
ordination between foreign and defence policies of Member States. At the same 
time, it is no secret that the main decisions regarding the directions of this policy 
will be made by the countries with the greatest political and military weight, i.e. 
Germany and France, with Italy and Spain playing a smaller role. At the current 
stage of political cooperation, this is not a real challenge for NATO, albeit 
strengthening EU defence policy is ultimately intended to establish a true political 
autonomy of the European side with regard to the USA within NATO and in the 
broader context of transatlantic relations. Germany and France have considered 
defence policy for many years as essential in gaining strategic independence from 
the USA. It is true that Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, has denied many times that the aim of the 
currently initiated cooperation was to build a European army35, but representatives 
of other states do not hide that such is precisely its long-term objective. The head 
of the Italian diplomacy judged that it is the nucleus of European integrated armed 
forces and the French Minister of Defence added that the most secret ambition of 
the Germans is the creation of a European army36. Moreover, this seems also to be 
a significant political area for Germany that will reinforce the importance of this 
country in Central Europe and also weaken the American influence in this region 
lasting since the end of the Cold War37. 
The next element contributing to increasing interdependencies in Europe is to 
be the cooperation between arms industries and tightening arms purchase regimes 
in the EU (particularly in states entering permanent structured cooperation under 
the CSDP). Developing such measures would lead to asymmetry in relations be-
tween states with strong industries as well as financial and military potential and 
weaker states. The latter may become dependent on support provided by EU fi-
nancial instruments, cooperation with the largest corporations from Western Eu-
rope and strategic objectives in foreign and defence policy elaborated in the EU. 
This type of asymmetry would thus be strategically advantageous for the largest 
powers, particularly for Germany, but could be problematic for smaller states, 
including those located in Central Europe38. 
and Art. 46 of the Treaty on European Union and the Protocol on permanent structured cooperation 
established under Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union (Protocol No 10). 
35 Atlantic Council, Mogherini Dismisses Likelihood of European Army, But Seeks Deployment of EU Bat-
tlegroups, 6 September 2016, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/mogherini-dismisses-
likelihood-of-european-army-but-seeks-deployment-of-eu-battlegroups [accessed: 29.12.2016]. 
36 “Ceci n’est pas une EU army”, 2. 
37 Stelzenmüller, “Germany: Between Power and Responsibility”. 
38 Jacek Czaputowicz, “The Impact of the Changing European Integration Model on Common 
Security and Defence Policy”, in European Union Policies at a Time of Crisis, ed. Tomasz Grzegorz 
Grosse (Warsaw, Scholar, 2016), 85-101.  
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German tactics and political tendencies in Europe 
Some Central European countries have not only distanced themselves from Ber-
lin's proposals to deepen the integration in selected EU policies, but have explicitly 
called for loosening up of the existing integration gains, reducing the powers of the 
European Commission and aiming at “renationalization” of certain EU compe-
tences.39 For example, a majority of Poles do not want to adopt the European 
currency and are opposed to the relocation of refugees.40 Consequently, the Polish 
government rejected the prospect of joining the euro area and was also distancing 
itself from many of Berlin’s ideas for the further advancement of European inte-
gration. 
In this situation, Berlin’s tactical action was to support the progress of integra-
tion among the willing European avant-garde countries. Chancellor Angela Merkel 
expressed her opinion that the European Union could become a “multi-speed 
Europe”. Germany was also increasingly inclined to continue reforming the Euro-
zone.41 It was a tactical acquiescence to the temporary differentiation of integration 
and a greater management flexibility which were perceived to ensure the EU’s 
durability in the difficult period after Brexit. At the same time, the “two speed 
Europe” scenario was intended to put pressure on some Member States, especially 
from Central Europe, to proceed with further integration in defense and migration 
policy. 
Meanwhile, Emmanuel Macron’s victory in the 2017 presidential election in 
France refreshed French efforts to deepen integration in the euro area. The new 
president has launched an ambitious reform agenda in this field that could bring 
the EU closer to the “two speed Europe” model. These reforms have included the 
idea of setting up of a separate budget for the Eurozone, creation of a chamber in 
the European Parliament set up specifically for the euro area, establishment of the 
post of the Minister of Finance for this zone, and even the introduction of euro 
bonds, i.e. debt instruments that would be issued by the Eurozone as a whole, 
leading to joint liabilities for its 19 members.42 These proposals have been strongly 
39 Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse, “Strategy for a Time of Collapse. Polish EU reform proposals ben-
efit Western Europe”, BBC Monitoring European, London, 07 October 2016, 
http://search.proquest.com/business/docview/1826539685/7F8F081AAAD9406CPQ/16?accounti
d=160514 [access: 29.10.2016]. 
40 “CBOS: 70 proc. Polaków przeciwko euro w Polsce. Najwięcej w historii badania”, Gazeta 
Wyborcza, 27.05.2015; ”CBOS: 74 proc. Polaków przeciw przyjmowaniu uchodźców z Bliskiego 
Wschodu i Afryki”, Rzeczpospolita, 14.04.2017.  
41 “Macron and Merkel signal new move to strengthen eurozone”, The Guardian, 15 May 2017.  
42 Pierre Briançon, “Macron to Germany: No rush into eurozone reform, for now”, Politico, 5/14/17, 
http://www.politico.eu/article/macron-to-germany-no-rush-into-eurozone-reform-for-now/ 
[accessed: 29.06.2017]. 
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supported by Italy, Spain and Portugal.43 All of this opened a new stage for discus-
sions on the future of the EU and put political pressure on Berlin to accept not 
only challenging reforms in the euro area, but also the “two speed Europe” inte-
gration model. An additional factor that will facilitate the implementation of this 
scenario is a deteriorating political climate between Western Europe and some 
Central European countries. It concerns disputes over refugee relocation and fu-
ture systemic reforms in the EU, as well as alleged undemocratic tendencies and 
violations of the rule of law in Hungary and Poland, and even a controversy over 
German reparations for Poland after the Second World War. 
In this way, further crises and growing political tension in Europe may hamper 
Berlin's principal strategic objective of maintaining cohesion in the EU and in-
creasing interdependencies among Member States. It is also more and more likely 
that the tactical actions allowing temporary differentiation of integration in accord-
ance with the “multi-speed Europe” model would lead to a durable segmentation 
of the EU in line with the “two speed Europe” model. This way, the mere tactical 
actions could replace the prior strategic objective of the German government. 
This, in turn, threatens to deepen the disintegration processes, especially in the 
areas considered to be European peripheries. 
Conclusions  
Europe is not effectively solving the main problems that have been weakening 
European integration in the last few years. This is to a large extent due to the fact 
that German leaders do not want to pay too high a price for saving the European 
project. The direction of the German strategy was rather to transfer the costs of 
crises onto other states44 and to bind them together through mutual obligations, 
economic and political ties in a manner leaving no alternative other than European 
integration. German strategists expected that no real proposals for leaving the 
Union or excluding a given state from one of the leading EU policies would ap-
pear, even in the case of occurrence of subsequent crises - or protraction of exist-
ing ones and the accompanying social costs. 
Berlin’s policy may not necessarily produce the outcomes that were expected. 
For the time being, the consequence is the weakening of the integration project 
and its general sensitivity to so-called external shocks, i.e. adverse events that may 
                                                     
43 “France’s Macron and Italy’s Gentiloni present a united front over EU”, Euronews, 
22/05/2017, http://www.euronews.com/2017/05/22/france-s-macron-and-italy-s-gentiloni-
present-a-united-front-over-eu [accessed: 29.07.2017].  
44 Peter A. Hall, “Varieties of Capitalism and the Euro Crisis”, West European Politics, 37 (6), 2014, 
1223–1243; Stefan Collignon, “Political Lessons from the Economics of the Euro-crisis”, in The 
Eurozone Crisis and the Transformation of EU Governance, ed. Maria João Rodrigues, Eleni Xiarchogi-
annopoulou (Burlington: Ashgate, 2014), 85–106; Simon Bulmer and William E. Paterson, “Germany 
as the EU’s Reluctant Hegemon? Of Economic Strength and Political Constraints”, Journal of Europe-
an Public Policy, vol. 20, no. 10, 2013, 1387-1405. 
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potentially destabilise the economy. The EU remains very prone to internal politi-
cal turbulences, primarily the increase in ratings of eurosceptic parties. In the com-
ing years, this may contribute to the strengthening of disintegration tendencies. It 
seems that another consequence of the German strategy is a growing tendency to 
differentiate European integration according to the “two-speed Europe” mecha-
nism. Even if at the beginning it was a tactical gimmick aimed at inducing hesitant 
states to tighten cooperation in the scope of defence policy among others, it finally 
consists in actions being initiated by the few states ready for further integration. 
And this may lead to increasing divisions inside the EU if not all states make the 
decision to take up such measures.     August 2017  
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Introduction 
The so-called Community method has been very successful in the first five decades 
of existence of the EEC/EC/EU. Since the Treaty of Maastricht (1991) and the 
increase in the number of Member States from six to twenty-eight the method has 
become obsolescent.1 Let us be clear: the Community method is dead. I agree with 
Majone that this method was designed only for a small group of homogeneous 
countries in 1958. But what is the next stage of European integration now that 
Member States disagree about the pace and nature of the process? How can we 
change, starting from this method? ‘Europe can’t be reformed’, was heard during 
the Brexit campaign in the UK in 2016. One core characteristic of the Community 
method has always been to be vague about the finality, the end-goal, of the integra-
tion process apart from the terms ‘ever closer union’. European integration was 
created as a rational and not an emotional process. This vague finality and the idea 
of a never stopping bullet train to ever more integration and a higher number of 
Member States is at the basis of increasing unease and discomfort in not only the 
old Member States, but also in the newer Central and East-European Member 
States. The very idea of supranationalism seems to be at stake. The nation states 
are the building blocks of the EU and the masters of the Treaties (‘Herren der Ver-
träge’). If large parts of the population in the nation states are uncomfortable with 
the EU as it has been developed, the EU itself will be in trouble.  
 
This contribution will start from the assumption that there is an urgent need to 
move beyond the Community method in European integration and cooperation. 
Are the options the European Commission put on the table the 1st of March 2017 
                                                     
1 Giandomenico Majone, Europe as the Would-be World Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), chapter 7 (“The Obsolescence of the Traditional Integration Methods”). 
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an alternative to the Community method? Or are more common terms such as 
‘confederation’ or ‘federation’ to be preferred? It is not a speculative argument that 
will be presented. I will pay attention to how we can move away from the actual 
Community method, taking the rapidly changing global context into account. It 
will pay attention to theoretical approaches to the nature of European integration, 
but also legal issues focusing on recent case law of the CJEU that is already paying 
more ‘respect’ to issues related to national identity.  
The Community method 
The Community method, basically, consists of ground-rules to make this commu-
nity of Member States work. These ground-rules are found in the original EEC 
Treaty, e.g. the important political and pro-integration role of the European Com-
mission to defend the common interests of the Member States. This method has 
been successful from the 1960s to the end of the 1980s, when the EEC consisted 
of relatively homogeneous Member States struggling to rebuild their economies 
after the Second World War. Essential factors in this success were de-politicization 
and technocratic decision-making through elites, especially at the helm of the Eu-
ropean Commission. These bureaucratic elites came from the Commission, nation-
al bureaucrats and experts also played an immensely important role in the so-called 
comitology procedures. Decision-making by ‘Brussels’ therefore includes many 
national officials. Because of weak input legitimacy and lack of democracy, the 
focus was on output legitimacy and good decision-making in the interest of the 
‘general good’. Arend Lijpharts’ theory of consociationalism has been applied to 
decision making in the European Community. This theory explains stability in 
heterogeneous societies such as the Netherlands in the past with its separate and 
homogeneous protestant, catholic, liberal and socialist pillars with each their own 
schools, broadcasting corporations and politicians. Politicians and elites from the 
pillars cooperated in The Hague and this cooperation was characterized by stabil-
ity, at least for some decades. De-pillarization was inevitable in later years as the 
pillars became less homogeneous. Applying consociationalism to the European 
Community would imply de-politicization and elite cooperation.2 The peoples of 
the Member States form the pillars. Politicization would be the worst option in this 
consociationalist view because it could lead to destabilization. Politics is for the 
Member States and technocracy for the EC level. This construction could last as 
long as the number of Member States was low and the number of issues the EEC-
level dealt with was not too high. Inherent in the European integration concept is 
the idea of an ‘ever closer union’. So, from the beginning it was apparent that this 
2 See for an example Dimitris Chryssochoou, Theorizing European Integration (London: Sage, 2001), 
chapter 5 (‘Theorizing the European Consociation’).  
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method could not last forever. Old habits, however, hardly die. There are many 
path-dependencies involved.  
The fear to politicize is also seen in another characteristic of the Community 
method: an unidentified finality. There is no agreement on the end-goal of the 
European integration process apart from general terminology such as ‘ever closer 
union’ in the preamble of the EEC Treaty, the preservation of peace, protection of 
human rights and creation of strong economies. Former Prime Minister David 
Cameron of the UK, in his negotiations with the EU before the referendum on 
Brexit in 2016, tried unsuccessfully to water down the words ‘ever closer union’. 
Lack of agreement among the Member States on the end-goal does not mean that 
the European integration process is not a goal-oriented exercise. The EU as it has 
grown is in its legal characteristics first and foremost a ‘functional polity that is 
organized around objectives’.3 The European Court of Justice has used in its case 
law a systematic and teleological approach, making arguments on the basis of the 
goals and the system of the Treaty or a specific legislative text in a directive.  
In 2004 I asked in another contribution the question whether unidentified fi-
nality could be considered as an essential element of a European Political Identity. 
At that time my answer was moderately positive in that more time was needed for 
the Member States to decide on the finality of the EU.4 Disagreement between the 
Member States was still too strong. The negative result of the referenda on the 
constitutional treaty of the EU in 2004 in France and the Netherlands only 
strengthened resistance to far-fetched prospects about the future of the EU. The 
then Dutch government in a reaction on the negative outcome of the referendum 
even banned the European flag for a certain period. Pragmatic and practical steps 
are needed, not prospects.  
We need to know, however, what the EU is about. In order to come to the be-
ginning of an answer to this difficult question and, at the same time, to show the 
demise of the Community method I will use the following structure and method. 
In three main sections I will pay attention to the early years of the EEC, the domi-
nance of the neo-liberal model in the 1980s until the financial crisis of 2008 and, 
finally, the options used in theory and practice to re-lance the European project. 
The titles of the respective sections are related to the terms embedded, dis-
embedded and re-embedded liberalism, taken from both Polyani and Ruggie. The 
method is used to assess the influence of the general context in the years 1958-
1985, 1985-2008 and 2008+ corresponding to the three-tiered structure of this 
contribution. By general context I mean the general political conditions, e.g. peri-
                                                     
3 François-Xavier Millet, “The Respect for National Constitutional Identity”, in The Question of 
Competence in the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 258. 
4 Herman Voogsgeerd, “Unidentified Finality as an essential element of European Political Iden-
tity”, Siegener Periodicum zur Internationalen Empirischen Literaturwissenschaften 21 (2002), 313. 
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ods of tension during the Cold War, the ascent of neo-liberalism and the end of 
the Cold War, and the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008.  
The Treaty of Rome (1958) and its premises in an area of embedded 
liberalism 
The conclusion of the Treaty of the EEC in Rome ended a period of deadlock in 
the European cooperation process that started in 1954 when the French Parlia-
ment refused to discuss the plans for a European Defense Union and a Political 
Union. This refusal had more to do with resistance against cooperation with West 
Germany, but the death of Stalin in 1953 ended one of the most serious stages of 
the Cold War. The focus of the European cooperation project was now to be laid 
on the economy. Sensitive areas of ‘high politics’ related to sovereignty, such as 
defense and foreign policy, were taboo for the next thirty years. The core of the 
project became a ‘common market’, a ‘common commercial policy’ and a ‘compe-
tition authority’ at the European level. I agree with Walters and Haahr, who put 
the common market as a component of what John Ruggie at the global level called 
‘embedded liberalism’.5 At world-wide level this meant a combination of ‘moder-
ate’ free trade within frameworks such as the GATT with the ability of nation 
states to manage their welfare states through safeguard procedures. At the EEC 
level a comparable combination existed during this period: there is a right to free 
movement in the common market, but there is a ‘largely positive view of the na-
tion state’ in social welfare related topics.6 This was definitely so during the so-
called transitory stage that ended the 31st of December 1969. Member States had 
certain safeguarding powers, e.g. in case a sudden surge in the import of certain 
products from another member-state (Italy) would cause problems in the domestic 
market of the importing member-state (France), the European Commission could 
allow restrictions to that trade.7 Member States still had discretionary powers to 
limit free movement. The free movements of the common market served an end 
but were not an end in itself; they were only ‘a tool’ to pool energies of Member 
States and to realize peace, stability, economic development and a rising standard 
of living.8  
Hans-Peter Ipsens’ work related to so-called ‘special purpose associations’ 
(Zweckverbände) of functional integration had been very influential in the earlier 
years of the EEC. Functional integration was the key to success and technocratic 
solutions for the common good were to be preferred instead of politics and emo-
tions. Special purpose associations were definitely not ‘emotional associations’. 
5 William Walters and Jens Henrik Haahr, “The Common Market”, Governing Europe. Discourse, 
Governmentality and European Integration (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 58. 
6 William Walters and Jens Henrik Haahr, ibidem, 44. 
7 Italian refrigerators case, Case 13/63 Italy versus Commission. [1963] ECR, 351. 
8 William Walters and Jens Henrik Haahr, ibidem, 44. 
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Special purpose associations were also not general purpose associations, only states 
were to be qualified as general purpose associations. The EEC could therefore not 
become a general purpose association. It was important to downplay the finality of 
the integration process: ‘ever closer union’ in the preamble of the EEC Treaty was 
sufficiently vague to serve this purpose. The nature of the European integration 
process had to remain open in character, at least as long as the Member States as 
Masters of the Treaties (Herren der Verträge) did not agree on the future of the inte-
gration process. Ipsen seemed to be content with the term ‘Community’ chosen 
for the EEC. The European project needed a term that was not occupied by other 
entities such as (con)federation or union.9 Examples of ‘special purpose associa-
tions’ were to be found in the economic realm, e.g. a customs union, the four eco-
nomic freedoms, non-discrimination on the basis of nationality, but Ipsen did not 
exclude topics outside this area, e.g. cooperation on foreign policy. The term spe-
cial purpose association is therefore extremely broad in scope and is not limited to 
functional areas, e.g. agriculture, transport or specific sectors of the economy. The 
term is also flexible as Ipsen did not oppose to occasional cases of disintegration.10 
Although the concept is powerful in its potential to clarify the earlier years of 
the EEC and the first successful steps towards economic integration in Europe, I 
agree with the complaint heard from Giandomenico Majone from the title of his 
book Integration by Stealth.11 Over the years and after many court cases from the 
European Court of Justice in Luxembourg, integration in the economic sphere 
(and therefore also political because the two are difficult to separate) was pushed 
to a level not known to the original authors of the Treaty. This proves the success 
of the concept. But in fact, the common market was in the words of Sauter and 
Schepel ‘imposed on the Member States’ by the European Court of Justice.12 Es-
pecially after the transitory stage in 1970 the common market freedoms were in-
terpreted more and more extensively by the ECJ. This happened at first for the 
important free movement of goods with important court cases in Dassonville and 
Cassis de Dijon.13 Not much later case law concerning free movement of persons 
followed. The free movement of services and capital were essentially dealt with in 
the following period of ‘dis-embedded liberalism’.  
  
                                                     
9 Hans-Peter Ipsen, Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht in Einzelstudien (1984), 80-92. 
10 As quoted in Voogsgeerd, 317. 
11 Giandomenico Majone, Dilemmas of European Integration: The Ambiguities and Pitfalls of Integration 
by Stealth, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
12 Wolf Sauter and Harm Schepel, State and Market in European Union Law, (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2009). 
13 Case 8/74, Dassonville [1974] ECR, 837 and case 120/78, Cassis de Dijon [1979] ECR 649. 
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The Single European Act (1985) and the ascent of neo-liberalism and 
disembedded liberalism 
The mid 1980s became a real watershed in the history of the European integration 
project. Apart from the beginning years and the active EEC Commission under 
president Walter Hallstein that lasted until the empty chair crisis in 1963, the peri-
od between 1985 and 1992 also may be qualified as a very successful period of 
European integration, this time under European Commission president Jacques 
Delors. The context during these years changed dramatically. The rise of supply-
side economics, combined with pleas for deregulation and privatization, influenced 
the dominant discourse in the EEC. The famous Lord Cockfield report on the 
costs of non-Europe laid the groundwork for the realization of the ‘internal mar-
ket’, an area without internal borders (article 14, paragraph 2 EC, now article 26, 
paragraph 2 TFEU).14 This discursive change from common to internal market is 
not without impact. In the period before 1985 the role of governments was seen as 
essential, after 1958 this changed. Walters and Haahr see this development as 
“something of a reversal in the figures of the state and the market”.15 The market 
is ‘good’ and states have to interfere as little as possible. Giubonni is of the same 
opinion, when he talks about the reversal of the relationship between social policy 
and as he calls it ‘the law of economics’.16 The premises on which the EEC Treaty 
of Rome rested changed. Asymmetries arose between national democratic control 
and world-wide economic processes and also between social rights and economic 
market freedoms.17 
New areas were tried in case law of the ECJ. Free movement of capital was 
completely liberalized with the Treaty of Maastricht (1992). Case law concerning 
this freedom has been quite radical in the sense that even minor dissuasive effects 
on capital moves would trigger this freedom. Government shareholding positions 
in companies, so-called ‘golden shares’ were deemed to be against freedom of capi-
tal. The Volkswagen-battle between Germany and the European Commission 
lasted several years. In 2007 the ECJ took the side of the Commission concerning 
the so-called Volkswagen law that protected certain (public) shareholders.18 Free 
movement of services was radicalized as well. Now that an internal market in 
goods was almost completely realized, the service economy needed to be pushed. 
14 Cockfield White Paper, 1985, Completing the Internal Market, Luxembourg, Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities. 
15 William Walters and Jens Henrik Haahr, “The Common Market”, Governing Europe. Discourse, 
Governmentality and European Integration (London, New York: Routledge, 2005), 44. 
16 Stefano Giubboni, Social Rights and Market Freedom in the European Constitution (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 20. 
17 See especially the strong arguments of Fritz Scharpf, Governing in Europe. Effective and Democrat-
ic?, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), chapter 2 ‘Negative and positive integration’.  
18 Case C-112/05, Commission versus Germany, 23 October 2007. See on this case the short contri-
bution of Wolf-Georg Ringe, “The Volkswagen Case and the European Court of Justice”, Common 
Market Law Review, vol. 45, 2008.  
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Posting of workers from other Member States within the freedom to provide ser-
vices was put on the agenda of the European legislator after the case Rush Portu-
guesa.19 Employers from member-state A, who performed a service in another 
member-state, were allowed to bring their own workers temporarily to the other 
member-state under the labour conditions of the home state. In an economically 
diverse EU with richer and poorer countries, especially after the accession of eight 
Central and Eastern European countries to the EU, this had large consequences. 
This development lead to the posting of workers directive 96/71/EC, which al-
lowed the host member-state to impose at least the national minimum wage on 
these workers, but for many richer Member States this was not enough. On top of 
this, many self-employed from poorer countries profited from the freedom of 
establishment and they competed on price with their colleagues from richer Euro-
pean countries. Economic freedoms seemed to be given priority to social protec-
tion, as the famous cases of Viking and Laval from the end of 2007 showed.20 Col-
lective actions by trade unions were tested against the freedom of establishment in 
Viking and against the freedom to provide services in Laval. The important link in 
embedded-liberalism between free trade externally and welfare state internally was 
finally broken. Many authors protested against these radical developments. Joerges 
and Rödl talk about an EU social deficit and argue that social policies should have 
been left to the Member States.21 Holmes is of the opinion that one should re-
examine “the balance between national regulatory sovereignty and the goal of trade 
liberalization”, now that market integration within the EU “begins to bite on more 
sensitive areas”.22 The financial crisis that struck the U.S. and the western world in 
2008 also had large consequences, although these consequences came in the open 
much later. In 2011 Crouch still asked the question why neo-liberalism did not die 
after these vehement crises.23 Only in 2016 with the UK referendum on a Brexit 
and the election of president Trump in the U.S. did it become clear that the crisis 
in neoliberalism could have large consequences.  
The Treaty of Lisbon (2009) and after. Re-embedding liberalism?  
Negotiations on the new Lisbon Treaty more or less coincided with the financial 
and economic crisis that struck western countries in 2008, but that crisis did not 
have any immediate impact on the text of the new Treaty. The question has been 
                                                     
19 Case C-113/89, Rush Portuguesa [1990] ECR I-1417. 
20 Case C-438/05, Viking [2007] ECR I-10779 and case C-341/05, Laval [2007] I-11767. 
21 See especially Christian Joerges and Florian Rödl, “Informal Politics, Formalised Law and the 
‘Social Deficit’ of European integration: Reflections after the Judgements of the ECJ in Viking and 
Laval”, European Law Journal. 2009, 15:1, 1-19. 
22 Peter Holmes, “Trade and ‘domestic’ policies: the European mix”, Journal of European Public 
Policies, 13: 6 (2006), 816. 
23 Colin Crouch, The Strange Non-Death of Neoliberalism, (Cambridge: Polity press, 2011). 
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raised whether ‘Lisbon’ led to major changes in the legal order of the EU.24 Millet 
answers the question in the negative as path-dependency is more important than 
newer developments. Moreover, the Court of Justice, after Lisbon called CJEU 
instead of ECJ, does not have incentives to change its case law under the new 
Treaty.25 Less drastic changes did nonetheless happen at the level of the new Trea-
ty text with consequences of the case law of the CJEU. Article 4, paragraph 2 of 
the TEU is of interest here. In this provision the national constitutional identity of 
the Member States is, from now on, explicitly protected. This identity consists of  
the words of the provision: “their essential State functions, including ensuring the 
territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding nation-
al security”. This provision has to be operationalized by the CJEU and balanced 
against the interests of the internal market and the standards of article 2 TEU in 
which the foundational values of the Union are mentioned: “respect for human 
rights, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, including the rights of per-
sons belonging to minorities”.  
This new focus on the constitutional identity of Member StatesMember States 
is one example of re-embedding liberalism. In the earlier stage of dis-embedded 
liberalism the scope of the four economic freedoms of the internal market was 
widened as much as possible. The internal market should become as close to a 
domestic market as possible. But in this third stage important interests of the 
Member States were to be better protected than before. The German Constitu-
tional Court in its Lisbon Decision emphasized this element of constitutional iden-
tity. As in its earlier Solange decisions and the Maastricht Decision the Constitution-
al Court reiterated that the EU, as a Staatenbund, a confederation, is bound to re-
spect fundamental human rights (Solange), the principle of democracy (Maastricht 
Decision) and now the constitutional identity of the Member States. That this last 
topic is taken seriously by the CJEU as well became clear in the Omega, Sayn-
Wittgenstein and Runevic-Vardyn cases.26 The case Sayn-Wittgenstein is the most inter-
esting of the three, as that case explicitly refers to the constitution of the Republic 
of Austria in which there is a provision, article xx, that bans the bearing of nobility 
titles. The CJEU accepted this ban and this implied that a female German-born 
self-employed selling perfumes etc. to clients in Austria was not allowed to call 
herself princess (Fürstin) of Sayn-Wittgenstein in her advertising. This, although 
there was a clear link with her activity as seller of perfume. Omega concerned the 
banning in Germany of laser games for children, accepted by the CJEU on public 
interest grounds. Runevic-Vardyn dealt with spelling rules that differed between 
24 See the volume edited by Loïc Azoulai, The Question of Competence in the European Union, (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
25 François-Xavier Millet, “The Respect for National Constitutional Identity”, p. 258 in the vol-
ume mentioned in the preceding reference. 
26 Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen, [2004] ECR I-9609; case C-208/09 Sayn-Wittgenstein, [2010] I-
3696 and case C-391/09 Runevic-Vardyn, [2011] ECR I-3787.  
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Poland and Lithuania. Here the CJEU accepted the law of the land – Member 
States do not have to respect the spelling rules of another Member State.27 The 
president of the CJEU, Lenaerts, in an academic contribution admitted that “where 
the core values of the Union are not in danger, the ECJ favours ‘value diversity’”.28 
This argument presupposes that in case of a conflict between the core values of 
the EU and the core values of a Member State the CJEU might opt for the first. 
But later Lenaerts admits that the CJEU will do its best to take both EU and na-
tional interest into account. It will try to accommodate both levels.29 An open con-
flict between a Member State and the EU level is not a good thing. This will have 
to be avoided.  
Respect for the constitutional identity of the Member States is one relatively 
small element of re-embedding the internal market. More difficult is to address the 
general consequence of decades of internal market case law: an increasing ‘econo-
mization’. Many aspects are seen first and foremost through an economic lens. 
Authors submit that the case law of the CJEU is characterized by ‘some degree of 
economic bias’.30 The CJEU enables negative harmonization through the four 
economic freedoms of the Treaty in the absence of sufficient positive harmoniza-
tion through EU legislation because of a lack of competence of the EU in a specif-
ic area or the lack of sufficient votes to legislate from the Member States. Econo-
mization and de-politicization are causes of unease among large parts of the popu-
lation. William Davies, in a critical analysis of neoliberalism asks himself why eco-
nomics should be “a better analytical basis for government than other political or 
scientific forms of authority”.31 De-politicization and government by experts, use-
ful in the beginning years of the EEC, have reached their limit. Moreover, the pri-
macy of economics and the increasing role of experts in Brussels and national capi-
tals did have redistributive consequences.32 The referendum for a Brexit is an indi-
cation for the return of the primacy of politics by large parts of the population 
who felt forgotten by their own national government. Brexit itself can therefore be 
                                                     
27 Compare this case with the much older case Konstantinidis (C-168/91, ECR [1993], I-1191) in 
which Germany had to respect the Greek alphabet, in which the name was written differently than 
the German authorities did. For professional reasons related to the economic freedom of persons 
(workers) the ECJ supported the argument brought forward by Konstantinidis. 
28 Koen Lenaerts, “The Court’s Outer and Inner Selves”, Judging Europe’s Judges. The Legitimacy of 
the Case Law of the European Court of Justice (Oxford and Portland (Oregon): Hart Publishing, 2015), 60.  
29 Koen Lenaerts, ibidem. 
30 D. Leczykiewicz, “Conceptualising Conflict between the Economic and the Social in EU Law 
after Viking and Laval”, Viking, Laval and Beyond eds. M. Freedland and J. Prassl, (Oxford and Port-
land (Oregon): Hart Publishing, 2014), 234. 
31 William Davies, The Limits of Neoliberalism, (Sage, 2017), 10. 
32 See the interesting analysis by David Kennedy, A World of Struggle. How Power, Law and Expertise 
Shape Global Political Economy, (Princeton, 2016). 
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qualified as an example of re-embedding markets.33 The EU has to take this into 
account and forget about the traditional Community method. Politics matters. 
Plans for the immediate future of the EU 
Making plans for the immediate future of the EU is difficult as ideas concerning 
the end-goal of the EU still diverge in 2017. As the French President Emmanuel 
Macron in his Sorbonne lecture of 26 September 2017 focused on the need to 
‘relaunch’ European integration, because of a lack of a long-term vision and suffer-
ing from the need for unanimous decisions, he perfectly addressed the tension 
between the two. A long-term vision is impossible as long as the Member States 
disagree on this. The Dutch Prime Minister Rutte, for example, is only interested 
in practical and down-to-earth decisions and not at all in blueprints for an EU 
future.34 How to solve this dilemma? 
The European Commission White Paper on the future of Europe of March 
2017 is the first main endeavor on the future for the EU 27 after Brexit that needs 
to be discussed here. Five scenarios are given in the White Paper. None of the five 
mention legal or institutional aspects because the Commission assumes that form 
will follow the function.35 This assumption is acceptable as the scenarios are meant 
only to stimulate thinking. It is important, however not to limit oneself to the func-
tionalist logic. Scenario 1 to 5 do not seem to fit in a continuum from less to more 
integration. The first scenario, ‘Carrying on’ implies almost no change to the actual 
stage of the EU and scenario 2 ‘nothing but the single market’ is a step backwards 
and at the same time not an improvement with respect to the issues mentioned 
before. Scenario 2 will automatically imply a larger say concerning the practicalities 
of the internal market for Member States and their national courts. The scenario 
even specifically mentions border controls at the internal borders of the EU, and 
steps backwards concerning free movement of workers and services.36 Scenario 3, 
‘those who want to do more’ is a continuation of an already existing possibility of 
enhanced cooperation. In article 20 TEU a general provision deals with the possi-
bility of enhanced cooperation by a smaller number of Member States, but this is 
limited to the non-exclusive competences of the EU. Specific provisions on special 
cooperation exist for example in the areas of Common Foreign and Defense coop-
eration (article 42, paragraph 6 and article 46 TEU) and mutual recognition of 
judicial decisions in the area of criminal law (article 82, paragraph 3 TFEU), Sce-
nario 4, ‘doing less more efficiently’ focuses on implementation and enforcement 
33 See Jonathan Hopkin, “When Polanyi met Farage: Market fundamentalism, economic nation-
alism, and Britain’s exit from the European Union”, The British Journal of Politics and International Rela-
tions, 2017, 19 (3), 465-478. 
34 Speech of Emmanuel Macron, Paris, Sorbonne, 26th of September 2017. 
35 European Commission, White Paper on the Future of Europe, 2017, p. 15. 
36 European Commission, Ibidem, p. 18. 
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issues. A more efficient EU is welcomed, but in return some topics have to be 
given back to the level of the Member States. Specifically mentioned policy areas to 
return to the Member States are parts of employment policy not directly related to 
the internal market, public health and regional development. On the other hand a 
European Border and Coast Guard takes over control of the external border of the 
EU. The idea of a deal in giving some powers back to the Member States and en-
forcing other powers more effectively and efficiently at EU level is an attractive 
one. It will solve part of the problems mentioned before concerning the domi-
nance of neoliberalism. The fifth scenario, ‘doing much more together’ does not 
seem realistic at this moment in time. Scenario 3 has already been criticized by 
some Central and Eastern European countries and now also by the President of 
the European Council, Donald Tusk. He seems to have taken a position in the 
middle, no far-sights, only practical deals on a limited number of issues such as 
defense, trade deals with third countries, combatting cyber-crime, solidarity in 
climate and energy issues, a new social dimension in the EU, fiscal justice, control 
of immigration and digital revolution. This looks very much like the first scenario.  
The White Paper and the plans of President Tusk both do not refer to institu-
tional and legal issues. Nevertheless, it will be inevitable to deal with these issues in 
the near future as well. In order to end with the obsolete Community method and 
to try new roads the relationship between the EU and its Member StatesMember 
States will have to be addressed. What is the role nowadays of the Masters of the 
Treaties (Herren der Verträge) after more than sixty years of European law? Some 
authors assume that the nation state is the main problem in the EU.37 They are the 
cause of the malfunctioning of the EU at this moment. Others assume that the EU 
should stop weakening the nation state. This view is now adhered to by nobody 
less than former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair. In my view this is only possible by 
naming the EU what it actually is, not an ordinary international organization but a 
confederation, a Staatenbund. To a certain extent the Member States need to be 
protected. And they need to be able to make collective decisions in extraordinary 
situations. If Member States only disagree, there is no strong future for the EU. 
Some of the existing decision-making mechanisms need therefore to remain in 
place in the confederation.  
  
                                                     
37 See Ulrike Guérot, Warum Europa eine Republik werden muss: Eine politische Utopie, 2nd edition, 
(Piper, 2016).  
 Visions and Revisions of Europe 36 
Bibliography 
Barents, René. The Autonomy of Community Law. Alphen aan de Rijn: Kluwer, 
2004.  
Chryssochoou, Dimitris. Theorizing European Integration. London: Sage, 2001. 
European Commission, White Paper on the Future of Europe. Reflections and scenarios 
for the EU27 by 2025. COM(2017)2025 of 1st of March 2017. 
Crouch, Colin. The Strange Non-Death of Neoliberalism. (Cambridge: Polity press, 
2011. 
Davies, William. The Limits of Neoliberalism. Authority, Sovereignty and the Logic of 
Competition. London: Sage, 2017. 
Giubboni, Stefano. Social Rights and Market Freedom in the European Constitution. 
A Labour Law Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
Holmes, Peter. “Trade and ‘domestic’ policies: the European mix.” Journal of 
European Public Policies 13:6 (2006), 816.  
Hopkin, Jonathan. “When Polanyi met Farage: Market fundamentalism, eco-
nomic nationalism, and Britain’s exit from the European Union.” The British Journal 
of Politics and International Relations 19:3 (2017), 465-478. 
Ipsen, Hans-Peter. Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht in Einzelstudien, Baden-Baden, 
1984. 
Joerges, Christian and Florian Rödl. “Informal Politics, Formalised Law and 
the ‘Social Deficit’ of European Integration: Reflections after the Judgements of 
the ECJ in Viking and Laval,” European Law Journal 15:1 (2009): 1-19. 
Kennedy, David. A World of Struggle. How Power, Law and Expertise Shape Global 
Political Economy. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2016. 
Leczykiewicz, D. “Conceptualising Conflict between the Economic and the 
Social in EU Law after Viking and Laval.” In Viking, Laval and Beyond, edited by M. 
Freedland and J. Prassl, 234 and following. Oxford and Portland (Oregon): Hart 
Publishing, 2014. 
Lenaerts, Koen. “The Court’s Outer and Inner Selves: Exploring the External 
and Internal Legitimacy of the European Court of Justice.” In Judging Europe’s Judg-
es. The Legitimacy of the Case Law of the European Court of Justice, edited by Maurice 
Adams a.o., 13-60. Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart publishing, 2015. 
Macron, Emmanuel. Initiative for Europe. Sorbonne speech 26th of October 
2017. http://international.blogs.ouest-france.fr/archive/2017/09/29/macron-
sorbonne-verbatim-europe-18583.html (accessed 2 November 2017). 
Majone, Giandomenico. Europe as the Would-be World Power. The EU at Fifty. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.  
Millet, François-Xavier. “The Respect for National Constitutional Identity in 
the European Legal Space: An Approach to Federalism as Constitutionalism.” In 
The Question of Competence in the European Union, edited by Loïc Azoulai, 253-275. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. 
Voogsgeerd, The Death of the ‘Community Method’ 
 
 
37 
Polanyi, K. The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time. 
Boston MA: Beacon Press, 1944. 
Sauter Wolf and Harm Schepel. State and Market in European Union Law: the Pub-
lic and Private Spheres of the Internal market before the EU Courts. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009.  
Scharpf, Fritz. Governing in Europe. Effective and Democratic? Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1999. 
Voogsgeerd, Herman. “A reappraisal of H.P. Ipsens ‘Zweckverband’. Uniden-
tified Finality as an Essential Element of European Political Identity?”. Siegener 
Periodicum zur Internationalen Empirischen Literaturwissenschaft 21, (2002): 313-326.  
Walters, William and Jens Henrik Haahr. Governing Europe. Discourse, Governmen-
tality and European Integration. London and New York: Routledge, 2005. 
  

  
Reframing the Past? Myths, Amnesia and the Role 
of  Historians in Contemporary Europe 
Janny de Jong 
 
 
 
 
 
Where do we go from here in Europe? The academic conference “Visions and 
Revisions of Europe. Scenarios for further European integration” that took place 
in June 2017 at Jagiellonian University, Krakow, had an activist overall theme. As 
the convenors wrote in the call for papers: European citizens should act to “help 
shape, revise and create a Europe that is safe, inclusive, prosperous and, perhaps 
above all, hopeful”.1 I could not agree more, but the history of Europe has not al-
ways given reason to be optimistic and hopeful. How should we deal with that 
history? Which role might there be for historians? A “reframing of the past”, in 
other words deliberately stressing some parts and leaving out others in order to 
build positive myths, is not consistent, to put it mildly, with the professional ethics 
of the history discipline. Yet, deliberately or not, historians have indeed been in-
volved in mythmaking about European history.  
Of course there might be reason to be proud of the results of the European in-
tegration project that has resulted in many important positive developments. That 
in any case was the opinion of the Nobel Prize committee when in 2012 it decided 
to award the European Union (EU) with the Nobel Peace Prize. It praised its con-
tribution, and that of its forerunners, to the “advancement of peace and reconcilia-
tion, democracy and human rights in Europe”.2 However, in 2015 some of the 
European core values such as tolerance and diversity were put to the test when 
over one million refugees and migrants fled to Europe. In June 2016 a majority of 
51.9 % of British voters in the United Kingdom European Union referendum were 
in favour of leaving the EU, a “Brexit”. Both the refugee issue and the Brexit vote 
led to many, often heated, debates about the EU and Europe as a whole. The fi-
nancial crisis of 2007, transforming into a sovereign debt crisis in 2009 in several 
                                                     
1 “Visions and Revisions of Europe. Scenarios for further European integration”,  
https://eurocultureip.eu/scholar-conference/, accessed 27 July 2017.  
2 “The Nobel Peace Prize for 2012”. Press release 12 October 2012.  
https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2012/press.html 
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Eurozone countries, was probably the most important though. Not only because 
of its financial, economic, political and social consequences, but also because the 
legitimacy of European integration as such was being questioned.3  
Historians do not need to stand on the side-line of those contemporary de-
bates and issues in and about Europe, to the contrary. In any case it is clear that 
historians are no exception to the rule that their research is connected to the time 
in which they live.4 Key to the discipline is the ability to explain both continuity 
and change over time. It goes without saying that this might help to understand 
contemporary crises and challenges. 
What role could history and historians play in the “revision of Europe”? In the 
following I will first discuss important myths and omissions in European history 
and memory: the myth of European integration as a project of peace and the myth 
of reversing the past; the amnesia of the role of colonialism and imperialism in 
postwar Europe; and the Holocaust as a negative myth. I will then proceed by 
sketching how historians might indeed contribute to develop more understanding 
and insight where integration in Europe is heading. A key element is not to skip 
the black pages in Europe’s history: these parts in history should be remembered 
and discussed. The question is how. Another matter is if that gives reason to be 
hopeful.  
Myths and half-truths 
Indeed it is the scholar who usually provides the citizen with the mythology (or, if it sounds 
more respectable, the theory) on which he justifies his actions. (Denys Hay).5 
Denys Hay, the author of the well-known Europe: The Emergence of an Idea, first pub-
lished in 1957 and reprinted no less than 6 times, uttered in the quote above criti-
cism on how historians, himself included, actively had tried to push forward the 
European idea after the Second World War. In hindsight, writing in 1979, he 
thought this was embarrassing. Sure, he and other scholars at that time reflected 
the mood of the moment, and at a time when the first institutional developments 
took place, such as the Coal and Steel Community, the Atomic Energy Community 
and the European Economic Community, the world of western Europe indeed 
3 See for instance Philomena Murray and Michael Longo,“The Crisis-Legitimacy Nexus in the 
European Union”, In The European Union in Crisis: Explorations in Representation and Democratic Legitima-
cy, edited by Kyriakos N. Demetriou (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2015), 59–74. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-08774-0_4. Crisis in the EU is a widely discussed and researched 
issue: a simple google search with the words ‘European Union’ and ‘crisis’ produces no less than 
245.000.000 results. (Search performed on 27 December 2017).  
4 Presentism usually is considered a no go. See the debate on that issue in the 1960s and early 
1970s in Howard Schonberger. “Purposes and Ends in History: Presentism and the New Left.” The 
History Teacher 7, no. 3 (1974): 448–58. 
5 Denys Hay, “Europe Revisited: 1979”, History of European Ideas 1, no. 1 (1980): 1–6, 3. 
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was “full of itself”. Historians had even willingly been creating myths, because, as 
he put it, “the scholar as propagandist was very near the scholar as citizen”. Never-
theless he warned against biased views that were rooted in the present, and against 
searching for the roots of the European idea much further back than the 19th cen-
tury. If one would want to sketch the evolution of the European institutions and 
sentiments from the 19th century onwards, the violence that had also taken place 
ought not to be overlooked.6  
In the preceding decades, starting with the First World War, eminent histori-
ans, such as Henri Pirenne, Johan Huizinga, Benedetto Croce, Christopher Daw-
son, Werner Kaegi to name but a few, had also reflected on “Europe” precisely 
because of the times of crisis and distress they experienced.7 The anxiety about 
Europe was put forward clearly by for instance Dutch historian Johan Huizinga in 
the opening sentence of his long essay Schaduwen van morgen (In the Shadow of To-
Morrow): “We are living in a demented world. And we know it”.8 He then ex-
pressed the fear that “poor Europe” might end up in a “state of distracted stupor” 
in which its spirit was gone. Earlier, in 1933, he had articulated the same concern 
that today’s Europe was exposed to a force that “threatened her return to barba-
rism”.9 The book was an immediate best seller and translated into other languages. 
By the way the book’s reception by intellectuals and the general public both before 
and after the war demonstrates also how important the political atmosphere is: in 
the optimism of the 1960s Huizinga was presented as defeatist, not giving inspira-
tion to resist.10 
In the 1950s and 1960s the atmosphere had changed decidedly: optimism pre-
dominated about where (western) Europe was heading. Europe had overcome its 
dark past by choosing collaboration and in that way securing peace. Peace might be 
indeed the most important result on a continent that had experienced many wars, 
                                                     
6 Ibid., 6. 
7 See for an overview Stuart Woolf, “Europe and Its Historians,” Contemporary European History 
12, no. 3 (August 2003): 323–37, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0960777303001243. 
8 J. Huizinga, In de schaduwen van morgen : een diagnose van het geestelijk lijden van onzen tijd, 6e dr. 
(Haarlem: Tjeenk Willink, 1936), 1.; translation: J. Huizinga, In the Shadow of To-Morrow : A Diagnosis of 
the Spiritual Distemper of Our Time (London [etc.]: Heinemann, 1964), 1. The essay was based on a 
speech held in Brussels in 1935.  
9 The quote ran: “L’Europe d'aujourd'hui se trouve exposée à plus d'une force qui la menace 
d'un retour à la barbarie”. J. Huizinga, “Discours sur l'avenir de l'esprit européen” at the Institut 
Internationale de Coopération Intellectuelle, Paris, 1933. In: J. Huizinga, Verzamelde Werken VII. 
Geschiedwetenschap. Hedendaagsche cultuur (H.D. Tjeenk Willink & zoon, Haarlem 1950), 261-266. Quote 
on 266. Full text also available online: 
http://www.dbnl.org/tekst/huiz003gesc03_01/huiz003gesc03_01_0023.php. 2008 DBNL erven 
Johan Huizinga. Accessed December 2017. 
10 A recent study by Carla du Pree shows how influential and long-lasting the critique of espe-
cially historian Pieter Geyl was. Carla du Pree, Johan Huizinga en de bezeten wereld: de rol van publieke 
intellectueel tussen twee wereldoorlogen (Leusden: ISVW Uitgevers, 2016), 192–213.  
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destruction and tremendous losses of lives especially in the first half of the century. 
But the “Europe as a peace project” narrative definitely needs to be contextualised.  
 In the beginning a fairly limited number of European countries were involved 
in some of the new institutional structures that preceded the present European 
Union. This was less the case in the European Movement, which united federalist 
movements, and was founded in The Hague in 1948. The Council of Europe, es-
tablished in May 1949, also had the intent to represent the whole of Europe, and 
especially promoted human rights, adopting the European convention of Human 
Rights and establishing the European Court of Human Rights.11  Still “Europe” 
was geographically rather limited since it concerned mostly western Europe. Or at 
least that is how it seemed.    
At the start of the European cooperation in 1951, when Germany and France 
together with Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg started the Euro-
pean Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) with the explicit aim to create a common 
market for coal and steel, securing peace was important. Coal and steel after all 
were products that were crucial for waging war. But when we observe the geo-
graphical map of the countries that were partners in this cooperation, we also no-
tice another thing: in 1951 Algeria was an integral part of the French Republic. The 
Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950, that preceded the ECSC, included the fol-
lowing sentence: “With increased resources, Europe will be able to pursue the 
achievement of one of its essential tasks, namely the development of the African 
continent”.12 This statement is usually interpreted as a clear example of the pater-
nalism and Eurocentrism of that time. Yet there seemed also to be a commitment 
involved, because the directly preceding sentence read, “This production will be 
offered to the world as a whole without distinction or exception, with the aim of 
contributing to raising living standards and to promoting peaceful achievements”.13 
Yet, these developments clearly were projected in a colonial context, in which Af-
rican resources were to be exploited by Europe. In other words, the start of Euro-
pean integration was heavily associated with, especially French, colonial interests.14 
A clear association with all colonial possessions also formed part of the Treaty 
of Rome of 1957. The then established European Development Fund gave rise to 
more internal divergence, however. Western Germany and the Netherlands propa-
gated moving into the direction of development policies.15 That was the direction 
11 Patrick Pasture, Imagining European Unity since 1000 AD (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2015), 179-180. 
12 Chiara Bottici and Benoît Challand, Imagining Europe: Myth, Memory, and Identity (New York 
[u.a.]: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2013), 172.  
13 https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/declaration-of-9-may-1950. Accessed June 2017. 
14 Peo Hansen, and Stefan Jonsson. “Bringing Africa as a ‘Dowry to Europe’: European Integra-
tion and the Eurafrican Project, 1920–1960”, Interventions 13, no. 3 (September 2011): 443–63. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/1369801X.2011.597600. 
15 Pasteure, Imagining, 
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in which the relation with Africa would develop. Decolonisation there and in other 
parts of the world took place at different speeds, but the fate of the colonial em-
pires was sealed.  
In scholarship on (early) European integration this influence of colonial inter-
ests is usually overlooked. In recent years scholars have drawn more attention to 
these colonial ties, arguing that the perceived necessity to keep the colonial system 
was part and parcel of the start of European integration.16 Taking account of the 
colonial dimension illustrates that Europe ought to be less complacent about the 
core values it adheres to. Failing to do so leads to a half-truth.   
Colonisation and decolonisation are also important to understand the com-
plexity of issues such as migration and contemporary plural societies. In many 
West-European countries these are very closely related to their former colonial 
empires and presence overseas. The phrase “we are here because you were 
there” illustrates that link neatly. Assertive postcolonial migrants used that phrase 
for instance in the 1970s in the United Kingdom in response to anti-immigrant 
discourses and measures.  As such it was an effective way of drawing attention to 
the role of these colonial ties and especially to the responsibilities and consequenc-
es this entailed for the former colonial power.    
A more global perspective is also important for a proper understanding of how 
and why exactly previous antagonisms in Europe were overcome and dealt with. 
The importance of the military, political and economic dominance of the United 
States and the start of the Cold War in that matter can hardly be overstated. In 
June 1947 the American Secretary of State George Marshall had presented the 
European Economic Recovery plan, which would come into effect the next year. 
The Marshall plan stimulated cooperation and consultation in Europe since the 
participating states – 16 in total, including Turkey and Germany but excluding 
Spain - had to work together in the joint recovery plan.  But it also signified a 
break with the Soviet Union, which did not take part because it refused to comply 
with the American demand of the right of supervision.17 The Cold War was in-
strumental in overcoming previous antagonisms and in securing peace and collabo-
ration.  So yes, securing peace was important and played a role from the very start 
of European integration but this process entailed many elements, both European 
and global, and was less clear-cut than it might seem.  
 Yesterday’s traps 
Maybe it is relevant to go back once more to the Nobel Peace Prize of 2012.  Why 
did the Norwegian Nobel Prize committee decide unanimously to grant the EU 
this prestigious award? After all, if advancement of peace and reconciliation was 
                                                     
16 Hansen and Jonsson, “Dowry”, 461. 
17 Pasture, Imagining, 172-173. 
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the most important issue, then the moment that no less than 10 countries joined 
the EU in 2004 might have been a relevant occasion to acknowledge that a big step 
forward had been made. Or for that matter, it might also have made sense to re-
ward certain politicians for their efforts to achieve an inclusive Europe. The point 
is that the Nobel Peace Prize is often not only a reward for good deeds in the past, 
but usually it is also meant to steer some processes in a certain direction. This for 
instance was clearly the case in 2009 when American president Barack Obama 
received the award in recognition for his promotion of non-proliferation, only 
having been in office for 9 months.  Geir Lundestad, secretary of the Norwegian 
Nobel committee at that time, himself a historian, regretted the decision after-
wards, since it did not help Obama to achieve the goals of nuclear disarmament.18 
What then did the committee try to achieve or to prevent in 2012? In 2012 the 
words “crisis in the EU” referred to the problems related to the sovereign debt 
crisis, threatening the stability of Europe. The hardships that the financial crisis of 
2007 had brought to Europe and the world at large, had resulted in a growth of 
populism and nationalism in general. These new political parties and protest 
movements were mainly found on the rightist side of the political spectrum which 
brought back to memory which role the financial crisis had played in the 1930s.  
Indeed the laudatory speech directly referred to this past: 
Without this European cooperation, the result might easily have been new protec-
tionism, new nationalism, with the risk that the ground gained would be lost. 
We know from the inter-war years that this is what can happen when ordinary 
people pay the bills for a financial crisis triggered by others. But the solution now 
as then is not for the countries to act on their own at the expense of others. Nor 
for vulnerable minorities to be given the blame. 
That would lead us into yesterday’s traps. 
By referring to the 1930s the Nobel committee linked the effects of the financial 
crisis with criticism on minorities and strengthening especially rightist movements 
and parties. Recent research indicates that this assumed relation indeed exists. 
Three economists made an analysis of the effect of financial crises on voting be-
haviour and political parties. The research was based on 800 elections in 20 coun-
tries over a period of 140 years. The authors concluded that financial crises have 
significant political after effects: the support for traditional parties goes down, 
while that for rightist parties and movements goes up.  “After a crisis, voters seem 
18 Colin Freeman, “Nobel Peace Prize panellists at war over book that reveals behind-the-scenes 
rows”, The Telegraph, 2 October 2015, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/norway/11907862/Nobel-Peace-Prize-
panellists-at-war-over-book-that-reveals-behind-the-scenes-rows.html, accessed June 2017; “Nobel 
secretary regrets Obama peace prize”, BBC news,  17 September 2015, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34277960, accessed June 2017.
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to be particularly attracted to the political rhetoric of the extreme right, which of-
ten attributes blame to minorities or foreigners”.19 Furthermore the increase of 
political parties and political gridlock contributes to the slow economic recovery 
after a financial crisis. Therefore they warned financial regulators and central bank-
ers to be very careful: “Preventing financial crises also means reducing the proba-
bility of a political disaster”.20 It is an interesting example of trying to avoid less 
desirable developments based on what happened in the past.  
Today comparisons to the history of the 1930s are frequently made. Not only 
with regard to the financial crises of those years and its profound effects, but even 
more so regarding economic nationalism. The former Belgian Prime Minister Guy 
Verhofstadt, since 2009 the leader of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for 
Europe Group in the European Parliament, called nationalism in 2015 The sickness 
of Europe (and the rediscovery of the ideal). He stated that the overall idea of the Europe-
an project had been to finally send nationalism to the dustbin of history. But now, 
he saw the spectres of the past threaten Europe again, and it seemed “like we are 
catapulted back in time, to the interwar years”.21 It did not make sense to return to 
economic nationalism and protectionism because national solutions to global prob-
lems would not work. Only a stronger Europe would be able to facilitate the cul-
tural diversity, and the ideals and values. It would be a guarantee to avoid the mis-
takes of the past.  
Of course knowledge of the past plays a role in making contemporary judg-
ments and decisions. But it goes without saying that predicting the future on the 
basis of historic knowledge is impossible. A very informed historian like Mary 
Nolan, who wrote a outstanding comprehensive article on the Historikerstreit (the 
intense debate in Germany about the role of the past) for example called the Ger-
man reunification in 1988 a “dead issue”.22 Who can blame her? How was she to 
know that very soon afterwards German reunification would be taking place, if the 
Fall of the Berlin Wall and its after effects also took the leading politicians by sur-
prise. And it is an understatement to say that not everyone was pleasantly sur-
prised.  
In 1980 historian James Joll, expert in 19th and 20th century European history, 
had been quite optimistic about the future. Analysing the continuous set of military 
                                                     
19 Manuel Funke, Moritz Schularick, and Christoph Trebesch. “Going to Extremes: Politics after 
Financial Crises, 1870-2014.” European Economic Review 88 (September 2016): 227–60. 
doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2016.03.006, 227; Jeroen Dijsselbloem, “Financiële crisis leidt wel degelijk 
tot opkomst van populisme”, Het Financieele Dagblad, 14 December 2016. 
https://fd.nl/opinie/1179599/financiele-crisis-leidt-wel-degelijk-tot-opkomst-van-populisme, ac-
cessed June 2017. 
20 Funke e.a., “Extremes”,  245.  
21 Guy Verhofstadt, De ziekte van Europa: en de herontdekking van het ideaal. Amsterdam: De Bezige 
Bij, 2015, 60; See also Guy Verhofstadt, “Europa en het nationalisme”, Van der Leeuw Lecture 18 
October 2013, Groningen. http://www.vanderleeuwlezing.nl/lezingen/europa-en-het-nationalisme 
22 Nolan 
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conflicts between Germany and France in particular, his conclusion was that Eu-
ropeans had made “a genuine effort to reverse the past”.23 But he was sceptical 
about what would happen if Germany would ever be united, since its strength 
would threaten the European balance, “thus make the only form in which Europe 
might possibly unite that of a Europe under German hegemony”.24  
It was indeed this prospect that was haunting some of the leading politicians in 
1989. German Chancellor Helmut Kohl remembered Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher being particularly hostile to German unification. She undoubtedly was, 
not only because she feared the consequences of the balance of power in Western 
Europe, but also for the stability in the world. She even told the Soviet leader 
Michail Gorbatchev in September 1989 that Britain nor Western Europe wanted a 
German unification, nor was she in favour of a dissolution of the Warsaw Pact.25 
While Thatcher during a dinner at a meeting of the heads of State in Strasbourg, 8 
December 1989, referred to history saying “We beat the Germans twice, now there 
are back”, this was in fact not very different from how French president François 
Mitterand discussed the German attitude and danger of German unification in 
London during a private meeting at Downing Street no 10.26 The prospect of uni-
fication had given the Germans a kind of “mental shock” and turned them again 
into “bad Germans”: they might even gain more influence in Europe than Hitler 
ever had.27 However, the difference is that Mitterrand drew the conclusion that it 
would be “stupid to say no to reunification”, while it took longer for Thatcher to 
accept that. The last part was obviously how Mitterrand wished to remember his 
role in this history.28 France at first tried to slow down the process, but subse-
23 Joll, James. “Europe—An Historian’s View.” History of European Ideas 1, no. 1 (1980): 16.  
24 Ibid. 
25 Conversation Margaret Thatcher with Mikhail Gorbachev 23 September 1989. Extract from 
Soviet memorandum of conversation in the Gorbachev Archive, available on Margaret Thatcher Foun-
dation. https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/112005 accessed October 2017; Barbara Wesel, 
“Der Feldzug der Margaret Thatcher, ARD Tagesschau, 9-11-2009, 
http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/thatcher106.html (accessed October 2017). 
26 Carsten Volkery, “The Iron Lady’s Views on German Reunification “The Germans Are 
Back!””, Der Spiegel, 11 September 1990. Der Spiegel Online, http://www.spiegel.de
/international/europe/the-iron-lady-s-views-on-german-reunification-the-germans-are-back-a-
648364.htm. 
27 Memorandum of conversation (Margaret Thatcher & President Mitterrand) [declassified 2010] 
Secret and personal letter from C.D. Powell, private secretary to the Prime Minister, to Simon Webb 
(Ministry of Defence) 20 January 1990. 1990 Jan 20 Sa Archive (Cabinet Office). Available on 
https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/113883. Accessed December 2017.  
28 An Pyeongeok, “Obstructive All the Way? British Policy towards German Unification 1989–
90.” German Politics 15, no. 1 (March 2006): 111–21; François Mitterrand, “Of Germany and France” 
Extract from François Mitterrand, De l'Allemagne. De la France (Paris: Odile Jacob, 1996) 39-44. Avail-
able on https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2003/4/16/33ae0d5e-f55b-4476-aa6b-
549648111114/publishable_en.pdf, (accessed December 2017). 
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quently was constructive in building a stronger European structure, in that way 
ensuring that Germany would remain firmly tied to the European Community.29 
 Post Wall History: Collective Amnesia Reversed?  
The Fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union had a tre-
mendous impact on history writing, and especially on dealing with the past in the 
form of memory. It provoked a great many new studies and especially new inter-
pretations. What had been the official truth in the GDR, writes historian Tony Judt 
in Postwar, was now “discredited root and branch”.30 The Western European narra-
tive of history was challenged, Nazism after all had not been the only totalitarian 
system.31 
The difficulty of confronting a “double-burdened past” in Germany was men-
tioned by Wolgang Thierse, then president of the German Parliament, the Bundes-
tag, in a commemoration speech before the Bundestag on 27 January 2000. The 
speech was held in the presence of Elie Wiesel, Nobel Prize laureate and Ausch-
witz survivor, on accession of the Gedenkstunde (commemoration) of the German 
Bundestag related to the Day of Remembrance for the victims of National Social-
ism.32  Besides the difficulty of facing the burdened pasts, Thierse also mentioned 
the advantage that now at least a historical consciousness could be developed 
without ideological or political pressure. However, he also acknowledged that 
many Germans grew tired of memory and commemoration, who called special 
days of commemoration “empty rituals” or even a “crusade” against forgetting. 
How Memorial Days could keep their significance was therefore a matter for fur-
ther discussion. Thierse noted that indeed a lesson could be learned from history: 
that it is fatal for a democracy if the majority does not take action when foreigners 
are attacked or anti-Semitic violence takes place. Obviously referring to current 
debates he mentioned that the strength of a democracy is evidenced by how “we 
live together with people who are “foreign”, who constitute a minority, or live at 
the fringes of society”.33  
                                                     
29 Judt, Postwar, 639-643; Bozo, Frédéric. “‘I Feel More Comfortable with You’: France, the So-
viet Union, and German Reunification”, Journal of Cold War Studies 17, no. 3 (2015): 116–58. 
30 Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945, New York, NY etc.: Penguin Press, 2005. 
824. 
31 See for the role in European politics: Laure Neumayer, “Integrating the Central European 
Past into a Common Narrative: The Mobilizations Around the ‘Crimes of Communism’ in the Euro-
pean Parliament,” Journal of Contemporary European Studies 23, no. 3 (July 3, 2015): 344–63, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2014.1001825. 
32 27 January is the day that Soviet troops liberated the Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camp, 
Roman Herzog, then president of the Bundestag, had established this national day of commemora-
tion by proclamation in 1996.  In 2005 the General Assembly of the UN designated January 27 as the 
International Day of Commemoration in Memory of the Victims of the Holocaust. 
33 Wie fest das demokratische Bewusstsein in unserer Gesellschaft verankert ist, das erweist sich 
darin, wie wir mit den Menschen zusammenleben, die hier „fremd“ sind, die in der Minderheit sind 
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Naturally, coming to terms with the past because of the Holocaust was not re-
stricted to Germany. The collective amnesia that had existed in many countries, for 
instance regarding the question of how many people in fact had collaborated dur-
ing the Second World War only slowly changed into recognition. Judt pointed to 
another issue, the role that the Holocaust gained as “the very definition and guar-
antee of the continent’s restored humanity”.34    
Judt was right in this analysis, if one takes a look at how the Holocaust gained 
importance in creating a European memory. Lliljana Radonić for instance demon-
strates how post-communist memorial museums in East-Central Europe tell sto-
ries about the important but very complicated history of the 20th century: the oc-
cupation first by Nazi Germany and later by the Soviet Union, collaboration, the 
Holocaust and the accession to the European Union. She shows how “Europeani-
zation of memory” took place and points especially to the very large influence the 
Holocaust has gained as “a negative founding myth”. The example of the museum 
in Budapest is a case in point: even though there was nothing on display yet, the 
museum was opened a few weeks before Hungary’s official succession to the Eu-
ropean Union.35  
Noticing that memories and histories are not the same in Europe does not say 
much. But there is more to it than just difference; scholars have also pointed to  
how earlier established “mental maps”, especially during the Cold War, are still 
influential. Sociologist Benoît Challand for instance refers to the dominance of the 
Western European perspective: Western Europe provided not only “the right 
model to follow” in the Holocaust discussion but this dominance is also prominent 
in literature about democratization and the promotion of civil society.36  
Very prominent is the tendency to turn a negative past into something positive: 
like Thierse did in the earlier quoted speech: how to ensure that the established 
democracy remains a democracy, learning from and not forgetting the past. Ger-
many’s policy has even become a template for other countries to follow.37 In any 
case this is true for the EU as a whole, if one considers the calls in research pro-
jects on history and heritage, and policy statements on remembrance and history.   
oder an den Rand der Gesellschaft gedrängt wurden”, Speech W. Thierse, 27 January 2000, Bulletin 
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34 Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945, (New York, NY etc.: Penguin Press, 2005), 
824. 
35 Ibid., 804. Ljiljana Radonić, “Post-Communist Invocation of Europe: Memorial Museums’ 
Narratives and the Europeanization of Memory.” National Identities 19, no. 2 (April 3, 2017): 269–88. 
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European Journal of Social Theory 12, no. 3 (2009): 399–403. 
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 “The Resolution on European Conscience and Totalitarianism of 2 April 
2009” of the European Parliament for instance calls upon the Commission and 
Member states to strengthen the teaching of European history and “to underline 
the historic achievement of European integration and the stark contrast between 
the tragic past and the peaceful and democratic social order in today's European 
Union”. In the same document the wish to come to a “common view of its histo-
ry” is mentioned as a precondition to become a truly united Europe, and obvious-
ly, since this was the motivation of the resolution, history and the memory of vic-
tims of totalitarian regimes should play a key role.38 
The resolution was related to the then very recent enlargements of the EU 
with former communist states in the eastern part of Europe.  Judging from the 
quotes above it might also seem as if the European Parliament was promoting a 
single view of European history. Yet, that interpretation is not correct since it also 
explicitly stated that “official political interpretations of historical facts should not 
be imposed by means of majority decisions of parliaments”, and  “a parliament 
cannot legislate on the past”.39 The preceding joint Motion for a resolution re-
ferred directly to the historical profession: on the one hand the impossibility to 
arrive at fully objective interpretations of historical facts, but on the other hand the 
use of scientific tools by professional historians in order to study the past and “try 
to be as impartial as possible”. This document contained the provision as well that 
no political institution or party had a “monopoly on interpreting history”.40  
This statement was highly relevant since earlier established “mental maps”, es-
pecially during the Cold War, had remained influential. Sociologist Challand point-
ed for instance to the dominance of the Western European perspective: Western 
Europe provided not only “the right model to follow” in the Holocaust discussion. 
In literature about democratization and the promotion of civil society the Western 
perspective dominated as well.41 Yet more and more recognition was gained for 
different memories of the past in Eastern Europe, especially for what Stalinism 
had meant.  
The 2009 resolution of the EP was the culmination of previous ones on for in-
stance European memory, the future of Europe sixty years after the Second World 
War, the Holocaust, Victims of Stalinism and Nazism, to name but a few. The 
European Parliament’s expressed ideas were in line with views of the European 
Commission and Council on this matter. In other words, one could speak of a 
                                                     
38 “European Parliament resolution of 2 April 2009 on European conscience and 
totalitarianism”, P6_TA(2009)0213. http://www.europarl.europa.eu. 
39 Ibid.  
40 “Joint Motion for a resolution”, 30 March 2009. RC-B6-0165/2009, http://www.europarl.
europa.eu, (accessed October 2017).  
41 Benoît Challand, “1989, Contested Memories and the Shifting Cognitive Maps of Europe,” 
European Journal of Social Theory 12, no. 3 (2009): 399–403. 
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genuine European Union remembrance policy.42 Remarkably, in those earlier 
statements the terms memory and remembrance were used far more often than 
history.43 
Yet the term remembrance policy does not mean that there necessarily exists a 
common understanding about what constitutes a genuine “European” memory. 
Overcoming the tensions between the various national memories has proven to be 
difficult. Since memory plays a crucial role in identity construction, it has im-
portant political connotations. Hence also constructivist scholars in international 
relations are addressing this field more and more.44  
The European remembrance policy was apparent in various projects aiming to 
find common ground. This contained attempts to construct a broad encompassing 
historical narrative. Examples are the “Active European Remembrance Pro-
gramme which was Action 4 of the Citizenship Programme 2007-201345 and the 
New Narrative for Europe as part of Cultural Heritage.46    
The House of European History museum in Brussels, that opened its doors in 
May 2017, had a comparable intention. Since in 2007 the president of the Europe-
an Parliament proposed its establishment, the project underwent important chang-
es; most important perhaps is the decision to devote less space in the museum to 
European integration, since this element had drawn public criticism. The museum 
focuses on the 19th and 20th century. Visiting the museum in October 2017, I 
thought the museum tried to give a balanced and nuanced view of European histo-
ry, in which the “black pages” in history, such as colonialism and racism, were not 
forgotten. The idea, according to Andrea Mork, coordinator for the permanent 
exhibition since 2011, was to give multiple perspectives, showing “diversity, con-
                                                     
42 Markus J. Prutsch, European Historical Memory: Policies, Challenges and Perspectives. Policy Depart-
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trasts and contradictions”.47 Wolfram Kaiser, who recently analysed the develop-
ment of this museum project under the telling title “limits of cultural engineering” 
is rather critical about the end result.48  He especially regrets the prominent space 
for Eastern European memory culture since other forms of  fragmentation, such 
as between the ‘core’ and various peripheries in Europe and the EU were omit-
ted.49  
One of the recent calls of the European Commission about history is called 
Improving mutual understanding among Europeans by working through troubled pasts.50  To 
quote:  
 
Of particular importance is to survey and investigate comparatively how discourses 
in civil society and the media, including social and digital media, are informed by 
such legacies, [troubled pasts, JdJ] and how in turn civil society and the media con-
duct such discourses. Research needs to unearth how national narratives are influ-
enced by difficult pasts and how civil society, politics and the media constructed 
discourses, and which factors and acts such as commemorations, apology, reconcil-
iations, reparations but also non-action informed both the construction and the 
evolution of such narratives. (…) Of interest are also discourses in the profession 
of historians in the post-war/post-authoritarian period and how they might have 
evolved over time.  
 
These kind of calls have also drawn criticism, because it might lead to overly posi-
tive studies about the EU.51 Indeed in the project above there was also a political 
aim involved: gaining more knowledge on the significance and impact of com-
memoration and how public discourses might affect civil societies. But this does 
not necessarily make the research biased by definition.  
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cating World War I, IFa edition Culture and Foreign Policy. Edgar Wolfrum a.o. eds., (2014), 233, 
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48 Wolfram Kaiser, “Limits of Cultural Engineering: Actors and Narratives in the European Par-
liament’s House of European History Project,” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 55, no. 3 
(2017): 518–34. 
49 Ibid., 534.  
50 Horizon 2020, work programme 2016-2017, Pillar Societal challenges, Europe in a changing 
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Research into the “troubled past” and the discourses about it remains highly 
relevant. The earlier narrative of Europe as a project of peace was naïve. There are 
so many radical differences in the national and regional perception of the war that 
European history and memory remain divided.52 Stressing only the differences, 
however, is also getting it wrong. When Joll discussed the possibility in 1979 that 
the Cold War might come to an end, he stated:   
If the Iron Curtain were to be torn down, then we would begin to realize how 
much of eastern Europe, and even Russia itself shared a common European tradi-
tion and how it does not really make sense, historically at least, to talk of a Europe 
which does not include Konigsberg and Cracow, Breslau and Budapest, or even 
for that matter Goethe’s Weimar.53 
At that time the western and eastern part of Europe indeed seemed worlds apart 
and Joll was right in pointing to the many ties and traditions that have existed and 
were overlooked during the Cold War. Today it seems as if the opposite is the 
case. It is perfectly possible to discuss both: what binds and what keeps apart.  
Political scientist Jan-Werner Müller points to two options regarding the possi-
bility to arrive at a European memory: either a commitment by European nations 
to work through the past, in other words similar ways to deal with the different 
pasts, or a genuinely shared European memory with similar contents and not just 
shared practices. The last option seems simply impossible. Not only because their 
pasts are different, but also because it would hardly lead to more agreement.54 The 
dividedness does not need to be a problem. I agree with sociologist Gerard Delan-
ty who suggests to focus on comparative analyses, since the European cultural 
heritage is formed ‘out of the entanglements of different memories” both within 
Europe and outside.55 But maybe it would be a bigger problem if European 
memory would seem to have a similar content. It could never be a historically cor-
rect version.   
Many myths have been constructed about European history and the European 
integration project. The tendency to make new versions of recent history is always 
there, because every country has parts in its history it would rather like to forget. 
Judt already in 1992 noted that Europe after 1989 was “being built upon historical 
sands at least as shifting in nature as those upon which the post-war edifice was 
52 Ibid. 61. 
53 ibid.18. 
54 Jan Werner Müller, “On “European Memory” Some Conceptual and Normative Remarks” in 
Małgorzata Pakier and Bo Stråth, A European Memory? : Contested Histories and Politics of Remembrance, 
Studies in Contemporary European History ; Volume 6; Studies in Contemporary European History ; 
Volume 6. (New York : Berghahn Books, 2010), 27. 
55 Gerard Delanty, The European Heritage: A Critical Re-Interpretation (Milton Park, Abingdon, Ox-
on ; New York, NY: Routledge, 2018), 16. 
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mounted”.56 References to the past have often been and still are problematic and 
even irresponsible. If anywhere, here lies a special task for historical researchers to 
check and if necessary “speak truth to power”.57  
Conclusion 
Historians might indeed help “shape, revise and create a Europe that is safe, inclu-
sive, prosperous and, perhaps above all, hopeful” by constructing balanced and 
nuanced histories. Especially in the 1950s and 1960s writing about European inte-
gration or about common European values and civilisation, there was a tendency 
by those writing about European history to overlook the parts that did not fit in 
the positive “peace” narrative. This in the end is doing a disservice.  
Of course research on what European peoples have had and still have in 
common is perfectly legitimate and important.  Let us not forget that in Europe 
there are many similarities and common elements as well. Historians should not be 
naïve and be aware of the political importance of their work, without letting this 
knowledge guide their research. In other words, it remains important to speak 
“truth to power”.  The point is that it is not possible to go forward without a 
proper view on what has been going on in the past.  Historians therefore are badly 
needed.  
As Jo Guildi and David Armitage argue in their History Manifesto: “The sword 
of history has two edges, one that cuts open new possibilities in the future, and 
one that cuts through the noise, contradictions, and lies of the past”.58  My inten-
tion was to deconstruct and contextualise some of these lies and myths of the past, 
and to indicate where alternative approaches or perceptions might be of use. And 
yes, this ‘cutting open’ of new possibilities in the future of course does entail hope.  
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Introduction 
A great body of literature coincides with the relevance of political support and 
particularly, trust in state institutions for a healthy and working democracy. But, at 
the same time, processes such as cognitive mobilization, increasing political effica-
cy on the citizens’ side, alongside with poor economic and political performance 
on the side of those in office, have had as a consequence a generalized decline of 
institutional trust in western democracies.  
Citizens’ support for political systems, and particularly, trust in institutions is a 
key element for a working democracy1 in the sense that strong political trust also 
contributes to a structured and stable system of voting2, and it reinforces citizens' 
compliance with norms and duties towards society.3  
Due to the financial and economic crisis affecting Europe and the world, trust 
in institutions in European societies has suffered a strong decline since 2008. In 
some cases, this decline of trust in public institutions has been identified as one of 
the most evident and shared symptoms of the crisis, moving beyond the economic 
sphere and becoming a legitimacy issue, particularly in those contexts where the 
crisis has been particularly severe.  
The main aim of this article is to answer to the following questions: a) To what 
extent have the levels of trust in political institutions in European democracies 
changed during the financial and economic crisis? b) Do levels of trust in institu-
                                                     
1 Hofferbert and Klingemann, “Remembering the Bad Old Days: Human Rights, Economic 
Conditions and Democratic Performance in Transitional Regimes.” 
2 Zmerli and Hooghe, Political Trust. Why Context Matters. 
3 Rudolph and Evans, “Political Trust, Ideology, and Public Support for Government 
Spending.” 
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tions show relevant variations over time? c) Has the crisis caused the same reaction 
among European citizens in countries affected differently by the crisis? and d) 
Does trust in public institutions rely on the same factors during the crisis? 
Studying trust in political institutions is highly relevant to studying democracy, 
in the sense that it is crucial when analysing the circumstances in which trust in 
political institutions is under threat and which aspects may be endangering the 
success of the relationship between citizens and their institutions and democratic 
governance. Analysing those elements affecting trust in institutions in comparative 
terms and over time is also relevant. 
Thus, we have studied a number of European democracies hit by the financial 
and economic crisis in different ways. Trust in political institutions is analysed 
using three time periods: 2008, 2010 and 2012. This allows us to assess citizens' 
trust in public institutions in different European economic contexts.  
The article is structured as follows: first the theoretical framework and hypoth-
eses are introduced. Then, the results are presented followed by an analysis of the 
predictors on trust in institutions. Finally, conclusions are derived from the results. 
Trust in institutions, relevance and consequences of decline 
Political trust is defined as a “basic evaluative orientation toward the government, 
founded on how well the government is operating according to people´s normative 
expectations”.4 Political trust is therefore considered an orientation towards State 
institutions and incumbents, which is based on performance and expectations on 
performance and good will by those in office. In this sense, trust in institutions 
refers not only to legitimate power (e.g., in the parliament), authority (e.g., in the 
government), or the economy (e.g., in the mode of production), but also to proce-
dures and basic practices.  
As mentioned above, literature provides quite a number of explanations for the 
decline of trust in institutions.5 Cognitive mobilization and citizens' higher level of 
sophistication and political efficacy, in terms of information, interest in politics and 
educational level 6 are in the core of those individual transformations due to mod-
ernization, democratization and massive access to education in westerns societies. 
These sophisticated, or critical citizens7 would tend to have higher expectations of 
4 Hetherington, “The Political Relevance of Political Trust,” 791. 
5 Zmerli and Hooghe, Political Trust. Why Context Matters; Bowler and Karp, “Politicians, 
Scandals, and Trust in Government”; Newton, “Political Support: Social Capital, Civil Society, and 
Political and Economic Performance”; Rudolph and Evans, “Political Trust, Ideology, and Public 
Support for Government Spending”; Hetherington, “The Political Relevance of Political Trust”; 
Hetherington, Why Trust Matters: Declining Political Trust and the Demise of American Liberalism. 
6 Klingemann, Klingemann, H. D. (1998). Mapping Political Support in the 1990s. A Global Analysis; 
Norris, Critical Citizens. Global Support for Democratic Governance. 
7 Ibid. 
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their government, but this would not mean any danger or damage in their support 
for democratic principles.8  
Policy performance seems to be at the core of some explanations regarding 
lower levels of political trust, such as poor economic or political performance, 
scandals or failed expectations.9 In this sense, economic performance and econom-
ic outcomes are the main dimensions of policy performance when it comes to trust 
in institutions.  
Hetherington explains the important role of citizens’ material sacrifices in or-
der to explain a decreasing trust in institutions.10 Failed expectations combined 
with those personal material sacrifices and grievances significantly affect institu-
tional trust.11 
Predictors for trust in political institutions 
As pointed out above, several factors lead to a generalized decline in trusting polit-
ical institutions, and this has been widely studied, particularly in advanced western 
democracies. Taking this as a starting point, we aim to study this phenomenon in 
the context of Europe, during a specific time period when the recent financial 
crisis had a clear impact. One aim of the article is to analyse the levels of trust in 
institutions and trends in trust during a relevant period of financial crisis. We also 
examine how trust in institutions is affected by relevant explanatory factors, and 
take into account that the recession has affected European countries in different 
ways. Trust in institutions, understood to be a clear measure of public support, is 
expected to rely on a set of correlates measuring citizens´ opinions and attitudes, 
observed at different points in time. The effect of these variations and variables 
across time are expected to differ significantly, depending on how the crisis has 
affected citizens in different countries. 
Economic satisfaction is one of the first factors to be taken into account when 
analysing trust in political institutions. According to several authors12, political trust 
                                                     
8 Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life; Easton, “A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political 
Support”; Newton, “Political Support: Social Capital, Civil Society, and Political and Economic 
Performance”; Zmerli and Hooghe, Political Trust. Why Context Matters. 
9 Levi and Stoker, “Political Trust and Trustworthiness”; Criado and Herreros, “Political 
Support. Taking into Account the Institutional Context”; Miller, “Political Issues and Trust in 
Government: 1964-1970.” 
10 Why Trust Matters: Declining Political Trust and the Demise of American Liberalism. 
11 Kinder and Kiewiet, “Economic Discontent and Political Behavior: The Role of Personal 
Grievances and Collective Economic Judgments in Congressional Voting,” 497. 
12 Cohen, “Economic Perceptions and Executive Approval in Comparative Perspective”; 
Anderson and Guillory, “Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy: A Cross-National 
Analysis of Consensus and Majoritarian Systems”; Listhaug, “The Dynamics of Trust in Politicians”; 
Hofferbert and Klingemann, “Remembering the Bad Old Days: Human Rights, Economic 
Conditions and Democratic Performance in Transitional Regimes.”; Rohrschneider, Learning 
Democracy: Democratic and Economic Values in Unified Germany; Mishler and Rose, “What Are The Origins 
of Political Trust? Testing Institutional and Cultural Theories in Post-Communist Societies.” 
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is likely to strongly rely on satisfaction with economic and personal performance, 
based on personal experiences and an evaluation of each individual situation. 
When evaluating their own personal situation, (mainly economic situation), indi-
viduals tend to articulate their judgements and trust towards institutions.  As a 
consequence, a positive personal situation would be expected to have a positive 
effect on trust in institutions, whereas a negative personal situation would tend to 
decrease trust.   
Short-term government performance is also considered a relevant factor in ex-
plaining institutional trust. According to Anderson and Guillory13 and Anderson 
and Tverdova14, institutional trust can be predicted by the degree to which citizens 
participate in the electoral process through voting, and the level of agreement with 
election results. In addition, satisfaction with the performance of the incumbent in 
government would tend to increase institutional trust.  
According to the literature, long-term factors, understood as lasting aspects 
that persist in a society, are key explanatory factors for institutional trust. These 
persistent elements are considered an outcome of religious tradition, history, and 
the values on which the state and political system have been established. They 
shape the relationship between individuals and their political system, and therefore 
shape trust in state institutions. These factors determine a set of values and atti-
tudes shared by the citizenry, and are perceivable through the way citizens establish 
their views of political community, regime and authorities. These shared aspects, 
transmitted and learnt through socialization, are established in society over time. In 
this regard, there are several cultural elements inherent in political systems, both 
formal and informal. These can be identified as long-term characteristics, since 
these factors establish culture and values in a country’s constitution, or the so 
called “Constitution in Operation”.15 Generalized trust is a very important factor in 
this explanation.16 It refers to the extended trust people have in others who they 
do not necessarily know, and measures the trusting links in a society beyond family 
ties.  
Other key indicators of the long-term explanation are political efficacy, meas-
ured in this article by interest in politics17, and life satisfaction18 among others.  
13 “Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy: A Cross-National Analysis of 
Consensus and Majoritarian Systems.” 
14 “Winners, Losers, and Attitudes about Government in Contemporary Democracies.” 
15 Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life. 
16 Delhey and Newton, “Who Trusts? The Origins of Social Trust in Seven Societies.” 
17 Craig, Niemi, and Silver, “Political Efficacy and Trust: A Report on the NES Pilot Study 
Items”; Niemi, Craig, and Mattei, “Measuring Internal Political Efficacy in the 1988 National 
Election Study”; Finkel, “Reciprocal Effects of Participation and Political Efficacy: A Panel 
Analysis”; Gabriel, “The Impact of Values.” 
18 Inglehart and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy: The Human Development 
Sequence. 
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Control variables such as gender, age, level of education and ideology are in-
cluded in the analysis. Age is considered a relevant factor in terms of political atti-
tudes, where young people are more susceptible to political change as they have 
less experience of a specific political system.19 Education also plays a central role in 
explaining political trust, as it is part of the winner-loser theory.20 According to this 
theory, the better educated, the more satisfied, and the wealthier tend to have 
higher levels of trust in people and institutions due to their successful life experi-
ences. Ideology, measured as self-placement on a left-right political scale, is related 
to institutional trust in terms of group-related beliefs or particular group interests. 
In addition, in some European democracies, the extreme right and the extreme left 
may represent a profoundly dissatisfied group since they feel their demands are 
almost never fulfilled.21 
Hypotheses 
The main claim is that individual levels of institutional trust, expressed as a latent 
variable, have changed over time as a consequence of the economic crisis. Factors 
affecting trust in institutions are also analysed. We hypothesize that correlates of 
trust in institutions differ significantly across European countries, depending on 
the level of impact the financial crisis has had on each country. 
The first hypothesis contends that the levels of trust in political institutions are 
expected to be significantly lower in those countries most affected by the econom-
ic crisis (H1). The literature explains how evaluation of performance may affect 
trust in institutions. Taking this into account, we expect that those citizens most 
affected by the crisis will evaluate the political and economic performance of their 
governments more poorly, and therefore, trust in their institutions will tend to be 
lower.22 
The second hypothesis relates to the effect of economic crisis and trust in in-
stitutions over time. It is expected that levels of trust in institutions will tend to 
decrease over time, due to the effect of the crisis in all countries, although those 
countries most affected by the crisis will have a sharper decline (H2). 
Moreover, we expect that the correlates for trust in political institutions will 
not be constant over time, and that the changing context significantly affects this 
19 Dalton, Democratic Challenges: Democratic Choice: The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced 
Industrial Democracies, 483. 
20 Zmerli and Newton, “Social Trust and Attitudes toward Democracy.” 
21 Lubbers and Scheepers, “Explanations of Political Euro-Skepticism at the Individual, Regional 
and National Levels.” 
22 Weatherford, “How Does Government Performance Influence Political Support?”; Citrin, 
“Comment: The Political Relevance of Trust in Government”; Anderson and Guillory, “Political 
Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy: A Cross-National Analysis of Consensus and 
Majoritarian Systems.” 
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variation (H3). Consequently, the changing context and the situation of crisis over 
time would therefore lead to unequal levels of trust in institutions.23 
Furthermore, we argue that there are significant differences in the effect of ex-
planatory factors as a consequence of an unequal impact of the crisis on countries 
(H4). We expect predictors to affect trust in institutions differently, depending on 
the depth of the financial crisis. Short-term correlates would therefore have a 
stronger effect on trust in institutions when the economic crisis is more acute, and 
long-term correlates would tend to have stronger effects if the economic crisis is 
less acute. 
Data and methods 
Firstly, multiple group confirmatory factor analysis (MGCFA) and invariance test-
ing are explained. Finally, a measurement of the predictive variables for trust in 
political institutions is described. 
In our analyses we use European Social Survey (ESS) data, for three different 
time periods (2008, 2010 and 2012) and eight countries (Germany, Netherlands, 
Sweden, Norway, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain). The data is used to test the 
hypotheses related to trust in political institutions. Table 1 shows the sample size 
used in each period and country. 
Table 1:  Sample size for each country and period 
2008 2010 2012 
Germany 2744 3015 2954 
Netherlands 1775 1821 1843 
Sweden 1828 1489 1843 
Norway 1546 1544 1615 
Greece 2066 2703 N/A 
Ireland 1763 2542 2594 
Portugal 2342 2136 2136 
Spain 2554 1877 1874 
The countries selected have been differently affected by the economic crisis during 
the period studied. Although all European countries have been affected by the 
economic crisis, there is a significant difference in severity of the crisis in Ireland, 
Greece, Portugal and Spain. These countries have stronger austerity measures and 
23 Hetherington, Why Trust Matters: Declining Political Trust and the Demise of American Liberalism. 
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significantly higher unemployment rates than other European countries such as 
Germany, the Netherlands, Norway or Sweden. 
Multiple Group Confirmatory Factor Analysis   
Multiple group confirmatory factor analysis -MGCFA- 24 is generally used for 
cross-cultural comparison in order to test if a latent variable of interest is compa-
rable across groups, countries and/or years, and takes measurement invariance into 
account. In the case invariance holds, relationships and/or means of the latent 
constructs can be compared across groups (countries and time periods).  
Thus, trust in political institutions will be measured as a latent factor with three 
reflective indicators, using structural equation modelling, SEM.25 A specific SEM 
model, known as confirmatory factor analysis -CFA- 26 is used to estimate the 
measurement model, shown in a generalized form in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Generalization of CFA model 
 
 
Where yi’s are three observed indicators, τi is the intercept of each of the three 
observed indicators, j is the latent variable, ij is the factor loading or slope from 
the j latent variable to the yi observed indicator and ei is a random measurement 
error for the responses for each of the three indicators. Covariances between the 
                                                     
24 Bollen, Structural Equations with Latent Variables; Ariel and Davidov, “Assessment of 
Measurement Equivalence with Cross-National and Longitudinal Surveys in Political Science”; 
Davidov, Schmidt, and Billiet, Cross-Cultural Analysis: Methods and Applications; Meredith, 
“Measurement Invariance, Factor Analysis and Factorial Invariance”; Steenkamp and Baumgartner, 
“Assessing Measurement Invariance in Cross-National Consumer Research”; Cieciuch et al., “The 
Cross-National Invariance Properties of a New Scale to Measure 19 Basic Human Values: A Test 
Across Eight Countries”; Davidov et al., “Measurement Equivalence in Cross-National Research.” 
25 Bollen, Structural Equations with Latent Variables; Kline, Principles and Practice of Structural Equation 
Modeling. 
26 Brown, Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Applied Research. 
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latent variable (i) and the error variance (ei) or among the error variances them-
selves are constrained to zero.  
The estimation of each observed variables is based on the general equation: 
yi= τi+ijj + ei          (1) 
which in this case can be decomposed into the following three equations for 
each of the two factors: 
y1= τ1 + 111 + e1 (2) 
y2= τ2 + 211 + e2 (3) 
y3= τ3 + 311 + e3 (4) 
where y1, y2 and y3 stand for the three indicators. 
In this article these indicators are obtained from the ESS questionnaire using the 
specific question: “on a score of 0-10 how much do you personally trust each of 
the institutions? 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you 
have complete trust”. The institutions are the country’s parliament (namely ‘trust in 
parliament’), the legal system (namely ‘trust in the legal system’), and politicians 
(namely ‘trust in politicians). Each of these three institutions represents a different 
type of political institution. Parliament generally represents the classic institution of 
state representation; the legal system accounts for effective rights and public sector 
performance; and politicians represent the articulation of people´s ideas and op-
tions in the political sphere through political organizations. Thus, these three indi-
cators are used in the MGCFA model with ‘trust in political institutions’ as a latent 
variable (see Figure 1). 
By establishing measurement invariance, we can draw meaningful comparisons 
of the latent means and detect the effects predictor variables have on the latent 
construct of interest, at the same time ensuring that the latent construct has the 
same meaning and scaling across groups (regions and/or time periods). When 
using MGCFA analysis, three hierarchical levels of measurement invariance - con-
figural, metric and scalar- 27 are generally tested. Thus, invariance across groups can 
be studied. 
In the case that a small number of groups are analysed, MGCFA can be used 
adequately, but when many groups are involved, it becomes difficult to manage 
and can prove problematic 28 as it requires many manual adjustments to the model 
specification. Fit indices, expected parameter changes, or modification indices for 
each previous model all have to be taken into consideration. In these cases, strict 
27 Davidov et al., “Measurement Equivalence in Cross-National Research.” 
28 Asparouhov and Muthén, “Multiple Group Factor Analysis Alignment”; Muthen and 
Asparouhov, “New Methods for the Study of Measurement Invariance with Many Groups.” 
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or even partial invariance is often not sufficient and some information regarding 
groups is generally taken out of the analysis. This inhibits analysing all groups of 
interest, and so the comparison has to be done with fewer groups. 
Predictive variables for trust in political institutions  
The effect of theoretically studied factors on trust in political institutions is also 
evaluated. Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) will be carried out in order to 
identify significant factors effecting trust in political institutions over time in dif-
ferent countries. In order to study those significant causal relationships on trust in 
political institutions, factor scores for the latent variable trust in political institu-
tions will be computed and used as a dependent variable. 
The measurement for the predictive factors is the same for each time period 
and country. The variable ‘Trust in others’ is posed as: “Generally speaking, would 
you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful when deal-
ing with people? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means ‘you can't be 
too careful’ and 10 means that ‘most people can be trusted’. ‘Satisfaction with life’ is 
asked as: “On the whole, how satisfied are you with your life in general?”, on a 
score of 0 (completely dissatisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied). Variables related to 
evaluation of performance are ‘satisfaction with country’s economic situation’ (“On the 
whole how satisfied are you with the present state of the economy in [country]?”), 
asked on a score of 0 (completely dissatisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied) and ‘satis-
faction with government’ (“Now thinking about the [country] government, how satis-
fied are you with the way it is doing its job?”), asked on a score of 0 (completely 
dissatisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied). Variables related to politics are ‘interest in 
politics’ (“How interested are you in politics?”) asked in four categories (Not at all 
interested; barely interested, quite interested; very interested); whether citizens voted 
or not in the last elections [vote] and their ‘political ideology’ (“In politics people 
sometimes talk of “left” and “right”. Where would you place yourself on this 
scale?; where 0 means on the left and 10 means on the right”). This variable is 
measured using a left-right scale. Control variables such as age (5 categories of age 
from 15-29 years old; 30-44 years old; 45-59 years old; 60-74 years old; and over 75 
years old), gender and level of education (4 categories from ‘Less than lower secondary 
education; Lower secondary education completed; Upper and post secondary edu-
cation completed; and tertiary education completed’).  
Results 
This section shows the factor means using the alignment method for the 23 groups 
analysed. In order to draw a comparison with the traditionally used MGCFA, a 
MGCFA is also carried out for the 23 groups, and factor means for both methods 
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compared. Finally, results show the trend and the effect of the predictive variables 
for trust in political institutions for each country in 2008, 2010 and 2012. 
Table 2 and Figure 2 show the results of the factor means of trust in institu-
tions, estimated using the alignment method for all eight countries, in three time 
periods. Results show that Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and Norway pre-
sent the highest levels of trust in institutions, whereas Greece, Ireland, Portugal 
and Spain show the lowest. This suggests that those countries less affected by the 
financial crisis show higher levels of trust in institutions, supporting H1.  
Table 2. Results for Factor Trust in Political Institutions 
Ranking Country Year Alignment scores MGCFA scores 
1 Norway 2012 0,623 1,777 
2 Norway 2010 0,507 1,561 
3 Sweden 2010 0,545 1,732 
4 Sweden 2012 0,375 1,387 
5 Norway 2008 0,348 1,251 
6 Sweden 2008 0,281 1,205 
7 Netherlands 2008 0,202 0,951 
8 Netherlands 2012 0,155 0,761 
9 Netherlands 2010 0,143 0,815 
10 Germany 2012 -0,182 0,217 
11 Germany 2008 -0,296 0 
12 Germany 2010 -0,431 -0,317
13 Spain 2008 -0,491 -0,242
14 Ireland 2010 -0,576 -0,456
15 Ireland 2008 -0,641 -0,388
16 Ireland 2012 -0,649 -0,55
17 Greece 2008 -0,786 -0,92
18 Spain 2010 -0,797 -1,028
19 Portugal 2008 -1,117 -1,342
20 Spain 2012 -1,236 -2,143
21 Portugal 2010 -1,365 -1,686
22 Portugal 2012 -1,450 -1,988
23 Greece 2010 -1,484 -2,511
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Figure 2. Levels of trust by country and year 
 
Furthermore, trust in political institutions in Norway increases over time (as it does 
in Sweden between 2008 and 2012), before returning to the level it initially had in 
2012. The Netherlands shows stable trends, and Germany a slight decrease in 
2010, with levels of trust increasing sharply in 2012. Conversely Greece, Spain, and 
Portugal show a clear decrease in their levels of trust in institutions between 2008 
and 2012 and Ireland a slight decrease. These data reflect the fact that the countries 
most affected by the crisis show lower levels of institutional trust, and that levels 
of trust continue to decrease as the economic crisis continues in these countries. 
Thus, these results support H2. 
Predictors for trust in political institutions 
Trust in political institutions is first analysed, then its predictors are studied. In this 
case, the interest is to study the effect of theoretically related factors (voting behav-
iour, interest in politics, satisfaction with life, age, and gender, among others) on 
trust in political institutions over across time for eight European countries. 
From the results of the analysis in Table 3 we can see how predictive variables 
have different effects on trust in institutions, depending on the country and also 
across time. The first three independent variables in Table 3 (interpersonal trust, 
life satisfaction and interest in politics) refer to the long-term explanatory factors. 
Satisfaction with economy and satisfaction with government are variables which 
respond to short-term factors based on the evaluation of political and economic 
performance. Voting corresponds to people's participation in the political process 
and ideology, age, gender and education are included as control variables.  
Interpersonal trust is a relevant correlate in all countries, particularly in those 
less affected by the economic crisis, showing stronger positive effects than in those 
countries more affected. Along the same lines, political efficacy, measured by the 
interest shown in politics, has a stronger effect in the countries less affected by the 
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financial crisis. In those countries where the economic and financial crisis has been 
more acute, the effect of political efficacy is weaker, and also decreases over time. 
A third group of predictive variables are called long-term aspects, for instance, life 
satisfaction, which measures the overall satisfaction with living conditions. Data 
show that life satisfaction is not a relevant factor, except for some countries, in 
some time periods. However, this effect disappears as the crisis worsens.  
Satisfaction with the economy is a clear relevant measure of evaluation of per-
formance. This measurement is low to begin with in those countries less affected 
by the economic crisis, even being non-significant in countries like Germany or the 
Netherlands initially. As the crisis deepens, these evaluations turn into significant 
predictors, although they are weak. In those countries where the economic crisis 
was more serious, short-term evaluations of economic performance have a strong-
er and more significant effect, increasing with time in countries such as Spain and 
Ireland. 
Satisfaction with political performance, measured by the variable of satisfaction 
with the performance of government, shows a strong and stable effect in all coun-
tries. There is practically no difference whether they have been affected by the 
crisis or not.  
Voting in the election is included in the analysis in order to measure whether 
individuals participate in the political process, or whether, to the contrary, they feel 
alienated from it. In those countries less affected by the crisis, direct participation 
in elections through voting has a positive effect on trust in institutions, with the 
exception of Sweden, and in part, the Netherlands, where it is not shown to be 
significant. In Greece and Spain it is only significant in the first years. 
In terms of the effect of the ideological position on trust in institutions, those 
who are more right-wing show a higher level of trust in institutions in most coun-
tries. The only exception to this pattern is Spain in 2012. This is probably due to 
the change of Government in 2011, when left-wing citizens were more critical with 
institutions in order to punish a government led by the conservative People´s par-
ty.  
Control variables only seem to be significant in those countries less affected by 
the economic crisis. Age has a negative effect in Germany, the Netherlands Swe-
den and Norway, which means that people lose trust in institutions as they age. 
However this variable is not significant in those countries more affected by the 
crisis, with the exception of Greece, where the pattern is reversed. In Greece, 
younger people distrust institutions more, most likely because younger generations 
have felt particularly deprived and frustrated as a result of the crisis. Gender has 
practically no effect, and education has a positive effect, although it is rather weak. 
This is mostly in those countries less affected by the crisis, with the exception of 
Portugal and Ireland. The positive effect of education confirms winner loser theo-
ry, which claims that those who are better educated and better located in the socio-
Coromina/Bartolomé-Peral, Has the Economic Crisis Eroded Trust?  
 
 
69 
economic spectrum tend to be more trusting, because being successful in society 
makes them trusting.29 
From these results we can also confirm Hypothesis 3, which claims that the ef-
fect of correlates shows no constant pattern over time. We assert that the changing 
context of economic crisis over the periods analysed have reshaped the effect of 
correlates on trust in institutions. According to this hypothesis, trust in institutions 
is explained differently in situations of economic crisis. 
Hypothesis 4, which predicts significant differences in the effect of explanatory 
factors as a consequence of the impact of the crisis on countries being unequal, is 
also confirmed by the analyses, as shown in the results. The effects of both long 
and short-term factors shape institutional trust differently, depending on the extent 
to which the country observed has been affected by the economic crisis. 
 
Table 3: Estimates for trust in political institutions  
 
  Germany  Netherlands  Sweden 
 2008 2010        2012        …
       
2008 2010 2012 … 2008 2010 2012  
Trust in others .17** .16** .20**     .15** .21** .20**  .28** .20** .19**  
Sat. with life .01 .03 -.02  -.02 .04* .03  .06 .06* -.00  
Interest in politics .18** .29** .23**  .38** .44** .56**  .45** .30** .40**  
Sat Economy .02 .13** .11**  .02 .11** .07**  .07** .09** .11**  
Sat Government .54** .49** .47**  .61** .50** .54**  .39** .41** .42**  
Vote  .19** .31** .37**  .09 .23* .15  .27 .18 .05  
Left-right -.03 .00 .00  -.02 .05** -.07**  -.11** -.10** -.09**  
Age .05** .05** .08**  .10** .07** -.07**  -.11** -.10** -.09**  
Gender .01 -.01 -.03  .01 .01 .02  -.02 .05* .01  
Education .04* 05** .07**  .06** .07** .07**  .06* .08** .13**  
R2 .55 .55 .52  .61 .55 .62  .48 .44 .40  
*p-value<.05;** p-value<.01  
 
Table 3 (cont): Estimates for trust in political institutions 
 
 Norway Portugal Spain 
 2008 2010 2012  2008 2010 2012  2008 2010 2012 
Trust in others .25** .17** .22**  .04 .13** .11**  .16** .12** .15 
Sat with life .05* -.02 .03  .09** .04* .03  .05* .03 .02 
Interest in politics .43** .48* .36**  .44** .32** .48**  .36** .42** .34** 
Sat Economy .06** .11** .09**  .28** .28** .17**  .16** .24** .31** 
                                                     
29 Newton, “Political Support: Social Capital, Civil Society, and Political and Economic 
Performance.” 
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Sat Govern .51** .52** .49 .30** .31** .32** .37** .34** .32** 
Vote .20 .42** .28* .02 -.04 -.00 .22* .35** -.05 
Left-right .04* .05* .01 .07** .05* .01 .10** .12** .02 
Age .01 -.02 -.05* -.01 .05 -.00 -03 .03 .01
Gender .01 .05* .03 .09** .01 -.07** -.02 -.08** -.05*
Education .12** .10** .09** .06* .07* -.02 -.03 .03 -.02
R2 .55 .57 .52 .41 .38 .42 .50 .47 .46 
*p-value<.05;** p-value<.01
Table 3 (cont): Estimates for trust in political institutions 
Greece Ireland 
2008 2010 2012 …2008 2010 2012 
Trust in others .10** .14** NA .13** .12** .09** 
Sat with life .08** .04 NA .03 .01 .02 
Interest in politics .44** .29** NA .27** .22** .30** 
Sat Economy .26** .14** NA .15** .22** .21** 
Sat Govern .21** .48** NA .51** .42** .39** 
Vote .32** .12 NA .10 -.01 .20* 
Left-right .07** .09** NA .08** 06** .09** 
Age .10** .11** NA .01 -.01 .02 
Gender -.06** .00 NA .01 .02 -.02 
Education -.05* .02 NA .08** .00 .04* 
R2 .29 .42 NA .56 .47 .54 
*p-value<.05;** p-value<.01
Conclusions 
We have provided evidence showing that the decline has been more visible in 
those countries most affected by the crisis than in those where the crisis has not 
been so severe.  
Moreover, we have examined the main factors explaining trust in institutions 
and have observed different patterns across countries and over time. Levels of 
institutional trust have fluctuated significantly in some of the countries studied. 
Impacts of explanatory factors have also changed significantly over time, as our 
hypotheses claims. 
According to our results, we can offer some conclusions regarding our hy-
potheses: Data analysis provides evidence that helps to confirm the first hypothe-
ses. From the latent means we can conclude that levels of trust in institutions are 
different across countries, depending on whether those countries have been more 
or less affected by the crisis. It is clearly observable from the latent means that the 
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levels of trust for Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland are clearly lower than the 
ones in Germany, Sweden, Norway or Netherlands.  
The second hypothesis can be also confirmed. There is a clear pattern that in-
stitutional trust decreases over time, particularly in those countries more affected 
by the crisis. This supports our claim that trust in institutions is being eroded by 
the economic crisis. 
The third hypothesis concerns how predictor variables affect trust in institu-
tions over time. We can observe that the effects on trust are not constant over 
time, showing that the explanatory capacity of correlates for trust in institutions 
varies over time and circumstances. We can conclude that the existence and inten-
sity of economic crisis reshapes the effect of explanatory factors for trust in institu-
tions.  
Additionally, as asserted in Hypothesis 4, we can also confirm that the effect of 
correlates varies across countries. In those countries where the crisis is more acute, 
short-term correlates tend to have a stronger effect than in those countries less 
affected by the crisis. Conversely, long-term factors have a stronger effect in those 
countries where the crisis has not been so serious. 
As discussed previously in this article, the relevance of institutional trust is a 
crucial element for a functioning democracy and governance. System´s legitimacy 
and the quality of its democracy rely on a trusting relationship between citizens and 
their state. It has been widely argued in the literature that political trust and institu-
tional trust have noticeably declined in western democracies. There are several 
reasons for this in the relevant literature, some related to a rise in cognitive mobili-
zation and political sophistication, due to a persistent socialization of democratic 
values 30. Evaluation of performance is also highlighted as one of the main reasons 
for increasing people's distrust in state institutions.  
In this regard, even if democratic values and democratic support are not ques-
tioned by citizens in the short run, the unequal consequences of political and eco-
nomic performance would lead to unequal levels of institutional trust. Our findings 
suggest that a situation of severe and lasting economic crisis may have serious con-
sequences for institutional trust, and therefore may put a system´s legitimacy at risk 
if it persists. This article shows that economic and political performance do not 
only affect the support for specific incumbents in office, but they also damage the 
public´s trust in institutions, which is highly sensitive to short term evaluations 
when in situations of economic crisis. Even if democratic principles and values are 
well established in European democracies, we can see how personal grievances and 
sacrifices in the economic sphere can put institutional trust is serious jeopardy. 
 
  
                                                     
30 Norris, Critical Citizens. Global Support for Democratic Governance; Klingemann, Klingemann, H. D. 
(1998). Mapping Political Support in the 1990s. A Global Analysis. 
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Refugees Not Welcome. The Populist Radical Right 
in Poland and the Migration Crisis 
Natasza Styczyńska 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Despite being a beneficiary of European funds with a high level of public support 
for European integration, Poland is reluctant to accept some EU policies and pro-
posals for joint actions. One example of this might be its contestation of the pos-
sible creation of a common European Union (EU) migration policy, as well as 
opposition to mandatory quotas in the refugee relocation programme proposed by 
the EU in 2016. It seems that the rise of populism and Euroscepticism is fuelling 
anti-European stances, bringing xenophobic discourse into the mainstream of 
politics and strengthening anti-immigration rhetoric. It is possible for this to hap-
pen as the Europeanisation process in Poland is far from complete, and discontent 
with the transformation and liberal order is overlapping with disappointment with 
politics in general. 
In this paper I will present a general background of Poland–EU relations re-
garding relocation of refugees and the proposal of joint actions in the area of 
common migration policy, as well as the arguments of the radical-right parties that 
contest these solutions. The first part of the paper will be devoted to the concept 
of populist radical right (PRR) and the parties in the Polish political arena that can 
be seen as part of the PRR family. In the second part I will analyse the way populist 
radical-right parties in Poland are using the migration crisis in order to present 
their views on the future of Europe and mobilise the electorate. Two parties and 
their rhetoric will be examined. The first one is the Congress of the New Right 
(Kongres Nowej Prawicy – KNP), which won four seats in the European Parliament 
elections of 2014 and is the only openly Euro-reject party in Poland, to use the 
classification proposed by Kopecký and Mudde.1 The second grouping presented is 
                                                     
1 Petr Kopecký and Cas Mudde, “Explaining Different Paths of Democratization: The Czech 
and Slovak Republics”, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 16/3 (2002): 63-84.  
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Kukiz’15, which gained 8.81% of votes in the 2015 parliamentary election (cooper-
ating with the far-right National Movement). The party claims that Islam is a dan-
ger to the cultural (Catholic) Polish identity, and calls asylum seekers “culturally 
foreign”. Kukiz’15 is calling for a referendum on the refugee quotas that the EC 
proposed to introduce in 2015. The main aim of the paper is to analyse who is 
contesting the idea of redistribution of refugees around all member states of the 
EU and why, as well as criticising the proposal of a common migration policy. 
After analysing the party documents and rhetoric of the leaders (during the period 
from March 2015 to October 2017), I argue that the rhetoric is demonstrating 
many stereotypes and stigmatisations that are used in the political discourse and 
political agenda, but also simplifications and fears that very often go deeper. Most 
visible are identity-based arguments, including the one claiming that if refugees are 
to be accepted they need to be “like us”. Security and economic fears are also visi-
ble, and used by the mentioned parties in order to consolidate the electorate and 
gain political capital.  
The migration crisis – the view from Poland 
Despite the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, which was supposed to facili-
tate the establishment of the EU migration policy, member states are yet to come 
to an agreement. The refugee crisis, the apogee of which came in 2015, meant that 
the debates on the need for and shape of this joint policy returned with redoubled 
force. Owing to the Brexit negotiations, of great importance to all member states, 
as well as the signing of the EU-Turkey refugee deal and the relatively smaller 
number of refugees arriving in Europe, this topic has become much less frequent 
in the public discourse. Yet the problem has not gone away – such states as Italy, 
which struggle to cope with the largest number of arrivals on account of their loca-
tion, are continuing to appeal for constructive solutions at EU level as well as the 
support of other member states. A response to these appeals was supposed to 
come in the form of the refugee relocation system, which assumes that each Euro-
pean Union member state will accept a specific number of refugees. This number 
was to be calculated on the basis of a given country’s wealth and population. Yet 
this solution was criticised in several member states – especially the Visegrad 
Group and Austria. In May 2016, the European Commission (EC) announced 
financial penalties for those countries that fail to meet their designated quota of 
refugees. The Polish government consistently refuses to satisfy this requirement, 
and criticises the relocation programme. 
The issue of accepting refugees became the subject of heated political debate 
in Poland in 2015, particularly between the parties Law and Justice (PiS) and Civic 
Platform (PO). During its time in government until 2015, PO initially rejected the 
possibility of accepting refugees, before agreeing to Poland’s admitting around 
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7,000 relocated individuals.2 The PiS government rescinded this decision after 
coming to power in October 2015, citing security issues and Poland’s engagement 
in helping refugees from war-affected areas in Ukraine. They made it clear that, 
especially after the terrorist attacks in Brussels and Paris, Poland was unable to 
accept any refugees who might represent a danger to citizens’ safety. 
Poland was not the only country that did not agree to the quotas set by the 
EC, consistently refusing to accept even the smallest number of refugees. In light 
of this refusal, in December 2017 the EC decided to refer Poland, Hungary and 
the Czech Republic to the European Court of Justice. 
The migration crisis has been the subject of debates in the Polish parliament, 
including, notably, two important speeches on 16 September 2015, by Prime Min-
ister Ewa Kopacz and PiS leader Jarosław Kaczyński. These addresses resonated in 
the media, with the arguments the two leaders invoked, such as fear of the Islami-
sation of Europe, becoming a permanent fixture in the public discourse. In Octo-
ber 2016, the Polish parliament’s European Affairs Committee proposed a resolu-
tion concerning compulsory relocation of refugees. According to this resolution, 
the European Parliament and EU Council decree on the mechanism of mandatory 
relocation of refugees does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity described 
in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union.3 This resolution reflects the domi-
nant mood in Polish society, the vast majority of which does not support the idea 
of accepting refugees – according to a public opinion poll carried out in December 
2017 by CBOS, 63% of respondents do not agree to Poland accepting refugees 
from countries where military conflicts are taking place, 33% are of the opposite 
view, and 4% do not have an opinion.4 
Poland’s refusal to accept refugees has been widely discussed not only within 
EU institutions, but also in domestic and international media. A common question 
has been why a state whose citizens have often been forced into emigration (during 
communism, for example), but also who emigrate en masse in search of better 
living and working conditions, dissociates itself so unequivocally from the idea of 
showing solidarity in sharing a problem faced by certain member states. The aver-
sion to refugees is often explained by fears over their cultural and religious differ-
ences. Interestingly, there has been hardly any mention in the discussion of the 
issues resulting from the direct experience Poland had in the 1990s when admitting 
several tens of thousands of Chechens. As Muslims, these refugees might also have 
been perceived as a threat to Polish identity, yet this argument also failed to appear 
                                                     
2 Refugees in Poland, facts and myths, URL: https://www.premier.gov.pl/wydarzenia/
aktualnosci/uchodzcy-w-polsce-fakty-i-mity.html (accessed 8 December 2017). 
3 The Sejm committee against the mechanism of mandatory relocation of refugees, URL: 
http://www.parlamentarny.pl/wydarzenia/sejmowa-komisja-przeciw-mechanizmowi-przymusowej-
relokacji-uchodzcow,16007.html (accessed 8 December 2017). 
4 CBOS, Stosunek do przyjmowania uchodźców (“Attitude towards accepting refugees”), no. 
163/2017. 
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in the Polish public debate of the time. The refugee question appears to have be-
come politicised, and is used, albeit in different ways, by all political factions. The 
political discourse is divided into camps – those who call upon Poland to carry out 
its duties resulting from solidarity with other EU member states, but also its Chris-
tian duty, and those who refuse to accept refugees, citing the need to defend the 
Christian Polish identity from the influx of Islam. 
The Polish populist radical right 
Defining a party of the populist radical right causes a number of problems, mostly 
because the very concept of populism is broad and vague, and can be used by dif-
fering ideological groups. Researchers point to the characteristics of populism, 
which claims the right to represent “the people”, contrasting it usually with the 
corrupt elites,5 thus creating two antagonistic groups within society. Ivan Krastev, 
meanwhile, explains that “the priority given to building capitalism over building 
democracy is at the heart of the current rise of democratic illiberalism in Central 
and Eastern Europe”.6 In part, Polish populism, as in other countries of the re-
gion, is characterised not by right-wing or left-wing rhetoric, but nationalist dis-
course, proclaiming the need to revisit the period of transformation.7 At the same 
time, most researchers agree that populist rhetoric appeals to citizens’ fears and 
frustrations, exploiting their unfamiliarity with how the mechanisms of politics 
function. For the purposes of this article, I will use Cas Mudde’s definition of the 
populist radical right, which stresses that for populists, politics should express the 
volonté générale – the will of the people as the supreme value.8 
In analysing the radical right, it is important to emphasise the characteristics 
that distinguish it from the extreme right. Above all, the radical right criticises the 
existing democratic system; it is not anti-system as such, though, as it operates 
within the system and accepts its rules. Radical-right parties are usually anti-
European and oppose the trends of modernisation. According to Roger Griffin, 
the radical right is also characterised by aversion to individualism, as well as to 
upholding human rights (and especially minority rights).9 Mudde underlines that 
the radical right is characterised by nationalism and xenophobia, and also places an 
5 Andreas Schelder, “Anti-Political Establishment Parties”, Party Politics, 2/3(1996); Margaret 
Canovan, “Trust the people! Populism and the two faces of democracy”, Political Studies, 47,1 (1999) 
also in Paul Taggart, Populism, Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000. 
6 Ivan Krastev, “The strange death of the liberal consensus”, Journal of Democracy, 18,4 (2007). 
7 Radosław Markowski, “Populizm a demokracja: ujęcia, dylematy, kontrowersje”, in Radosław 
Markowski (ed.) Populizm a demokracja, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo ISP PAN, 2004, 23-24. 
8 Cas Mudde, Populist Radical Parties in Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 23 
9 Roger Griffin, “Afterword: last rights?”, in Sabrina P. Ramet (ed.), The Radical Right in Central 
and Eastern Europe since 1989, University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999. 
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emphasis on law and order, in order to construct a monocultural state.10 It is note-
worthy that in ethnically homogeneous countries such as Poland, where ethnic 
divides are practically invisible, right-wing parties rally against the enemy in the 
form of incomers – immigrants, people of a different religion or value system. 
Lenka Bustikova notes that, paradoxically, the mobilisation of the radical right in 
Eastern Europe against refugees “westernized the eastern European radical right in 
the opposition to Islam and migrants”.11 The tendency of mainstream parties (such 
as PiS and Fidesz in Hungary) to adopt some of the demands of radical-right 
groupings also causes problems with the classification of parties of the radical 
right.12 The populist radical right is therefore a complex concept that is hard to 
define. Mudde points out that the radical right is a form of nationalism, yet where-
as all radical-right parties are nationalist, not all nationalists are part of the radical 
right.13 Similarly, not every radical-right party is populist. In this article, I am only 
interested in the relevant parties of the radical populist right currently active on the 
Polish political scene – the Kukiz’15 movement, which invited activists from the 
National Movement to be on its lists, and the Congress of the New Right, present 
in the European Parliament (as well as the splinter party KORWiN/Liberty).  
 
Table 1: Polish elections 2014-2015  
 
Political party 2014  
European parliament 
elections  
2015  
Parliamentary elections 
Civic Platform  
(Platforma Obywatelska) 
32.13% 24.09 % 
Polish Peasant Party 
(Polskie Stronnictwo 
Ludowe) 
6.8% 
 
5.13 % 
Law and Justice 
(Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) 
31.78% 
 
37.58 % 
Democratic Left Alliance 
– Labour Union 
(Sojusz Lewicy Demo-
kratycznej – Unia Pracy) 
9.44% - 
Kukiz’15  - 8.81 % 
                                                     
10 Cas Mudde, The Ideology of the Extreme Right, Manchester–New York: Manchester University 
Press, 2000, 177 
11 Lenka Bustikova, “The Radical Right in Eastern Europe”, in: Jens Rydgren (ed.), The Oxford 
Handbook of the Radical Right, New York: Oxford University Press, 2017. 
12 Cas Mudde, The Study of Populist Radical Right Parties: Towards a Fourth Wave, C-Rex working pa-
per series, 1(2016), University of Oslo. 
13 Cas Mudde, The Ideology of the Extreme Right, op. cit., 30. 
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Congress of the New 
Right (Kongres Nowej 
Prawicy) 
7.15% - 
Modern 
(Nowoczesna) 
- 7.60% 
Source: National Electoral Commission www.pkw.gov.pl 
Congress of the New Right and KORWiN-Liberty 
The party founded by Janusz Korwin-Mikke in 2010 is the continuation of his 
political activities stretching back to the beginning of the democratic transfor-
mation in Poland. The founders of the Congress of the New Right were activists 
of the party Liberty and Lawfulness (Wolność i Praworządność), as well as politicians 
of the Real Politics Union (Unia Polityki Realnej). The party is conservative-liberal 
and Euro-hostile, advocating the abolition of the European Union. The Congress 
of the New Right (Kongres Nowej Prawicy) programme declares that it is the “only 
consistently and uncompromisingly anti-EU party in Poland”.14 In economic is-
sues, the party calls for far-reaching liberalism, declaring a market free from any 
intervention as a foundation of economic progress. In ideological questions, the 
KNP is a conservative party that stresses the Latin roots of European civilisation, 
and criticises civil partnerships, abortion and IVF, as well as the policy of multicul-
turalism. Until 2015, the face of the party was its leader, Janusz Korwin-Mikke, and 
its rhetoric is viewed as controversial, containing xenophobic and anti-Semitic 
elements and with a view of history based on conspiracy theories. 
The party electorate comprises mostly young people, generally residents of 
large cities, 75% of them men.15 The Congress employed new media to conduct an 
effective campaign targeted particularly at young voters. In the European Parlia-
ment elections in 2014, it achieved a result of 7.15%, taking fourth place and win-
ning four seats. Notably, the party’s result among Poles voting abroad was consid-
erably better than at home. In Ireland, it gained some 39.36% of valid votes, in the 
United Kingdom 37%, and in Iceland 30.25%.16 Some analysts have argued that 
the KNP electorate is made up of so-called protest votes which the party managed 
to mobilise in 2014. Neither the party, nor its former leader in presidential elec-
tions, has yet been able to win a significant number of votes. In 2015 Korwin-
Mikke, the party founder and its most recognisable and active politician, founded a 
new party named KORWiN (an acronym of his name meaning Coalition for the 
Renewal of the Republic Liberty and Hope). It did not win any seats in the Polish 
14 Programme of the Congress of the New Right (2014). 
15 Adrian Koładka, “KW Kongres Nowej Prawicy”, in Michał Dulak (ed.), Wybory do Parlamentu 
Europejskiego w Polsce 2014, Kraków 2014, 72. 
16 Electoral results, National Election Commission, URL: http://pe2014.pkw.gov.pl
/pl/wyniki/gminy/view/149901 (accessed 6 December 2017). 
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parliament, but retains two MEPs (one a member of the Europe of Freedom and 
Direct Democracy group, and the other unattached) elected from the KNP list, as 
well as one member of the lower house of the Polish parliament, the Sejm (elected 
from the Kukiz’15 list). In 2016, the KORWiN party changed its name to Liberty 
(Wolność), but the party structure and programme remain unchanged. 
Kukiz’15 
In formal terms, the Kukiz’15 movement is a parliamentary group in the eighth 
term of the Sejm, as well as an association constituting the structure of the move-
ment established by the musician Paweł Kukiz for the parliamentary elections in 
2015. The movement included members of the nationalistic National Movement 
and the All-Polish Youth, also a nationalist organisation invoking the tradition of a 
similar organisation operating in the inter-war period. In the 2015 presidential 
election, Kukiz received 20.8% of votes, putting him in third place.17 Owing to the 
ideological diversity of its members, the movement is characterised by an eclectic 
programme, in which the major points include the creation of single-member con-
stituencies, refusal to accept even the smallest number of refugees from Syria and 
other countries affected by war, and criticism of EU bureaucracy, as well as a pro-
posal to deregulate European law. At present, Kukiz’15 has 30 seats in the 460-
strong Sejm. 
In 2016, the Kukiz movement set up the website dzienreferendalny.pl (“refer-
endum day”), to promote the idea of a referendum on Poland’s acceptance of ref-
ugees. This idea stemmed from the belief that, as stated on the website, “The host 
in Poland at present is no other power, but the citizens. It is the citizens who 
should decide whether we allow anyone into our Homeland, and whom”.18 Along-
side the form for collecting signatures, the website also features a poll asking: “Are 
you in favour of Poland accepting refugees as part of the system of relocation in 
the European Union”. In Poland, the Sejm can decide to put a particular issue to 
referendum based on the initiative of citizens gaining the backing of at least 
500,000 people. Despite the involvement of various organisations in the collection 
of signatures (including fans of football clubs), as yet the minimum number has 
not been reached. 
 
  
                                                     
17 Presidential Election results 2015, National Election Commission, URL: 
http://prezydent2015.pkw.gov.pl/319_Pierwsze_glosowanie (accessed 7 December 2017). 
18 Referendum Day webpage, URL: http://dzienreferendalny.pl (accessed 6 December 2017). 
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“Refugees not welcome” – the rhetoric of the Polish populist radical right 
The system of relocation of refugees and proposals for EU-wide solutions to the 
migration crisis are contested at various levels – the most commonly raised issue is 
the threat to identity posed by incomers, and their associated religious and cultural 
differences, but economic issues and security are also important. 
The first rhetorical device used by politicians of the radical right concerns vo-
cabulary – in their speeches they seldom use the word “refugee”, replacing it with 
“immigrant”, “Islamic immigrant” or “economic migrant”. Their objective is to 
focus attention on the economic aspect of migration, and away from the question 
of war and political, ethnic and religious persecution. By highlighting economic 
aspects, they depict the European Union as a source of profits, and people trying 
to reach it are attributed with solely economic migrations. Robert Winnicki, leader 
of the National Movement, calls refugees “invaders”,19 arguing that refugees regis-
tered in Greece, for example, upon moving to another EU member state become 
merely economic migrants. It is worth mentioning that referring to new arrivals as 
false refugees took place in other European countries in the early 1990s with the 
inflow of immigrants from the East, when the idea of “undeserving asylum-
seekers” portrayed as “disguised economic migrants” appeared in the public dis-
course of the countries of the so-called old EU.20 
Analysis of the position of parties of the populist radical right reveals a host of 
references to economic issues. The politicians of these parties argue that Poland 
cannot afford to accept people arriving from the Middle East or Africa, and that 
the help offered by the European Union is minimal, sufficing for no more than a 
few months’ stay.21 The economic motives of refugees leaving, for example, Leba-
non and Turkey for EU states is also stressed; according to Kukiz’15, such indi-
viduals should be treated as economic immigrants.22 Janusz Korwin-Mikke’s stance 
is that refugees heading to Europe are attracted only by benefits: “if we were to 
abolish benefits, there wouldn’t be any people coming to Poland and the whole of 
Europe”.23 Korwin-Mikke also repeated his argument during a debate in the Euro-
pean Parliament on the European migration programme, emphasising that those 
19 “Manifestacja ‘Przeciw islamizacji Europy’. Winnicki: ‘To nie uchodźcy, to najeźdźcy’”, Polska 
The Times Warszawa, 7 February 2016, URL: http://www.polskatimes.pl/artykul/9371803,warszawa-
manifestacja-przeciw-islamizacji-europy-winnicki-to-nie-uchodzcy-to-najezdzcy-zdjecia,id,t.html 
(accessed 14 December 2017). 
20 Robin Cohen, Migration and its Enemies: Global Capital, Migrant Labour and the Nation-State. Alder-
shot: Ashgate, 2006, 88. 
21 Position of the Kukiz’15 movement on “refugees”, published on the Facebook page of Paweł 
Kukiz, 16 September 2015, URL: https://www.facebook.com/kukizpawel/posts/958933797507674 
(accessed 15 December 2017). 
22 Ibidem. 
23 Janusz Korwin-Mikke, speech in the European Parliament, 8 September 2015, URL: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v7CQkivQNQI (accessed 8 December 2017). 
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coming to Europe do not want to work, and that by offering high benefits, the EU 
does not give them an incentive to do so.24 
Security issues crop up frequently in the public debate, although usually in 
combination with cultural issues. Islam is seen as a threat not only to identity, but 
also to Poles’ immediate security. During a debate in the Sejm, Robert Winnicki 
from the National Movement demanded “zero immigrants, zero refugees, zero 
terrorists in the Polish state”.25 Equating refugees with terrorists has become a 
permanent feature of the radical right’s rhetoric. In Kukiz’15’s declaration, we can 
read that “among immigrants, for example in Hungary, Islamic State militants have 
already been identified. There will be more and more of them, because they make 
it clear that their next objective is an ‘assault’ of terrorists on Europe. Europe has 
immersed itself in chaos and ethnic and religious conflicts”.26 Media reports on the 
New Year’s Eve attacks on women in certain cities in Germany also reverberated 
in Poland, with female MPs from Kukiz’15 and KORWiN writing a letter to Prime 
Minister Beata Szydło on 14 January 2016 stating that “the increase in the number 
of Islamic immigrants is linked to cases of harassment, attacks and rapes of wom-
en, which we shall not accept, we will not allow the safety of Polish women to be 
any kind of bargaining chip”.27 In 2016 a proposal was made to build a fence be-
tween Poland and Ukraine in order to protect the eastern border.28 
The next, and perhaps most visible issue is that of religious- and culture-based 
arguments – refugees, especially Muslims or those from countries where Islam is 
dominant, are seen as culturally different and unacceptable. Before the Second 
World War, Poland was a multicultural country populated by Poles, Jews, Ger-
mans, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Armenians, Tatars and Lemkos, among others. 
Following the border shifts, the Holocaust and mass population transfers, Poland 
became one of the most ethnically homogeneous countries in Europe – today, 
94% of inhabitants see themselves as “ethnic Poles”29 and 93% declare themselves 
                                                     
24 Janusz Korwin-Mikke, speech in the European Parliament, 7 June 2016, URL: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IORwEe2fWQA (accessed 8 December 2017). 
25 Robert Winnicki, 15th session of the Sejm, 1 April 2016, 241. 
26 Position of the Kukiz’15 movement on “refugees”, op. cit. 
27 “Działaczki Kukiz’15 i KORWiN nie chcą w Polsce ani jednego ‘uchodźcy’! ‘Wzrost ilości 
imigrantów islamskich wiąże się z przypadkami molestowania, bicia i gwałcenia’”, wPolityce.pl, 14 
January 2016, URL: https://wpolityce.pl/polityka/278176-dzialaczki-kukiz15-i-korwin-nie-chca-w-
polsce-ani-jednego-uchodzcy-wzrost-ilosci-imigrantow-islamskich-wiaze-sie-z-przypadkami-
molestowania-bicia-i-gwalcenia (accessed 10 December 2017) 
28 “Ruch Narodowy chce ogrodzenia na granicy polsko-ukraińskiej”, Parlamentarny.pl, 25 
February 2016, URL: http://www.parlamentarny.pl/wydarzenia/ruch-narodowy-chce-ogrodzenia-
na-granicy-polsko-ukrainskiej,6077.html (accessed 12 December 2017). 
29 Wyniki Narodowego Spisu Powszechnego Ludności i Mieszkań 2011, Warsaw, March 2012, URL: 
https://stat.gov.pl/cps/rde/xbcr/gus/lu_nps2011_wyniki_nsp2011_22032012.pdf (accessed 12 
December 2017). 
 Visions and Revisions of Europe 84 
to be Catholics.30 For the radical right, this ethnic, cultural and religious uniformity 
of Poland is a virtue and a wealth that must be defended.31 Owing to this ethnic 
uniformity, as well as the country’s isolation during the years of communism, for-
eigners in Poland, especially those representing different cultures, are treated with 
reserve, and often also fear. The discourse based upon insisting on Catholicism as 
an intrinsic attribute of Polishness is also affected by the myth of Poland as 
Antemurale Christianitatis – the bulwark of Christendom – and Poland’s role in de-
fending Christian Europe from Eastern influence.32 The idea of Poland being the 
only country in the European Union to be founded on Christian values often ap-
pears in the statements of radical-right politicians. They regard Catholicism as the 
essence of Polishness and the foundation of Polish national identity, and hence in 
need of protection. This was what led the National Movement to stress during a 
plenary debate in the Sejm that “we want Poland to stay Christian (…) we don’t 
want the errors of multiculturalism Western Europe is making, and of which it is 
experiencing the tragic consequences”.33 During another debate, Kukiz’15 MP 
Anna-Maria Siarkowska said that Poles are “a hospitable nation, but don’t want 
culturally alien representatives of the civilisation of Islam, a civilisation that doesn’t 
assimilate, but imposes its way of life and thinking on others – it imposes its reli-
gion and its laws”.34 
The question of religion appears very frequently in the discourse, also in the 
context of whom we should help – there has been a proposal to help only Chris-
tian refugees, as those with whom Poles are connected by shared values. Here too, 
the argument was raised pointing to the primary needs of Poles living outside of 
the country – in Kazakhstan, Lithuania and Belarus. The Kukiz’15 leader’s declara-
tion emphasises that in Kazakhstan, Siberia and Ukraine there are “at least several 
tens of thousands of Poles and the descendants of Poles waiting for repatriation. 
There is no need to assimilate them, they won’t make terrorist attacks. And yet for 
25 years we have not brought them over”.35 This argument is also raised by other 
parties, including the ruling Law and Justice, who also point to the large number of 
citizens of Ukraine living in Poland as refugees from conflict-hit areas. 
The debate over the solution to the problem of refugees arriving in Europe al-
so became a forum for criticism of the institution of the European Union, which 
30 CBOS, Zmiany w zakresie wiary i religijności Polaków po śmierci Jana Pawła II (“Changes in the Belief 
and Religiosity of Poles since the Death of John Paul II”), Komunikat z badań BS/49/2012, 
Warszawa 2012. 
31 Robert Winnicki, Posiedzenie Sejmu, 9 February 2016, URL: https://videosejm.pl/video/
4787-posel-robert-winnicki-wystapienie-z-dnia-09-lutego-2016-roku (accessed 10 December 2017). 
32 Janusz Tazbir, Polska przedmurzem Europy, Warszawa: Twój styl, 2004. 
33 Robert Winnicki, 15th session of the Sejm, 1 April 2016, 242. 
34 Anna Siarkowska’s speech during Sejm session on 11 February 2016, video recording: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=33&v=S3nW-RWgNRw (accessed 14 December 
2017). 
35 Position of the Kukiz’15 movement on “refugees”, op. cit. 
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on the one hand is seen as ineffective, yet on the other hand is accused of exces-
sive interference in the internal affairs of member states. Most parties of the popu-
list radical right are Eurosceptic or hostile to the European Union, and the Polish 
example is no exception here. Both Kukiz’15 and the Congress of the New Right 
(as well as KORWiN) criticised the refugee relocation mechanism, and they were 
also active in passing the resolution in the Sejm rejecting mandatory relocation. 
Sylwester Chruszcz from Kukiz’15 supported the proposed resolution, maintaining 
that the Polish side would not agree to “the EU diktat imposing upon us by force a 
limit of citizens of third countries or stateless individuals”.36 He added that this 
position was in accordance with the Polish national interest, as “we are a sovereign 
state which itself decides upon issues fundamental to us”.37 The European Union 
is accused of lack of action to bring an end to the conflict in the Middle East, as 
well as providing insufficient aid in the countries in question. A common stance is 
the idea, included in the Kukiz’15 declaration, that refugees (the word “immigrant” 
is used in the declaration) “should be helped, but in the countries from which they 
come”, and that the EU ought to “provide active support for ending conflicts in 
such countries as Syria and Libya”.38 Kukiz believes that a “new Marshall Plan” 
should be proposed to the Middle East and North Africa.39 Criticism of the solu-
tions offered by the European Union has also become a motivation for collecting 
signatures for the initiative to hold a referendum, in which Kukiz’s movement 
wants to ask the question: “Are you in favour of Poland accepting ‘refugees’ within 
the relocation system in the European Union?”40 The programme of the KOR-
WiN party,41 founded after the split within the KNP, cites as the absolute priority 
of Poland’s foreign policy “regaining the possibility of making sovereign decisions 
on Poland’s immigration policy”,42 refusing to countenance the interference of the 
European Commission in Poland’s internal affairs. The Congress, the only Polish 
party to advocate abolition of the European Union, announced in 2014 that it 
would vote against all initiatives in the European Parliament aiming to increase the 
competences of EU institutions, and thus against all community initiatives.43 In a 
controversial speech in the European Parliament, Korwin-Mikke criticised the 
Dublin Regulation, comparing refugee camps to concentration camps and claiming 
                                                     
36 Artur Bartkiewicz, “Sejm za uchwałą odrzucającą przymusową relokację uchodźców w UE”, 
in Rzeczpospolita 21 October 2016 URL: http://www.rp.pl/Uchodzcy/161029860-Sejm-za-uchwala-
odrzucajaca-przymusowa-relokacje-uchodzcow-w-UE.html (accessed 8 December 2017). 
37 Ibidem. 
38 Position of the Kukiz’15 movement on “refugees”, op. cit. 
39 Ibidem. 
40 Referendum Day webpage, URL: http://dzienreferendalny.pl (accessed 6 December 2017). 
41 The KORWiN party changed its name to Wolność (Liberty) on 8 October 2016. 
42 Dumna, Bogata Polska, Program Partii KORWiN Koalicja Odnowy Rzeczypospolitej Wolność i Nadzieja, 
Warszawa 17 October 2015. 
43 Programme of the Congress of the New Right (2014). 
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that EU policy is one leading to “Europe being flooded with human garbage […] 
that does not want to work”; this policy, he argues, will lead to the “downfall of 
Europe”.44 
Conclusions 
Contemporary Polish identity is based on culture, language and religion, and par-
ticularly the last of these played an important role in the time when the Polish na-
tion was subjected to external oppression (the partitions and the communist peri-
od). The Catholic Church has often been perceived as the guardian of Polish iden-
tity as well as the bastion of freedom. It is therefore no surprise that arguments 
about endangered identity are cited in the debate on accepting refugees or the 
common EU migration policy. The fear of outsiders, often representing a different 
religion and culture, is fomented and reinforced by the discourse of the populist 
radical right. As Krastev notes, this type of rhetoric “exploits and strengthens the 
sense of division into ‘ordinary citizens’ and the ‘elite’, which only safeguards its 
own interests”.45 In these conditions, success is enjoyed by parties and their leaders 
who succeed in persuading society about the existence of a threat, as well as their 
commitment to defending ordinary citizens, their identity, way of life and well-
being. Analysis of the rhetoric of radical right-wing parties in Poland leads to the 
conclusion that both economic arguments and those related to security have an 
extra agenda in the form of identity-based arguments. Activists of the radical right 
view ethnic and religious uniformity as a virtue. In order to be accepted, refugees 
should be the same as inhabitants of the country in which they are arriving. As a 
result, if one is to even consider accepting them, then this should only be on con-
dition that they must be Christians. Islam is presented as “the other”, a threat for 
Polish and European identity, and the migration crisis is interpreted as an attempt-
ed “invasion of Europe”, an alien civilisation attempting to take control. The Eu-
ropean Union is criticised for approaching the crisis too liberally, for its excessive 
openness and undue protection of its citizens, as well as for its misguided policy of 
multiculturalism, which, according to the radical right, results in ethnic ghettos and 
terrorist attacks. The Polish radical right therefore has the mission to safeguard not 
only Polish society from Islamisation, but also Europe. This is the subject of one 
of the points in the Congress of the New Right’s programme: “we believe that only 
restoration of European values – Latin Civilisation and Western Universalism – 
can change the present Europe under occupation of the EU from an area of per-
manent crisis into a space of freedom, well-being and the principles that once built 
the power of the Old Continent”.46 The new Prime Minister of Poland, Mateusz 
44 Janusz Korwin-Mikke, speech in the European Parliament, 8 September 2015, URL: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v7CQkivQNQI (accessed 8 December 2017). 
45 Ivan Krastev, “The strange death”, op. cit. p. 60. 
46 Programme of the Congress of the New Right (2014). 
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Morawiecki, has also joined this rhetoric, speaking of the need for the re-
Christianisation of Europe.47 
A characteristic of the radical right in Eastern Europe is mainstream parties’ 
tendency to appropriate their rhetoric; this occurs in Hungary (where Fidesz 
adopted some of Jobbik’s xenophobic rhetoric),48 as well as in Poland, where the 
ruling Law and Justice party often uses exactly the same arguments against ac-
ceptance of relocation of refugees as Paweł Kukiz and Korwin-Mikke. An example 
might be the statement of Foreign Affairs Minister Witold Waszczykowski, who 
asserted that Poland could potentially accept Christian refugees, as only they would 
have the chance for assimilation. Commenting on the EU Justice Tribunal’s deci-
sion pronouncing that the refugee relocation mechanism is a legitimately adopted 
EU law binding in all countries (including Poland), Waszczykowski stated that it is 
not refugees who are in question, but economic immigrants. 
The rhetoric of the radical right, through the simplicity and clarity of its mes-
sage and with the help of the (especially social) media, reaches a broad range of 
recipients and influences their perception of the migration crisis and solutions 
proposed by the European Union. This rhetoric influences not only the radicalisa-
tion of the language of politics, but also attitudes in society, leading to acts of phys-
ical violence.49 This causes profound social division in Poland, but the question 
also divides European societies and has an impact on EU unity. In 2016, Ivan 
Krastev said of the divisions that opened up in the EU before the recent crises: 
“the financial crisis split the EU into creditors and debtors, tearing open a divide 
between north and south. Now the refugee crisis is dividing Europe between East 
and West […] We are not just experiencing a lack of solidarity […] we are experi-
encing the clash of conflicting solidarities: between national, ethnic and religious 
solidarity and our duty as human beings”.50 It seems that it will not be easy to head 
off the crisis over the failure to secure acceptance for the decision to relocate some 
refugees, especially after the European Commission’s decision in 2017 to refer 
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to the European Court of Justice.  
 
                                                     
47 Mateusz Morawiecki, interview for TV Trwam, 8 December 2017, URL: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ng4nkvx6Yy4 (accessed 14 December 2017). 
48 Lenka Bustikova, “The Radical Right”, op. cit. 
49 According to a report on the OKO.press website, in Poland in 2016 record numbers of hate 
crimes were recorded, meaning those motivated by supposed religion, nationality, sexual orientation 
or skin colour. URL: https://oko.press/waszczykowski-powtarza-przekaz-pis-uchodzcy-czyli-
migranci-czyli-terror-a-przeciez-przyjmujemy-ukraincow/ (accessed 8 December 2017). 
50 “Refugee crisis: ‘Not the same values in East and West’”, Die Welt, 8 March 2016, URL: 
http://www.dw.com/en/refugee-crisis-not-the-same-values-in-east-and-west/a-19102868 (accessed 
8 December 2017). 
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Introduction 
This article presents the results of social empirical research1 conducted in the 
Polish cities competing for the title of European Capital of Culture (ECOC) 2016. 
The Polish ECOC competition took place between 2007 and 2012.2 Eleven urban 
conurbations entered, six of which proceeded to the final round. In the end, 
Wrocław was selected (along with San Sebastián in the Basque Country) as Euro-
pean Capital of Culture. The empirical research focused on the seven cities which, 
on the basis of a cooperation agreement, founded the so-called Coalition of Cities 
to support Wrocław’s artistic activities in 2016. We worked on the assumption that 
the competition process for choosing the ECOC in Poland took place in an at-
mosphere of high levels of engagement from creative communities and urban 
movements, which were, through the organisation of the competition and then 
implementation of the ECOC 2016 festival, counting on a fundamental change in 
the artistic and social space, improved quality of government and governance of 
the city,3 and the opportunity for modernisation of the cultural infrastructure. The 
research employed qualitative methods using in-depth narrative interviews, partici-
pant observation and analysis of secondary sources, in this case mostly the bids 
made in the competition by the seven ECOC candidate cities selected for the 
study: Gdańsk, Katowice, Lublin, Łódź, Poznań, Szczecin and Wrocław. One of 
the approaches to the research assumed that the dynamic of the analysed changes 
is fundamentally influenced by a change in the discourse, understood as the rela-
                                                     
1 The specific results of the entire research process are presented in the book Paweł Kubicki, 
Bożena Gierat-Bieroń, Joanna Orzechowska-Wacławska Efekt ESK. Jak konkurs na Europejską Stolicę 
Kultury zmienił polskie miasta, Nomos, Kraków 2017. 
2 Białystok, Bydgoszcz, Gdańsk, Katowice, Lublin, Łódź, Poznań, Szczecin, Toruń, Warsaw, 
Wrocław. 
3 I follow Michael Foucault in distinguishing between government and governance. 
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tions in power regulating the forms of speaking and thinking about a specific reali-
ty and determining the “regimes of truth”.4 A key role in shaping discourse viewed 
in these terms is played by opinion leaders, who concentrate significant symbolic 
resources, impose the rules of the game, and decide who will have the privilege of 
being listened to.5 For this reason, opinion leaders from the various cities were 
interviewed. First and foremost, these were people directly involved in preparing 
the ECOC competition application, members of the campaign team and those 
responsible for cultural policies (local government officials, employees of local 
government culture departments). Second, they were the leaders of local urban 
movements, local media journalists and bloggers. A total of 60 interviews were 
held.6  
The discourse of this article focuses on the question of Europeanisation as a 
phenomenon explaining the processes of integration in culture. Given the Europe-
an nature of the ECOC competition, as a form of implementation of European 
Union cultural policy, it was necessary to verify the impact of the Europeanisation 
mechanism on the design of a large international festival/event from an artistic and 
social perspective. Since the interviews were conducted with the people preparing 
the application forms, during the research the discussion on the ECOC remained 
within the confines of the plans for the future they nurtured at the time. In keeping 
with the methodology of political science discourse, in this article I employ the 
methodological tools for theoretical analysis used in European studies and check 
the empirical application of the defined concepts. I also verify the influence of the 
impulses for integration, in terms of the European Capital of Culture programme 
objectives, on the dynamic of city-forming movements and cultural transformation 
in Poland. I assume that in Polish culture a certain “change” has taken place, re-
flecting integration trends, i.e. shaping pro-European mechanisms. This is suggest-
ed by the statements of cultural operators and competition entrants in Poland.  
In this article, the issues of Europeanisation are divided into three topics: Eu-
ropeanness, the European dimension, and Europeanisation per se. I defined the 
concepts, before asking respondents about their use in the concept for the Euro-
pean Capital of Culture for the various candidate cities. “Europeanness” is a noun 
defining a feature characteristic of something (like Polishness or Germanness, it 
does not exist of its own accord, but characterises something). Usually, European-
ness refers to the European axiology, meaning the set of values, norms and beliefs 
(human rights, democracy, tolerance, solidarity) at the basis of the integration pro-
cess and constituting the foundation of the European socio-political community. 
The concept of “the European dimension” is a normative and practical one. It is a 
4 Michael Foucault., The Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith, Pantheon Books, 
New York 1972. 
5 Alain Touraine, Thinking Differently, trans. D. Macey, Policy Press, New York 2009. 
6 The quotations given in this chapter were first printed in the book: Paweł Kubicki Bożena 
Gierat-Bieroń, Joanna Orzechowska-Wacławska (2017), Efekt ESK… op. cit. 
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specific European Commission guideline in the ECOC competition rules, accepted 
in Decision 1622/2006 EC7 This term is also widely used in EU documents on 
culture. Europeanisation is a  term used in European studies on the basis of politi-
cal science and international relations. In most discursive practices, it refers to the 
specific details of the processes of integration in its political dimension. There are 
at least 10 theories of Europeanisation.8 In this study I employed the “top-
down/bottom-up” conceptions of the German theoreticians Tanja A. Börzel and 
Thomas Risse.9 The Europeanisation mechanism is part of the Europeanising 
processes observed in broader terms. 
Europeanness 
Let us examine the main concepts more closely: Europeanness, the European di-
mension and Europeanisation. The Polish European studies scholar and identity 
analyst Wiesław Bokajło10 sees Europeanness as the dichotomous suspension of 
axiological systems between the Christian and secular tradition of humanism. Ac-
cording to Bokajło (a view shared, for instance, by Cris Shore and Gerard Delan-
ty), the Christian idea of human dignity and freedom as the highest humanistic 
value was transferred, so to speak, from the sphere of the sacrum to that of public 
life, i.e. incorporated into the lay legal systems that comprise the secular canon of 
human rights, democracy, solidarity and freedom. Europeanness is the position of 
individual and collective identification of Europeans (regardless of nationality or 
country of origin) with fundamental European laws, as well as conscious use of 
freedom, perceived as a higher value than local traditions and customs. European-
ness is the right to freedom of speech and of intellectual and creative expression. It 
is also being accustomed to freedom-based standards of cultural expression, artistic 
sophistication, the cult of literary virtuosity and artistic genius (but also artistic 
rebellion and respect for avant-gardes), as well as, in the pragmatism of working 
life, professional management of culture based as much on protection of elite val-
                                                     
7 Decision No 1622/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 
2006 establishing a Community action for the European Capital of Culture event for the years 2007 
to 2019, OJ L 304, 3.11.2006.  
8 The best-known are the concepts of the British scholars Helen Wallace and Robert Ladrech, 
the American political scientist James Caporaso, the Italian British-based professor Claudio Radaelli, 
and the Norwegian researcher Johan P. Olsen. 
9 My arguments are based on the publications: Tanja A. Börzel, Thomas Risse,, “When Europe 
hits home: Europeanisation and domestic change”, [in:] European Integration, online paper, no. 4 (15), 
2000, and the article: Tanja A. Börzel, Thomas Risse, T., “Europeanization: The Domestic Impact of 
EU Politics”, [in:] The Sage Handbook of European Union Politics, eds. Knud Erik Jørgensen, Mark A. 
Pollack, Ben Rosamond, London 2007, pp. 483-504.  
10 Wiesław Bokajło,  “Europa i europejskość: idee i pojęcia”, [in:] Wiesław Bokajło, Anna 
Pacześniak (eds), Podstawy europeistyki. Podręcznik akademicki, alta 2, Wrocław 2009.  
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ues as on egalitarianism in access to art and culture. Other scholars (Klaić,11 Fish-
er,12 Gudrun,13 Purchla14) perceive Europeanness in terms of international or re-
gional cooperation between multiple entities. They define it as the standards of 
proper governance of cultural institutions, strategising of cultural actions and pro-
cesses, a high level of urban cultural policies or protection of cultural heritage. 
Others see in Europeanness the threat of cosmopolitanism and denationalisation 
as well as mythicisation (Klocek di Biasio, Michalski, Münch15). Europeanness has 
also been perceived as inclusive multiculturalism, or as a method of constructing 
socio-cultural consciousness (Piasecki, Woroniecki16). Andrzej Chodubski’s17 dis-
cussion of contemporary civilisation sees the emergence of global civil society in 
Europe as lying in European and integrational transformations. The characteristics 
of European society in the era of globalisation indicate a tendency for Europeans 
to reflect on Europeanness. This concept assumes the formation of a participatory 
democracy and a participative approach. It also assumes decentralisation and de-
concentration, resulting in the empowerment of society and crystallisation of a 
sense of autonomy towards the central structures. Modern European societies are 
eschewing a philosophy of “rule” in favour of harmonious and horizontal co-
existence, searching for alternative, non-traditional organisational structures with-
out hierarchies and authority. The pluralist co-existing societies are open to various 
systems of values and demonstrate understanding towards immigration as a phe-
nomenon of civilisation. These attributes of social change are often called the es-
sence of Europeanness. 
11 Dragan Klaić,., Mobilność wyobraźni. Międzynarodowa współpraca kulturalna. Przewodnik. Fundacja 
nowej Kultury Bęc Zmiana, Narodowy Instytutu Audiowizualny, Warszawa 2011. 
12 Rod Fisher, (ed.), Art Networking in Europe, The Arts Council of England, London 1997 
13 Pehn Gudrun, Networking Culture. The Role of European Cultural Networks. Council of Europe, 
Strasbourg 1999. 
14 Jacek Purchla, Magda Vášáryová. (eds), Modele mecenatu państwa wobec integracji europejskiej, MCK, 
Kraków 2008; Jacek Purchla, Dziedzictwo a transformacja, MCK, Kraków 2005.  
15 Beata Klocek di Biasio, Bogdan Michalski, Felix Münch, (eds), What Europeanness Means Today? 
European Identity and Its Multicultural, Economic, and Social Dimensions, Wyd. Adam Marszałek, Toruń 
2015.  
16 Ryszard Piasecki, Jan Woroniecki, “Europeanness: A Path to Unity Within The European Un-
ion”, [in:] Comparative Economic Research, Vol. 19/1, 2016, pp. 45-63. 
17 Andrzej Chodubski, “Wartości cywilizacji współczesnej a unifkiacja i dezintegracja Europy”, 
[in:], Barbara Fijałkowska, Arkadiusz Żukowski (eds), Unifikacja i różnicowanie się współczesnej Europy., 
Elipsa, Warszawa 2002.  
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The European Dimension 
As we have seen, the second research problem, the European dimension, is justi-
fied expressly in Decision 1622/2006/EC,18 which specifies the regulations 
framework of the European Capital of Culture programme. In article 4 point 1 of 
the Decision, the European Commission introduced the criteria which candidate 
cities were required to fulfil in the ECOC programme. Below is the definition of 
these criteria: 
As regards “the European Dimension”, the programme shall: 
(a) foster cooperation between cultural operators, artists and cities from the 
relevant Member States and other Member States in any cultural sector; 
(b) highlight the richness of cultural diversity in Europe; 
(c) bring the common aspects of European cultures to the fore.19 
From the point of view of the unification processes, therefore, the ECOC was 
supposed to generate international cooperation between numerous decision-
making levels of cities, between artists and artistic institutions, and in this way to 
contribute to the creation of lasting partnerships and institutional relationships in 
Europe. It was meant to forge the conditions for implementation of the integra-
tional paradigm of “unity in diversity”. In keeping with the European cohesion 
policy, the idea of the ECOC programme was to ensure lasting and sustainable 
development of European cities and regions, underscoring active, engaged citizen-
ship. As the European Commission declared the year 2007 the European Year of 
Intercultural Dialogue,20 the idea of “dialogue” also became a permanent element 
in ECOC programmes. The notion of “unity in diversity” was gradually expanded 
to include the issues of tolerance and respect for difference, preventing discrimina-
tion and supporting European solidarity. The strategic EU document European 
Agenda for Culture, accepted by the Council in 2007,21 confirmed the actual change 
in the paradigm of the EU cultural policy from “unity in diversity” to protection of 
“cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue”. As Dorota Jurkiewicz-Eckert notes, 
the stress was on the idea of “increasing accessibility to various cultural and lin-
guistic forms of expression, as well as promoting intercultural dialogue contrib-
uting to the formation of the European identity, European citizenship and social 
                                                     
18 Decision No 1622/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 
2006 establishing a Community action for the European Capital of Culture event for the years 2007 
to 2019, OJ L 304, 3.11.2006.  
19 Decision No. 1622/2006/WE, op. cit., p. 3.  
20 Decision No. 1983/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
18 December 2006 concerning the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue (2008), OJ L 412 of 
30.12.2006.  
21 European Commission, Communication on a European agenda for culture in a globalizing 
world, Brussels, 10.05.2007, COM (2007), 242 final and Resolution of the Council if the 16 Novem-
ber 2007 on a European Agenda for Culture, Brussels, OJ C 287/01, 29.11.2007.  
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cohesion”.22 All the aforementioned characteristics of the “European dimension” 
were amendments added to the 2006 Decision applying to subsequent ECOC 
cities. 
Europeanisation 
As I mentioned, Europeanisation is a new research category in political science and 
European studies, of which it is regarded as a subdiscipline. It is not a European 
studies theory, but rather a method for explaining the processes of integration. To 
do this, Europeanisation makes use of methods from other fields: it employs inter-
national relations theories, classical European integration theories, communications 
theory, functionalism, neo-functionalism, realism, liberalism, and universal theories 
of the social sciences (including new institutionalism). It also calls upon political 
science (democracy theory, legitimisation of power, political systems). Political 
scientists and European studies specialists agree that Europeanisation is the pro-
cess of adaptation of European Union member states to the EU’s acquis communau-
taire requirements, i.e. implementing the Union’s legal and political production at 
domestic level. Europeanisation, they stress, is not a synonym of communitisation. 
They also consider it to be a process, rather than a state, and a non-linear and non-
uniform one. Scholars usually point to its two tracks, something that was particu-
larly highlighted by the German researchers Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse in 
their 2000 article “When Europe Hits Home: Europeanisation and Domestic 
Change”. The authors analysed these two “pathways” as a top-down process, when 
supranational institutions influence nation-states, which open themselves up to this 
influence, and a bottom-up one, taking place through transfer of competences 
from national to supranational level. Following this line of thought, Europeanisa-
tion allows the nation-state’s institutions to be open to the influences of interna-
tional (supranational) institutions, thus permitting the adoption of transfer of Eu-
ropean rules, laws and standards from domestic to European level. On the other 
hand, Europeanisation means creation of international laws on the basis of the 
legal heritage of sovereign countries. Which of these levels is dominant usually 
depends on the way in which a given policy is shaped and framed. At times, the 
dual tracks are distributed evenly. In most cases, however, Europeanisation de-
notes a process of adaptation of national laws to the supranational solutions. One 
can say that top-down Europeanisation has a formal dimension, while bottom-up 
Europeanisation is less formal. There is also horizontal Europeanisation – cross-
loading, which takes place when a transfer of procedures occurs resulting from 
mutual communication and exchange. 
22 Dorota Jurkiewicz-Eckert, “Od Traktatu o Unii Europejskiej do Europejskiej Agendy dla 
Kultury – narodzony i rozwój polityki kulturalnej UE”, [in:] Studia Europejskie, no. 1 (73), 2015, p. 76.  
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The most classical definitions of Europeanisation are represented by the reflections 
of the scholars Helen Wallace and Robert Ladrech, as well as the political scientist 
James Caporaso and the Claudio Radaelli. Wallace,23 one of the first to notice the 
possibility of integration processes influencing domestic inter-institutional rela-
tions, underlined how this influence could vary depending on the given country’s 
legal and political traditions. Research on Europeanisation was popularised by 
Ladrech, who in 1994 argued24 that the phenomenon of Europeanisation in inte-
gration is “an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to 
the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organiza-
tional logic of national politics and policy-making”.25 In Ladrech’s later works, he 
particularly stressed the “national adaptation” in integration processes. This meant 
that during adoption of the legal community guidelines, a reorientation of the con-
tent of domestic policies took place, subsequently causing the actions taking place 
at international or supranational level to become a natural component of the 
member state’s internal policies. Caporaso26 produced a model of the mechanism 
of Europeanisation, much cited in the subject literature, based on the phenomenon 
of a feedback loop. Rafał Riedel offers a shrewd interpretation of this phenome-
non and Caporaso’s model of Europeanisation: 
This led researchers of Europeanisation to adopt a definition – now regarded 
as classic – through which we can see Europeanisation as the continuing process 
of European integration, exerting a kind of pressure on the entities of the integra-
tion (member states, their citizens, institutions), which is then subject to mediation 
from domestic factors and actors, before bringing concrete results in the form of 
changes in domestic policy. These results (as well as the mediation phase), via the 
mechanism of the feedback loop, also have an effect on the integration process.27 
Riedel illustrates the process as follows: integration – mediation (feedback 
loops) – result. According to Caporaso, therefore, the essence of Europeanisation 
is a response to the pressure exerted by supranational forces on domestic forces 
and a specific domestic change resulting from this pressure, but created via media-
tion. The change provoked by the mediation influences integration through feed-
back loops. One might say, somewhat tautologically, that the change “changes” the 
process of integration. Also important is the fact that the process assumes the 
activeness (and not passiveness) of the entity on which pressure exerted. Its inclu-
                                                     
23 Hellen Wallace, “The Impact of the European Communities on national policy-making”, [in:] 
Government and Opposition, 1971, no. 4 (6), pp. 520–538.  
24 Robert Ladrech., “Europeanisation of domestic politics and institutions: the case of France”, 
[in:], Journal of Common Market Studies, no. 32(1), 1994, pp. 69–88.  
25 Ibidem, p. 69. 
26 James Caporoso, “Three words of regional integration theory”, [in:] Paolo Graziano,  Maarten 
P. Vink,. (eds), Europeanisation. New Research Agendas, London 2007, pp. 23–34. 
27 Rafał Riedel, “Europeizacja polityk publicznych”, [in:] Wrocławskie Studia Politologiczne 18/2015, 
p. 58. 
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sion in the process of Europeanisation occurs through a multi-level mediation 
(Caporaso’s feedback loop), meaning negotiation, discussion, and debate.28 In his 
article “Europeanisation in Public Policy”,29 Radaelli mentions four ways in which 
a member state adapts to the processes of integration. These are: 1) reduction of 
contestation (a given political area opposes community regulations), 2) inertia (lack 
of will to adapt, lack of change, torpor, passive resistance); 3) accommodation or 
absorption (superficial adaptation of structures, entities and the state to the de-
mands of integration), 4) transformation (reshaping of structures, entities and the 
state at domestic level, profound adaptational change). These four levels create 
various possibilities of adaptation, which demonstrates that Europeanisation can 
occur in different ways at various stages. The forms it takes can also vary depend-
ing on the type of public policies and time of its application. It may be that in the 
case of adaptational processes in environmental protection there is a temporary 
reduction, and then a transformation, while there is a profound direct transfor-
mation with regional policy, and accommodation with audiovisual policy. 
According to the British researcher Kevin Featherstone,30 the term “European-
isation” is applied in four separate senses. The first, as with other analysts, is the 
process of institutional adaptation of EU member states to the obligations result-
ing from belonging to supranational, European structures, including in the scope 
of public administration, the work of parliament and political parties, civil society, 
regional government etc., as well as formal EU regulations. The second area is 
adaptation of policies and the way of practising politics. The last two areas are 
characterised by the anthropological-historical dimension. The third one therefore 
generates questions on cultural identification and the sense of belonging to the 
right place and time in the historical process. The fourth level of Europeanisation 
creates the conditions for diffusion of supranational models and cultural norms 
(including European axiology, human rights, and democratic values). A variant to 
the definition of Europeanisation was introduced by Scandinavian researchers, 
especially Johan P. Olsen in his famous essay “Many Faces of Europeanisation” 
(2002).31 Olsen identifies five levels of Europeanisation, the most important of 
which is created as a result of “Central [top-down] penetration of national systems 
of governance”.32 The others are changes generated under the influence of outside 
influences (the EU), development of institutions at European level and the result-
28 James Caporaso also repeated this model of Europeanisation in the book: Maria Green 
Cowles, James Caporaso, Thomas Risse, (eds), Transforming Europe. Europeanisation and Domestic Change, 
Cornell University Press 2001. 
29 Claudio Radaelli, “The Europeanization of Public Policy” [in:] Kevin Featherstone and Clau-
dio Radaelli, (eds.), The Politics of Europeanization, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 27–56.  
30 Kevin Featherstone and Claudio Radaelli (eds), The Politics of Europeanisation, Oxford University 
Press, 2003. 
31 Johan P. Olsen, “Many faces of Europeanisation”, [in:] Journal of Common Market Studies, 2002, 
no. 40 (5), Arena, University of Oslo, pp. 921–952. 
32 Ibidem, p. 923. 
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ant increasing capacity of the EU to govern; as well as export of the logic of inte-
gration within the EU and beyond its borders. 
Let us pause for a moment to sum up. In my opinion, the main dimension of 
the concept of Europeanisation is political (related to integration), thus reducing 
the discourse on values or norms, to which culture is close. In a sense, it is an ex-
cluding concept, because, as Marta Lackowska-Madurowicz rightly observes,33 the 
discourse on values “does not imply confining the concept to EU structures”. It 
sets broader horizons. From this point of view, it becomes troublesome to reflect 
on culture in the context of Europeanisation. 
Results of empirical research regarding the concepts of Europeanness, the 
European Dimension, Europeanisation  
I will now test how the concepts discussed above – Europeanness, the “European 
dimension” and Europeanisation – were interpreted by the Polish cultural opera-
tors preparing the seven Polish cities (from seven different regions: Lower Silesia, 
Lublin Region, Łódź Region, Pomerania, Silesia, Greater Poland and Western 
Pomerania) for the European Capital of Culture 2016 competition. Let us start 
with the concept of “Europeanness”. In fact, the respondents interpreted this term 
in an axionormative context. The interpretations pointed to a sense of identifica-
tion of contemporary Europeans with the continent’s ancient philosophical tradi-
tions and belonging to a common cultural space, created by the European histori-
cal process on the basis of similar religious and life experiences. 
 
This model originated on the foundations of Ancient Greek philosophy and Platonic thought. 
The central role in it is played by beauty and good. (WR08) 
There is one common cultural and religious element that unites everything. Even for atheists, 
the Christian religion is a point of reference. (LU07) 
 
Europeanness is the need for a shared cultural consciousness. According to the 
respondents, combining particular cultural themes constructed a historical story. 
After the expansion of the European Union in 2004, it became important for Poles 
to add the Polish narrative to European transformations of awareness. 
 
It was definitely about being present in the consciousness of Europeans, about Wrocław being 
present in Europe, proposing a fresh narrative. We know that Wrocław’s problems are similar to 
the problems of Europeans, and we wanted to come out with that fresh message, and we tried to do 
that. (WR 04) 
 
                                                     
33 Marta Lackowska-Madurowicz,., “Europeizacja – ramy koncepcyjne dla badań samorządów?” 
[in:] Zarządzanie Publiczne, no. 1 (15), 2011, p. 40. 
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The respondents stressed their understanding of Europeanness as a process of 
“joining” different elements: views, convictions, geopolitical perspectives and in-
tuitions: 
Even if European countries differ in terms of language, culture and customs, there is no doubt 
that something exists that enables us to talk about European unity. (WR08) 
Europeanness was perceived as a building block of regional values, with the con-
viction that there is no such thing as Europeanness as an abstract creation. Euro-
peanness is composed of regionality and localness to the same degree as regionality 
and localness contain in their makeup – in atomistic and immanent terms – Euro-
peanness. Furthermore, the respondents associated Europeanness with diversity as 
the opposite of unification, which the European Union is frequently accused of 
tending towards. They regard the local tradition, customs, habits, material and non-
material heritage of many European regions (including Polish ones) as indicating 
diversifying characteristics (which is not to say antagonising) rather than com-
munitising ones. 
For me, something that is very local or regional is also an indicator of Europeanness. Silesia 
has a local culture which it nurtures, which has been strongly rooted in people for centuries. 
(KA05) 
Europeanness is our place in Europe and our answer to how we see ourselves in the cultural 
landscape of Europe. Silesian tradition, perceived as local and regional, is important in the Euro-
pean context. Actually every culture has its own regional identification. (KA05) 
Europeanness is also a synonym for universality. Europeans interpret literary, artis-
tic and musical messages and experiences similarly, creating a universal (cross-
border) message of European culture. 
Localness becomes universal when there isn’t such rigidity. Take [Witold] Gombrowicz, for 
example, who was Polish through and through, yet also universal, or [Tadeusz] Kantor too. So 
when the localness is real and has that depth, it’s European, because it’s original, it’s something 
that is unique. (PO08) 
A very interesting idea in the respondents’ statements was the perception of Euro-
peanness as a process of shedding inferiority complexes – the organisers of the 
Lublin ECOC bid accentuated this angle. Especially in this Polish city, lying on the 
so-called eastern wall, the region with the lowest level of economic development, 
the need to make a mark on the European map was of prime significance for the 
future European Capital of Culture 2016. 
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Europeanness is a process from closing (focus on tradition) to opening (the desire to build a 
culture based on elements from outside) while maintaining a healthy balance. (LU06) 
 
The respondents also referred to the multiculturalism that was once important for 
Poles and today slightly forgotten, as meaning Europeanness. For centuries, it was 
present in Polish literary tradition: 
 
The Book of Henryków is doubly appealing. Firstly, it contains the first sentence in the 
Polish language, and secondly, it is remarkably emphatic evidence of the multiculturalism of this 
region in historical terms, yet translates to contemporary times. It is written by a German monk 
in Latin, and this monk quotes the first Polish sentence, which a Czech spoke to his Polish wife. 
(WR10) 
 
Europeanness was also perceived as the need for freedom of artistic expression 
and civil liberty. 
 
The Free City of Poznań […], to preserve the city’s autonomy, I don’t want to use the word 
liberal, because that has its connotations, but freedom from this pressure, from domination of the 
state. (PO08) 
 
On the other hand, the respondents referred to practices trivialising the concept of 
“Europeanness” in the ECOC application process itself. These entailed the ECOC 
organisers’ use of “grand” European rhetoric for conducting a mass event. 
 
In the case of the European capital, some were concerned with prestige, and some with the 
budget, because money comes with it. I don’t know whether the people preparing the ECOC heard 
the word “European”, whether they were concentrating on it. (PO05) 
 
The above statement leads us to the second discourse term, the “European dimen-
sion”. According to the respondents, this European Commission requirement, to 
which certain elements of the 2016 ECOC programme had to be adapted, de facto 
resulted in fudging of the term, or in the appearance of megalomaniac ideas on the 
part of local government officials regarding the ECOC festival, designed for devel-
opment of the cities’ promotional strategies, rather than for a celebration of Euro-
pean culture. The concept was reduced to entertainment and to a commercial fes-
tivity. 
 
The project jurors asked what the European dimension of the project will entail, and the cit-
ies usually make something up. (WR04) 
 
The “European dimension” of the ECOC was linked to the mechanism of appro-
priation of the European project for local political benefits. As a side effect of this 
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pragmatic approach, local government officials went so far as to demonstrate their 
disregard for the formal requirements of the competition. Cities favoured easy 
solutions such as staging celebrity events rather than using the title for developing 
a long-term strategy for city development. 
Europeanness is understood in a simple way. We’ll do a programme that will attract crowds 
from Europe. I’ve observed very many projects like that. […] They don’t actually get into the 
European awareness at all. Who knows about Wrocław ECOC in Poland? Those who listen to 
TOK FM or Polish Radio Three, or watch TVP Kultura? (GD06) 
One aspect certainly implemented by the cities as part of the “European dimen-
sion” was the need for development of collaboration between cultural operators in 
the city itself, between Polish cities and with partners abroad. 
Łódź is returning to the European network where it once was. (ŁÓ06) 
The theory of top-down/bottom-up Europeanisation manifested itself clearly in 
the empirical material. Both the ECOC organisers and the authors of application 
forms cited their experiences demonstrating the effects of Europeanisation pro-
cesses. They explained that the first result of the transfer of knowledge and flow of 
new information was increased cultural competencies of the organisers of future 
festivals. Overnight, the people working on preparing the ECOC became a team of 
experts responsible for international artistic ventures, acquiring expertise in manag-
ing a large budget. The sudden accumulation of skills was the result of making use 
of foreign expert help: 
We learnt from them sophistication, the philosophy of the project, finances. Suddenly people 
from Europe arrived who believed in Lublin, showed us how to develop it, how we could work 
together and what’s important in Europe. How to network. (LU08) 
The Polish cultural operators took a crash course in enterprise and knowledge 
of foreign languages. They learnt modern culture management, project accounts, 
financial reporting for EU institutions and networking: 
It was a kind of thinking that we already had cultural managers here, who are already in the 
international network, it was a new category, it wasn’t there before – cultural manager means 
people with contacts, knowledge of how to get people to come, they obtain funds, have the kind of 
knowledge that’s lacking in directors of cultural institutions, who wait for a specific grant. 
(ŁÓ06) 
In order to implement the new managerial practices in a city’s cultural policy, an 
urban revolution was necessary. And this was what Polish cities underwent as a 
result of the preparatory processes for the ECOC competition. Many of the re-
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spondents referred to a radical change in the relations between the team preparing 
the application and the local government authorities. In particular, this meant im-
plementation of deliberative and pro-development mechanisms,34 as well as trans-
parent methods of funding and accounting for cultural institutions. 
 
The approach to cultural institutions has changed. They used to be institutions run in very 
much an authoritarian fashion, without evaluation. […] It’s standard now that there’s a competi-
tion and new cultural managers and fresh staff have appeared. (ŁÓ07) 
 
A classic example of bottom-up Europeanisation in the context of ECOC 2016 
was the process of persuading the Szczecin city local government to mount a bid. 
This process was initiated by NGOs and activists, without initial enthusiasm from 
city authorities. With no let-up in social pressure, however, Szczecin did indeed 
enter the ECOC 2016 competition. 
 
Perhaps it wasn’t an unwanted initiative, but a kind of baby abandoned to the City Council. 
The mayor couldn’t oppose the European Capital of Culture, but I don’t imagine it was easy for 
him. The authorities of our city didn’t really have any idea what to do with it. It limped along. 
(SZ05) 
 
In Katowice, local government officials agreed to conduct the ECOC competition 
thanks to the work of grassroots movements, city initiatives and artists, who also 
attempted to persuade officials and the mayor of the values of the European Capi-
tal of Culture and its important role in the process of integration of residents and 
cultural promotion of the city. 
 
[…] there was a complete blockade from the city council but after a lot of discussions we 
managed to get a lot done. We went through a process from simple activities, aesthetic ones, to 
harder, critical ones, for example the officials not being worried about a mural being produced by 
Łukasz Surowiec that would be very critical of the situation with the miners’ strikes that were 
happening, and lots of that kind of activities. So definitely the officials learnt something, and also 
the mayor, who, to be blunt, was seen as a kind of chief who knows best about everything, had to 
be open to Marek Zieliński’s vision, and it’s great that Marek was fully independent then. 
(KA03) 
 
                                                     
34 The transformation of the administrative instruments for city policies is described in the pub-
lications of Jerzy Hausner and Anna Kerwińska, e.g. in the book Kultura i rozwój, NCK, Warszawa 
2013. Also important in this context is Stanisław Szultka and Piotr Zbieranek’s book Kultura – polityka 
– rozwój. O kulturze jako „dźwigni” rozwoju społecznego polskich metropolii i regionów, Gdańsk, Instytut Badań 
nad Gospodarką Rynkową, Gdańsk 2012.  
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As a result of the preparations for the ECOC competition and implementation of 
Europeanisation mechanisms, the respondents noticed a marked improvement in 
the city’s information policy, internationalisation of cultural contacts and modifica-
tions to its image: 
Materials in English appeared in galleries, options for foreign tourists, international projects 
and residencies. (ŁÓ07) 
Most festivals and events already have a European character. Events used to be called “na-
tionwide” … I’m not aware of any nationwide event in Łódź – they’re all international and 
European. (ŁÓ07) 
In trying to identify the Europeanisation mechanism, the respondents expounded a 
futuristic vision of the future of cities. To explain the idea of this phenomenon I 
call upon Hristova, Dragicević-Sesić and Duxbury’s concept of “Europolis”.35 I 
had the distinct impression that the respondents speaking about the Polish urban 
centres of the future had a certain idealised European metropolis (or “Europolis”) 
in mind. This ideal denoted a dynamic, modern city largely governed by social 
organisations. The city in question is open, tolerant, and – especially importantly – 
developing in a sustainable fashion, pro-environment and pro-social. 
Katowice will become a European city, meaning that it will be sexy to go into town, and not 
drive around it in a car, that Katowice’s pro-car policy will come to an end. It’s awful what they’ve 
done to this city in terms of transport. And this treatment of people on foot by officials will come to 
an end. (KA01) 
A European city has to be comfortable to live in and accessible, we’re still lacking various 
things, with various infrastructure: both sporting and cultural, so that people can do lots of differ-
ent things in their free time. (WR09) 
For me, the process of Europeanisation is also a process of general Europeanisation in men-
tal terms and in urban planning, because Europe is currently heading towards ecological city 
management, sustainable transport, also a participatory model in city management. I think that 
in this first respect we are very much behind, in the second one we’re keeping up. So for me, a 
European city is an ecological and sustainable city on the one hand, and a participatory and 
openly managed one on the other. (WR03) 
35 Svietlana Hristova, Milena Dragicević-Sesić, Nancy Duxbury (eds), Culture and Sustainability in 
European Cities: Imagining Europolis, Routledge, earthscan, 2015. The concept of “Europolis” is making 
increasingly expansive incursions into the public discourse as a term for properly developing, ecologi-
cal, sustainable and intelligently managed European cities. In the competition for the Polish Europo-
lis held by the Batory Foundation in Poland in 2016, Warsaw took first place as a result of its increas-
ing green spaces: parks, greens, woods etc. – as well as increasing investments and relatively high 
earnings. 
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Thanks in part to the ECOC competition, Polish cities have begun to aspire to be 
important European metropolises. They have recognised their place on the EU 
map, determined their cultural resources and defined their innovative functions in 
international relations. 
The city is becoming increasingly international, people are coming to work from northern Italy 
and Germany. It’s discernible. The number of virtual guides printed in 2016 – there’s very much 
there on Wrocław […] Before our eyes, Wrocław is being written onto the world map. (WE10) 
During the process of preparation for the ECOC 2016, the Polish cities described 
and redefined their identities, which enabled them to create innovative city narra-
tives. The respondents’ statements point to a change in the perspective on the city: 
not so much from a local/peripheral point of view, but rather a supranational one. 
This new, pro-European image has gained the acceptance of residents. 
Katowice began to search for a new identity, which coincided with a new strategy for promo-
tion of the city, as it was in parallel with the ECOC. There was a new promotion strategy with 
the slogan “Katowice for a change”, which in my opinion is quite clever, as we’re turning the page 
and looking at the city from a completely different side. And thanks to the ECOC, Katowicans 
have begun to look at the city a little differently, and that’s actually great. (KA01) 
There’s easternness as regionalness, and this urbanness – Lublin-ness. As for Lublin-ness, 
the main component that I sense here is the fact that we’re not a metropolis, but in a sense a 
province. On the other hand, this is a distinct centre, that’s existed for centuries. (LU06) 
Conclusions 
Let us summarise the above reflections. Poland entered the European Union in 
2004. The period in which the Polish competition for the European Capital of 
Culture took place was characterised by many levels of change in adaptation of the 
state to EU requirements. Poland was the beneficiary of the first EU structural 
funds, which reinvigorated the economy and led to the modernisation of roads, 
buildings and public places. The country found itself in a momentous situation that 
created hitherto unknown opportunities for development. The EU’s principles of 
free movement of people, goods and services enabled Polish cities to become 
joined to the European exchange network. This resulted in processes of cultural 
diffusion offering cities the chance to create social innovations. Without doubt, the 
advantageous conditions for urban development provided by these circumstances 
contributed to the remarkable engagement of Polish cultural operators in the 
ECOC 2016 competition. The fact that as many as 11 cities entered the competi-
tion testifies to the ambition and courage of the rivalry. As indicated by the re-
search analysed above, in this period Polish cultural operators were still unprepared 
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for such a large cultural undertaking. In 2000 Krakow had become the first Polish 
city to hold the title of European City/Capital of Culture, yet the knowledge of the 
organisers of this event was not spread further, despite research papers, summaries 
and reports.36 The failure to learn a lesson from the previous ECOC resulted in 
2007 in organisational chaos. This was why the respondents’ definitions regarding 
the terms proposed in the research tended to be intellectually inept. They were 
used interchangeably and often inaccurately. Nevertheless, the connotations of all 
the concepts remained common, being Europe or European integration in the 
broadest terms. 
When defining the semantic field of the concept of “Europeanness”, the re-
spondents pointed to the ideas of cultural unity. There is no doubt that participa-
tion in the ECOC competition instigated a process of understanding the idea of 
European culture in the context of development of the city and redefinition of 
regional and local culture. What was important for the inhabitants of Poland as a 
newcomer to the EU was the need to shed their inferiority complexes behind and 
attempt to view themselves as fully fledged citizens of Europe with just as valuable 
a material and non-material culture and artistic achievements as those of “old Eu-
rope”. Another matter was the need to confirm the idea of creative freedom and 
independence as typically European attributes of art and literature. Within the 
European dimension, cities gained from constructing multidimensional, interdisci-
plinary, international cooperation which was becoming less of a traditional bilat-
eral/multilateral exchange, and more of a partnership between multiple parties, 
based on mutual learning, exchange of knowhow, and forming and fostering last-
ing interinstitutional and personal bonds. The cooperation was to lead to the initia-
tion and creation of serious cultural consortia, putting into practice Manuel Cas-
tells’s idea of the contemporary network society. 
As a result of the ECOC competition, the new professional category of cultur-
al manager emerged. Of course, people have been managing culture in Poland for 
years, but the bidding process exposed its international dimension, bringing the 
Polish workforce into the international circulation via participation in large-budget 
European projects. A modern cultural manager understands the contemporary 
model of collaboration and the European idea of networking. The interviews clear-
ly demonstrate increased ambition in creating city cultural policies. The expecta-
tions of people working in culture are also raised regarding the effectiveness of the 
work of officials, NGOs, cultural institutions and artists themselves. Calls are made 
for democratic city governance based on a clear division of decisions and budget, 
36 Robert Salisz, Bogusław Sonik,, Kraków’2000, Europejskie Miasto Kultury. Raport końcowy, Biuro 
Kraków 2000, Kraków 2001; Bożena Gierat-Bieroń,., Europejskie Miasto Kultury/Europejska Stolica 
Kultury, Instytut Dziedzictwa/Narodowe Centrum Kultury, Kraków 2009; Bożena Gierat-Bieroń, 
Bogusław Sonik,  Kraków 2000. Po 10 latach. Krakow 2000. 10 years after, KBF, Instytut Dziedzictwa, 
Kraków 2011; Danuta Glondys,, Europejska Stolica Kultury. Miejsce kultury w polityce Unii Europejskiej, 
Attyka, Kraków 2010. 
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transparency, and in particular understanding that the contemporary model of local 
authority entails not emanation of the society’s will, but multi-stranded partnership 
in actions for the city. As an indirect result of the ECOC process, Polish cities 
aspire to the idea of “Europolis”. The respondents understand Europeanisation 
above all as standardisation and integration. They situate top-down Europeanisa-
tion in the space of city governance and modern cultural policy. As for bottom-up 
Europeanisation, they treat it rather as cities’ grassroots searches for identity, draw-
ing their mental map, “inventing”37 the city. The strongest accent of Europeanisa-
tion as the realisation of EU cultural policy in the case of the Polish ECOC com-
petition appears to be the process of adapting cultural institutions as well as the 
governance of large cities to Western standards, a kind of standardisation of pro-
fessional practices under the banner of “Poles learn fast”. Institutions that have 
already been on the European map want to stay there – not to return to the mar-
gins. The organisers of the ECOC competitions in Poland have begun to realise 
that EU programmes are geared towards shaping the mechanisms of cooperation, 
but these mechanisms remain weak in Poland. The observers of theatre life claim38 
that Polish cultural institutions have begun to take part in a multi-level organisa-
tional structure (via networks and co-productions) and entered into cosmopolitan-
ising processes. Institutions have become open to new ideas from direct contacts 
and access to foreign expertise. An important effect of the processes of top-down 
Europeanisation in Poland is therefore internationalisation of cultural institutions, 
while bottom-up processes have resulted in their local and regional consolidation. 
Critics sceptical about Europeanisation processes in culture highlight the insuffi-
cient preparation of Polish cultural institutions for participation in European pro-
grammes. Why? Mental barriers, lack of language proficiency, absence of interna-
tional experience.39 They see this as the source of failures, i.e. the mediocre pres-
ence of Polish institutions in EU programmes suggested by statistics,40 and thus 
also their slow Europeanisation. It seems, however, that regardless of the other EU 
programmes implemented in Poland, the competition for the European Capital of 
                                                     
37 This term was used by the sociologist Paweł Kubicki in his book Wynajdywanie miejskości. Polska 
kwestia miejska z perspektywy długiego trwania (“Invented Urbanity: the Polish Urban Question in a Longue 
Durée Perspective”, Nomos, Kraków 2016.  
38 www.nck.pl/blog-kultura-sie-liczy/316789-decentralizacja-a-europeizacja-przypadek-polskich-
teatrow [access: 15 August 2017]. 
39 Igor Rakowski-Kłos, “Kreatywna Łódź to pomyłka. Miliony poszły w błoto?” [in:] Gazeta 
Wyborcza, Łódź. 9 October 2015, lodz.wyborcza.pl/lodz/1,35153,18994251,kreatywna-lodz-to-
pomylka-miliony-poszly-w-bloto-opinia.html [access: 4 July 2017]. 
40 This is best illustrated by the Interim Evaluation of the Culture Programme 2007-13 Annexes to Sup-
port Final Report ECORYS UK on behalf of the European Commission DG Education and Culture, ECORYS 
Final Report 2010, which shows that Polish operators avoid positions of project leaders, tending 
rather to prefer partner positions. Furthermore, Joanna Sanetra-Szeliga, commenting on the evalua-
tion of the Culture 2007-2013 programme, said that Italy is the unquestioned leader of European 
culture projects is Italy. In: Culture Programme 2007-2013 in Poland – Analysis and Summary, Cultural 
Contact Point, IAM, Warszawa 2013.  
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Culture 2016 contributed to the rapid Europeanisation of cities, thus eloquently 
putting into practice the principle of “soft power” as an important, albeit underes-
timated mechanism of European integration. 
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Young Italians in Search of  Opportunities: 
The Image of  Europe as a Lifeline 
Monica Pascoli 
Introduction 
Europe represents a primary destination for a large number of young Italians: there 
is a wide social acceptance of this well-established trend, motivated by the belief 
that the best employment opportunities are to be found elsewhere. The latest data 
presented by the Italian institutes of statistics highlight a continuous growth in the 
number of expatriates. Employability and mobility are closely interlocked and one 
of the fundamental push factors for emigration is undoubtedly the lack of oppor-
tunities in the work field: the unemployment rate in the 15-24 group age is 40.7% 
(with peaks of 56.7% in southern Italy), while in the 25-34 age group is 18.3% 
(31% in the south alone).1 However, this flow of young people is not only trig-
gered by economic reasons. Italy is considered as the classic No Country for Young 
People2, since it only offers a limited array of life opportunities for self-fulfillment, 
independence, initiative and entrepreneurship.3  
While the political sphere simply ignores the issue, the emigration of young 
Italians and, in particular, of the highly educated (also called brain drain) has fea-
tured prominently in the public debate, and the almost uninterrupted media cover-
1 Istat, “Il mercato del lavoro. Primo trimestre 2017”, 
https://www.istat.it/it/files/2017/06/CS_Mercato_del_lavoro_I_trim_2017.pdf?title=Il+merc
ato+del+lavoro+-+09%2Fgiu%2F2017+-+Testo+integrale+e+nota+metodologica.pdf (accessed 12 
June 2017). 
2 This is the title of a film directed by Giovanni Veronesi (2017), on two Italians who decide to 
emigrate to Cuba to give a meaning to their lives. 
3 Paolo Balduzzi and Alessandro Toppeta, “Le ragioni della nuova migrazione degli Italiani”, 
Neodemos, October 6, 2015, http://www.neodemos.info/articoli/le-ragioni-della-nuova-migrazione-
degli-italiani/ (accessed 10 May 2017). Alessandro Rosina, Neet. Giovani che non studiano e non lavorano 
(Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 2015). 
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age has contributed to raise a greater awareness on the issue, albeit in a simplified 
manner.  
The first part of the paper briefly analyses the press coverage regarding brain 
drain by three of the most popular Italian newspapers and their approach to the 
topic; the aim of this analysis is merely explorative and does not move from any 
hypothesis: the purpose is to critically analyze how the issue has been presented to 
the public during a specific time frame. It emerges that the subject is treated quite 
superficially, leaving some important issues in the background.  
The analysis will then focus on the pull factors attracting young Italians and 
the role of imaginary and representation in the choice-making process: while push 
factors are recurring and predictable, because they are linked to the severe internal 
problems of the Italian economy and its labor market, pull factors are much more 
complex and refer to the imaginary that individuals build over the long run 
through socialization processes and life experiences. 
This paper offers a different perspective of the brain drain process, not based 
only on the analysis of the push factors, i.e. the reasons behind the decision to 
emigrate, but also on the imaginary associated with the places of destination. By 
shifting the focus, it is easier to better understand young people and their life pro-
jects. We believe that young Italians consider Europe a familiar space and that in 
their eyes, emigration is simply a life option, a choice that is perceived as ordinary, 
as recently published research projects confirm. 
Italian emigration: some data 
According to the National Population Statements of Istat updated in June 2016, at 
the beginning of 2016 the number of AIRE4 members was 4,811,163, i.e. 7.9% of 
the 60,665,551 residents in Italy. 
At a continental level, over half of Italian citizens abroad (+2.5 million) reside 
in Europe (53.8%), while over 1.9 million live in America (40.6%), especially in 
Central and Southern America (32.5%).5 In absolute terms, the most significant 
variations are recorded in Argentina (+28,982), Brazil (+20,427), the United King-
dom (+18,706), Germany (+18,674), Switzerland (+14,496), France (+11,358), the 
United States (+6,683) and Spain (+6,520). 
More than half of Italian nationals registered with AIRE is of southern origin 
(South: 1.602.196 and Islands: 842.850), 33.8% come from the northern regions 
4 A.I.R.E. is the Registry of Italians Resident Abroad. The Registry was established by Law no. 
470/1988 and contains all the personal data of Italians residing abroad for over 12 months. A.I.R.E. 
enrolment is mandatory for all citizens who live and take up residence in a foreign country for more 
than 12 months. Enrolment in the A.I.R.E. involves the cancellation from the Civil Registry in Italy. 
5 Italian citizenship is granted partially on the jus sanguinis criterion and a high number of Italian 
citizens in South America are the descendants of Italian emigrants during the XIX and XX centuries. 
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(North West: 817.412 and North East: 806.613) and 15.4% from central Italy 
(742.092). 
The number of emigrants (deletions from the Italian civil registry) is growing: 
in 2015 there were 147 thousand, 8% more than in 2014. This increase is due sole-
ly to the cancellation of Italian citizens (from 89 thousand to 102 thousand units, 
i.e. + 15%), while the cancellation of foreign citizens dropped from 47 thousand to 
45 thousand (-6%). The main destinations for Italian emigrants are the United 
Kingdom (17.1%), Germany (16.9%), Switzerland (11.2%) and France (10.6%). 
A growing number of Italian graduates over 25 years of age are now leaving 
the country (almost 23,000 in 2015, + 13% in 2014) and emigration is also on the 
rise among people with a medium-low study title (52,000, + 9%). 
Western European countries are the prime destinations for emigrants with Ital-
ian citizenship: United Kingdom and Germany (both with more than 17,000 mi-
grants), Switzerland and France (11,000) together account for more than half the 
quota of emigrants.6 There are no reliable data which refer to the jobs and careers 
of the young emigrants; a recently published work focused on university research-
ers who are working abroad clearly highlights, not without criticism, that the Italian 
Minister of Education and Research has never created a register of Italian scholars 
working in foreign universities, in and outside Europe.7  
High-quality migration has always been present within the more general migra-
tory flows8 and has, in certain historical periods, taken on a major importance in 
the circulation of knowledge and ideas. In the public sphere a plurality of catego-
ries is used to refer to the phenomenon: from “brain drain” to “talent migration”, 
to “scientific diaspora”. The concept of brain drain dates back to the 1960s, when it 
was coined to describe the departure of British scientists and researchers towards 
                                                     
6 Fondazione Migrantes. Rapporto Italiani nel Mondo 2016, 
http://www.migrantesonline.it/siti/s2magazine/index1.jsp?idPagina=2785 (accessed 8 May 2017). 
Istat. Rapporto Migrazioni 2015. Migrazioni internazionali e interne della popolazione residente. 
https://www.istat.it/it/files/2016/12/Report_Migrazioni_Anno_2015.pdf?title=Migrazioni+della+p
opolazione+residente+-+06%2Fdic%2F2016+-+Testo+integrale+e+nota+metodologica.pdf (acces-
sed 8 May 2017).  
See also: European Commission, Employment and social development in Europe 2017, 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=738&langId=en&pubId=8030&furtherPubs=yes  
(accessed 28 August 2017). 
Eurostat. Being young in Europe today. 2015 edition, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/
3217494/6776245/KS-05-14-031-EN-N.pdf/18bee6f0-c181-457d-ba82-d77b314456b9 (accessed  
8 May 2017). 
Eurostat. Key Figures in Europe. 2016. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-statistical-
books/-/KS-EI-16-001 (accessed 8 May 2017). 
7 Chantal Saint-Blancat, editor, Ricercare altrove. Fuga dei cervelli, circolazione dei talenti, opportunità (Bo-
logna: il Mulino, 2017): 8. 
8 Maria Carolina Brandi, “Evoluzione degli studi sulle skilled migration: brain drain e mobilità”, 
Studi Emigrazione/Migration Studies XXXVIII, no. 141, 2001. Maria Carolina Brandi, “Storia del Brain 
Drain”, Studi Emigrazione, XLI, no.156, 2004, 775-794. Maria Carolina Brandi, “L’emigrazione dei 
ricercatori italiani”, in Rapporto Migrantes, ed. Fondazione Migrantes (Todi: Tau Editrice, 2014).  
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the United States. The concept was then used to include all skilled labour without 
distinction between professional sectors. In the following decade, the academic 
interest focused on the migration of qualified people from developing to devel-
oped countries, on the relationship between centre and periphery and on the loss 
of resources in developing countries.9 
According to this view, the less developed countries that invested in education 
and qualification of their youth failed to benefit from their investment, as their 
young, educated citizens often chose to emigrate, thus not contributing to the do-
mestic economic growth. This was the standard view through which highly qualified 
migrations were analyzed for many years.10 At the end of the 1990s however, this 
paradigm was replaced by the so-called brain-circulation theory11, which described 
the movements of highly qualified personnel as polycentric, circular, temporary 
and mutual.12 
Currently, there is strong migratory mobility in all EU countries13. European 
institutions have been one of the main actors in this process through the financing 
of mobility programs and internationalization projects. What characterizes Italy 
however is the lack of circulation of people with high skills; in other words, the 
number of those who move is not compensated by the same number of highly 
qualified people arriving to Italy, thus creating a situation of brain-drain/brain-gain 
within Europe: immigrants that move to Italy tend to have low levels of education 
and scarce work skills. This is calculated using a ratio called highly skilled exchange 
rate, which for Italy is equal to -1.2% (France 2.8%, Germany 2.2%, Spain 2.9%, 
United Kingdom 1.1%, and USA 20%).14  
Young Italian expats: the press coverage 
Over the last few years, Italian emigration has become an important issue, widely 
reported by media and press in particular. Publishing the readers’ emigration sto-
9 Alexander Schellinger, edit. Brain Drain - Brain Gain: European Labour Markets in Times of Crisis 
(Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2015), http://www.fes.de/de/politik-fuer-europa-2017-plus/ 
UNESCO, Management of Social Transformations (MOST). Scientific diasporas: a new approach to 
the brain drain, by Jean-Baptiste Meyer and Mercy Brown (Discussion Paper Series 41, 1999), 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001163/116330eo.pdf (accessed 8 May 2017) 
10 Stephen Castles, Hein de Haas and Mark J. Miller, The Age of Migration (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2009). 
11 Jaques Gaillard and Anne Marie Gaillard, “The International Mobility of Brains: Exodus or 
Circulation?”, Science, Technology and Society 2, no. 2 (1997): 195-228. 
12 Lorenzo Beltrame, “Realtà e retorica del brain drain in Italia. Stime statistiche, definizioni 
pubbliche e interventi politici”, Trento. Quaderni del Dipartimento di Sociologia e Ricerca Sociale, Quaderno 
35 (2007), http://web.unitn.it/files/quad35.pdf (accessed 10 May 2017). 
13 However, the actual numbers remain low – around 3% - less than non-EU migration to the 
EU. I thank Karolina Czerka-Shaw for this comment. 
14Ibid., 20. 
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ries has become a common practice, and many online versions of the most popular 
newspapers devote columns to this topic.  
This has contributed to the creation of a linear narrative, recounting different 
versions of the story of the (more or less) talented youngsters who are forced to 
emigrate, hence mirroring the fate of all those who, up to only a few decades ago, 
had to mass emigrate towards distant destinations.  
The main object of this qualitative study will be the Italian press production. 
As already mentioned, this study is explorative, since it does not move from any 
hypothesis. The analysis aims at identifying the main topics associated to the ex-
pression “brain drain” and the kind of information related. As many scholars have 
noted, the concept of “brain drain” is quite vague and includes a number of differ-
ent mobilities, from the fresh graduate who seeks new work experiences abroad to 
the renowned scientist. 
I have taken into consideration the three most important national newspapers 
(Corriere della Sera, Repubblica, Sole24Ore) and analyzed the articles published 
online from January 2016 to October 2017 containing the keyword fuga di cervelli 
(brain drain). 
What emerges is the picture of a country with increasing emigration levels that, 
compared to the past, not only includes people with a low to average education, 
but also individuals with higher levels of education (graduates, masters and PhD: 
the heterogeneity of this group is very high). The online press focuses precisely on 
this aspect of the migratory phenomenon and draws attention to the consequences 
from both an individual and social point of view. As far as the individual choices 
are concerned, the picture tends to be rather standardized and repetitive.  
The pattern is always the same: the difficulty of finding a job worthy of that 
name, unpaid internships and lack of opportunities push young people to other 
European and non-European countries. The economic reasons are evident, but 
there are also other factors that cannot be neglected, first and foremost the quest 
for more symbolic elements such as respect and recognition, which sadly lack in 
the Italian work environments. 
The reports are usually beefed up with the family’s perspective, tales of pride 
for their children’s achievements mixed with sorrow for the detachment, nostalgia 
and resentment towards a country that does not know what to do with its youth. In the 
articles, individual anecdotes are accompanied by contributions illustrating the 
consequences of emigration in both economic and social terms, and the political 
initiatives aimed at inverting the trend.  
The following section will briefly present the results of the analysis made on 
articles published by the three online versions of popular newspapers. The most 
important differences among the journals are undoubtedly the space reserved to 
the topic and the level of analysis, which can range from anecdotes to well-
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structured reports. It should be noted that the life histories presented are usually 
positive and inspiring: there is no room for unsuccessful experiences.15 
In the period from January 2016 to October 2017, the online versions of the 
three most popular national newspapers (Corriere della Sera, Repubblica and Il 
Sole 24 Ore) published 147 articles on brain drain .16 These three papers covered the 
subject in very diffeent ways, both in terms of frequency of publications and the 
type of information offered.  
Table 1 – Articles dedicated to the “brain drain” phenomenon 
Corriere della 
Sera 
Repubblica Il Sole 24 Ore 
Life histories 36 2 plus a dedicated 
section with 26 
life histories 
1 
Bad administra-
tion in universities 
and research cen-
ters  
9 10 2 
Research and 
policy reports 
30 26 15 
Political debates 9 7 / 
Corriere della Sera published 85 articles on the subject, and started a column called 
L’Italia dei figli lontani (Italy of the far away children), on family stories told by young 
expats and their parents; these stories were collected on WhatsApp and then pub-
lished online on a dedicated page. Corriere della Sera has the largest number of 
contributions regarding brain drain and analyses the topic from various angles. 
Repubblica published a total of 46 articles in several sections (university, press 
commentaries, economy...) and a page called “Cervelli in fuga”, which gathers true 
stories. Lastly, Il Sole 24 Ore, the most important economic newspapers in Italy, 
and owned by Confindustria (Italian Industrial Association), published 18 articles 
on the subject: there are no life histories but a good number of research and policy 
reports. 
15 It can be assumed that a process of self-selection is active: people who face failure are less 
willing to tell their experience.  
16The keywords used in the “search” function on the newspapers’ website were: “fuga cervelli” 
and “fuga di cervelli”. The keywords rarely appear in the headlines, but abound in the text of the 
articles. The period taken into account was January 1st, 2016 to October 20th, 2017.  
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The content analysis identified four thematic areas (Tab 1):  
 Life Histories, describing the stories of people who, at different stages of 
their career, are forced to expatriate because of the impossibility to achieve 
their goals in their homeland. Generally speaking, these are stories of suc-
cess, but often reveal an underlying combination of clashing feelings, 
namely gratitude and resentment. Gratitude emerges from acknowledging 
the opportunities that the educational system has offered, making it possi-
ble for the young protagonist to compete globally on the world market. 
Resentment is directed towards the same system, often unable to offer ca-
reer opportunities, hence abandoning the young generation in a limbo of 
nothingness.  
The life histories therein collected describe a normality made of working routines, 
new friends, and nostalgia for the family. The future remains an open question. No 
mention is ever made to negative experiences, failures, changes of heart. The fami-
lies of origin are given space in the news, too: Repubblica and Corriere della Sera 
both promote initiatives in favour of the parents of young expats.17  
 Bad administration in universities and research centers. The focus is on 
episodes of corruption and scandals involving the university recruitment 
system. In these articles, the connection between the two issues is almost 
immediate and the result is a general discredit of the university system. 
Usually, the chronic underfunding of university and research institutions is 
only mentioned in passing. 
 Statistical information, research reports, intervention proposals: these arti-
cles display the results of the most popular researches published in Italy 
regarding the brain drain issue and its costs. In general, these data do not 
allow for the comparison of the Italian situation with that on the other 
side of the border. The data are usually followed by interviews with ex-
perts who illustrate the best policies to solve the problem, from fund allo-
cation to reverse brain drain, from tax reductions for companies hiring 
young people to initiatives endorsing youth entrepreneurship and start-
ups. 
 Political statements and controversy hardly leave any trace in the newspa-
pers, even though they are often a clear indicator of the disinterest with 
which politics tackle the issue.  
This brief analysis confirms the tendency to represent the brain drain using a single 
image, without considering the issue in its complexity. An example of the standard-
ized approach is the lack of articles focusing on related topics, such as brain gain, 
brain circulation and brain waste. It should also be noted that the concept of brain 
                                                     
17An example is www.mammedicervelliinfuga.com, a blog created by the mother of two expats, 
sharing experiences and supplying advice (retrieved October 1st, 2017). 
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drain tends to merge with the topic of youth emigration: the two issues are deeply 
intertwined and are often considered as facets of the same concept.  
The biggest limit of the public debate promoted by the press is the exclusive 
focus on the concept of brain drain, usually presented using an anecdotal and stere-
otypical narrative. The debate should be developed to include other themes that, 
although linked to the broader issue of youth unemployment and underemploy-
ment, have inadequate coverage.  
First and foremost is the issue of brain waste involving talented young people 
who remain in Italy and are forced to take up unskilled jobs with no career pro-
spects: this is a waste of talent and vitality, of years of education, ideas and energy. 
One example of brain waste is the phenomenon of neets: whilst in Europe the aver-
age is 11.5%, according to the latest data published by the European Commission 
the levels in Italy are much higher, i.e. 19.9% of the young Italian population.18  
Another important but neglected issue is linked to what can be called “the op-
tion of failure”: in the articles I examined there is only room for success stories, 
while no visibility is given to whoever failed and hence returned to Italy. Ignoring 
this possibility gives a falsified picture of the emigration process, an almost Eldo-
rado-like imaginary.  
In the following paragraphs, the focus will be shifted to the concepts of repre-
sentation and imaginary in the study of migration.  
Imaginary and representations of places 
The traditional approach employed to study migration typically consists of an anal-
ysis of the issue from economic, historical-structural, systemic and transnational 
points of view. An effective synthesis has led to the theorization of two models, 
defined as human capital theory and neomarxist approach to periphery center relation-
ships, respectively.19 The former model adopts a micro-social perspective, and then 
analyzes the individual - and rational - push driving people to search for a more 
favorable environment. The latter model consists of a macro-analysis of the issue 
and approaches migration through center-peripheral relationships.  
These two paradigms are identified as the standard view, which essentially con-
siders migration of skilled workers as (often unidirectional) the movement from 
developing to developed countries of individuals who choose to optimize the per-
formance of their education. From a micro-social perspective, the prevailing set-
ting results from a rational choice. 
18 European Commission, Employment and social development in Europe 2017, 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=738&langId=en&pubId=8030&furtherPubs=yes (ac-
cessed 13 October 2017). Alessandro Rosina, Neet. Giovani che non studiano e non lavorano (Milano: Vita e 
Pensiero, 2015). 
19 Beltrame, “Realtà e retorica del brain drain in Italia”; Robyn Iredale, “The migration of pro-
fessionals: theories and typologies”, International Migration 39(5) (2001): 7-24. Stephen Castles, Hein de 
Haas and Mark J. Miller. The Age of Migration (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009). 
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Less attention has been given to the combination of aspirations and expecta-
tions and to the role of myths and imaginaries associated with the countries of 
destination.  
The concept of myth here employed is that described by Barthes, hence a spe-
cial type of speech. In other words, myth is not just a genre of stories, but a way of 
saying things, an ethos, an ideology or set of values. Yet the integration process is 
strongly influenced by individual plans and strategies: aspirations and expectations 
are certainly influenced by individual characteristics (mainly age, level of education, 
civil status), but equally important are the social and cultural environment where 
the subject is inserted and these aspects shape his or her imaginary of migration. 
By the concept of imaginary, I refer to the set of past, present and future imag-
es associated with a certain place; those images characterize that place and define it, 
but at the same time influence the ways in which individuals approach and experi-
ence it in cultural, social and spatial terms. D'Amato20 defines imaginary as “the 
direct product of the tensions and relationships that man has with his physical and 
mental environment (...) the reality transformed into its representation (…). Its 
contents are mostly abstract; however, symbols, images, ideas have a concrete im-
pact (...)”.21 The concept is interpreted in relation to its opposites (the real and the 
symbolic), can be defined as “a set of representations”22  and viewed as “the inter-
face of the individual with the social, the rational with the instinctual (...) They 
always have a subject and an object: they are always representations of something 
for someone”.23 As such they arise in a certain place and context and through them 
“one can understand the world and the role played by individuals”.24 As regards 
the formation of social representation, Moscovici identifies a two-way process that 
includes the stages of anchoring and objectification. Through the anchoring process, 
individuals transform what is perceived as strange into something familiar, so as to 
make it understandable. The complementary process is objectivation, through 
which the subject attributes new meanings to a representation.25 
Myths and imaginaries have been defined as “symbolic collective representa-
tions of individuals’ aspirations, hopes and dreams (…) myths and imaginaries 
constitute an important part of migrants’ experiences and have concrete implica-
tions for the study of migration”.26  
                                                     
20 Marina D’Amato, “Rappresentazioni dell’immaginario”, in Finzione e mondi possibili. Per una so-
ciologia dell’immaginario, ed. Marina D’Amato (Padova: Libreria Universitaria, 2012), 3-35. 
21 Ibid., 10. 
22 Ibid., 11. 
23 Ibid., 17. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Serge Moscovici, Le rappresentazioni sociali (Bologna: il Mulino, 2005); Ambrogio Santambrogio, 
“Le rappresentazioni sociali dei giovani in Italia: alcune ipotesi interpretative”, in Le rappresentazioni 
sociali dei giovani in Italia, ed. Franco Crespi (Roma: Carocci, 2002), 15-40. 
26 Delphine Nakache, Helen Pellerin and Luisa Veronis, Migrants’ Myths and Imaginaries. Under-
standing their Role in Migration Movements and Policies (policy brief, Ottawa: University of Ottawa, 2015), 
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By using these concepts, the authors refer to three kinds of myths: 
1. the myth that the migrant embodies - an example used by Nakache et al. is
that according to which the migrant is viewed as a hero, hence the decision to 
undertake the journey is influenced by notions of honor and social recognition;  
2. the myth of migration itself, as in the case of freedom of geographical
mobility, referring to migrants’ desire to move freely despite increasingly stringent 
travel requirements; 
3. the myth of the countries of destination, a sort of positive narrative about
the social and political conditions in those countries. As Salazar suggested: “The 
motivations to cross borders are usually multiple but greatly linked to the ability of 
travelers and their social networks to imagine other places and lives. People hardly 
journey to terrae incognitae (…) but to destinations they already virtually “know” 
through the widely circulating imaginaries about them”.27 
Schapendonk distinguishes between aspirations and intentions.28 Aspirations 
refer to the "dreams of a life" that an individual would like to accomplish but can-
not be expressed in an ordinary, everyday life. Intentions refer to the concrete 
plans that the individual puts into action to accomplish his or her project of migra-
tion. The overlapping of aspirations and intentions, between the chance to realize a 
project of life and the concreteness of minimum requirements, everyday choices 
that represent small steps by which the individual hopes to approach the goal feed 
the imagery built around the destination country. The aspirations remain alive even 
in times of immobility and are at the basis of what is known as “migration cul-
ture”.29 
Ordinary emigrations and the idea of Europe 
Currently, the debates on the emigration of young, qualified Italians tend to em-
phasize the element of “escape”: migration would appear to be the only way out of 
unemployment – and therefore the only possibility to realize a life-project. 
The focus is therefore on the national issues that push young people rather 
than on those elements, especially cultural elements, which act as an attraction.  
I would like to suggest another perspective: for young Italians, moving abroad 
for long or short periods of time is just one of the various opportunities offered by 
life, since Europe is viewed as a familiar space.  
https://ruor.uottawa.ca/bitstream/10393/32834/4/Policy%20Brief%20-
%20Migrants%27%20Myths%20and%20Imaginaries.pdf (accessed 10 April 2017). 
27 Noel B Salazar, “The Power of Imagination in Transnational Mobilities”, Identities. Global Stud-
ies in Culture and Power, 18, no. 6, 2012: 576-598. 
28 Joris Schapendonk, “Turbulent Trajectories: African Migrants on Their Way to the European 
Union”, Societies 2(2) (2012), 27-41. 
29 Douglas S. Massey, “Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal”, Population 
and Development Review, 1(3) (1993), 431-466. 
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To date, there is no research exploring the role of the three types of myths de-
scribed previously, but recently published reports and researches offer an interest-
ing insight on issues that are strictly linked to them:  
The Migrantes Report30 describes Italian youth as an extremely educated gen-
eration, possessing qualified postgraduate degrees - specialization courses, masters, 
research fellowships, language certifications, study programs for international ex-
changes. 
Paradoxically however, this is also the most vulnerable generation in terms of 
job opportunities: unemployment rates are high, and youngsters do not consider 
emigration as a “flight” but rather as a means of satisfying ambitions and nurturing 
curiosity. Their mobility today is in the pipeline and can change continuously be-
cause it is not based on an already determined migratory project but on the oppor-
tunities encountered. 
The migratory event can be better defined as a path than as a well-defined pro-
ject: the direction it points to greatly depends on the opportunities encountered 
during the journey. Personal and professional life are thus closely intertwined. 
This condition paves the way to the analysis of the reasons behind the migra-
tory event (once again, the so-called push factors): 
• as regards the job context: the desire to find new and better working condi-
tions (employment and wages), to test oneself in more international and merito-
cratic environment, and to improve professionally; 
• as regards the personal context: a desire to discover, the curiosity to experi-
ence other social contexts, both in known and totally new places. 
Without denying the difficult national situation, when referring to their migra-
tion path, young people tend to refuse the term escape or flight, pointing out that 
their departure was above all a choice they made to satisfy their ambitions and 
appease their curiosity, and for this reason can be seen as one of the many stages 
of their life-path.31  
The research conducted by the University of Padua and focused on scholars 
who are currently working in European universities highlighted the aspect of casu-
alty of their migratory experience. Looking back at their choices, the majority of 
scientists confess that the reasons were not particularly clear, adequately motivated, 
or rational: at the beginning of their career many of the scientists interviewed did 
not think about their future as a one-way path32; the choice of going abroad 
seemed to be a random choice and surely there was a balanced mix of push and 
pull factors.33  
                                                     
30 Fondazione Migrantes, Rapporto Italiani nel Mondo 2016, 
http://www.migrantesonline.it/siti/s2magazine/index1.jsp?idPagina=2785 (accessed 8 May 2017) 
31 Ibid. 
32 Saint-Blancat, Ricercare altrove, 30. 
33 Ibid., 31. 
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In their relationship with Europe, young Italians display some of the unique 
traits that characterize them: in the first place, a strong sense of national identity, 
accompanied by an equally strong sense of local affiliation. As far as Europe is 
concerned, the strongest feeling of belonging can be found among the youngest 
and most highly educated (progressively decreasing as the age increases).34 
As far as the membership of the various territorial spheres is concerned, both 
the Migrantes report and the Young Report35 highlight the multiplicity of these 
affinities: young people are anchored to their country, of course, but multiple 
membership is the distinctive feature of young contemporary Europeans. This is 
confirmed also by the research coordinated by Saint-Blancat, in which the scien-
tists interviewed affirmed that “home” is where their family lives and where they 
can do science as they like. Some of them confess that Italy is strongly present but, 
at the same time, they refuse to make a choice because they admit they call home 
both Italy and Europe. Saint-Blancat goes beyond this dichotomy and relies on the 
concept of scientific diaspora to analyze the experience of these expats; this transna-
tional scientific community does not have frontiers or borders: living in the diaspora 
implies a procedural and dynamic relationship where the individual and collective 
identity is continually re-elaborated, where one experiences the social importance 
of identification and at the same time its denial. The symbolic centrality does not 
coincide with any particular territory: scientists feel they are members of an ex-
tended scientific community, beyond the borders of their own national academy.36 
In the order they are: scientists, then Europeans and/or Italians.37  
The Migrantes report confirms that millennials have grown up with the mobility 
paradigm within Europe, which is rated as a positive resource especially in the 
south of Italy, where mobility seems to be a natural destiny.  
European countries are perceived as places where one can find a job in one’s 
field of knowledge, putting into practice what one studied in Italy. Young Report38 
highlights for example that young Europeans’ willingness to move, even for limited 
34 Fondazione Migrantes, Rapporto Italiani nel Mondo 2016. See also, Fondazione Migrantes, Rap-
porto italiani nel mondo 2017 (Todi: Editrice Tau, 2017). 
35 Istituto Giuseppe Toniolo, La condizione giovanile in Italia. Rapporto giovani 2016 (Bologna: il Mu-
lino, 2017). 
36 Gabaccia, in her fundamental study on Italian emigration, introduced this idea of home as com-
munity: “In the modern civiltà italiana of Italy’s proletarian diasporas, home is still a face-to-face com-
munity – not the idea of a people rooted to a place, but the place itself. And that place can be anywhere in 
the world; it is not necessarily Italy, but a well-known village, neighborhood, or city anywhere in the 
world. (…) The civiltà italiana (…) continues to emerge from the local ties – and the everyday pleas-
ures – of food, family, parish and home place, all things that can be enjoyed and savored anywhere in 
the world that people call home” (my italics). Cfr. Donna R. Gabaccia., Italy’s many diasporas (London: 
UCL Press, 2000), 191. 
37 Saint-Blancat, Ricercare altrove, 77-78. 
38 Rita Bichi, “Leave or remain: integrazione, appartenenza e mobilità dei giovani europei”, in La 
condizione giovanile in Italia. Rapporto giovani 2016, ed. Istituto Giuseppe Toniolo (Bologna: il Mulino, 
2017), 97-121. 
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periods of time, from their homeland, and Italy, Spain and Poland in particular, is 
driven by the perspective of “personal enrichment”. The reasons against this 
choice can be usually ascribed to attachment to their family. 
These figures are consistent with the Eurobarometer 2014 survey, which states 
that “more than four in ten young Europeans said that they would like to work, 
study or undergo training in another EU country. This voluntary mobility is an 
aspiration shared by at least six out of ten young people in six EU Member States 
(Slovenia, Croatia, Estonia, Cyprus, Romania and Italy) and by at least half in 15 
others. In contrast, young people in Belgium, the Netherlands, the United King-
dom and France are the least likely to express a desire for mobility”.39 
Another survey carried out in 2012 by Viacom International Media Networks 
involved 15,000 individuals born between 1981 and 2001, resident in 24 countries. 
This survey revealed that 6 young Italians out of 10 believed that their lives would 
be better if they lived in another country.40 
Europe does not need to attract them in terms of membership, as it is already 
perceived as their playground, but with concrete opportunities for growth and 
social inclusion. Freedom and culture are the values that, according to the young peo-
ple interviewed, embody the idea of Europe.41 Europe is an opportunity, a wider 
ground for study, work and life opportunities. However, it is a work in progress as 
regards the role of the institutions and their policies for progressive integration.42 
Conclusion 
The emigration of young Italians and the phenomenon of brain drain are sensitive 
topics to which the media devote ample space. The analysis presented in the previ-
ous pages focusing on online articles published by the three major national on-line 
newspapers, however, reveals that the issue is usually presented to the readers in an 
over-simplified manner. Life histories often become a sort of mythical narrative: 
the talented young woman/man who, thanks to her/his abilities and family sup-
port, is able to make his or her way in a global context. This type of narrative over-
shadows the complexity of the issue and tends to ignore all failures with their bit-
ter, unavoidable return home. It also neglects the contiguous phenomenon of brain 
                                                     
39 Flash Eurobarometer (395), European Youth In 2014 Analytical Synthesis, in  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/eurobarometre/2014/youth/eb_395_synthesis_youth_en.pdf 
(accessed 21 June 2017), 2. 
Flash Eurobarometer (408). European Youth Report  
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/flash/fl_408_en.pdf (accessed 28 August 
2017). 
40 Corriere della Sera, “Giovani infelici e con la voglia di espatriare”. 2 December 2012. 
http://solferino28.corriere.it/2012/12/02/giovani-infelici-e-con-la-voglia-di-espatriare/?refresh_ce-
cp (accessed 21 June 2017). 
41 Bichi, Leave or remain, 103. 
42 Ibid, 105. 
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waste: the protagonists are the same young people, more or less skilled, whose 
potential remains unexpressed. 
The aim of the paper was also to reverse the image of migration, especially to-
wards other European countries, as an extraordinary event. To date, no research 
has been carried out on representative samples of young Italian emigrants that 
focuses on the analysis of pull factors and the role played by the imaginary associ-
ated with the country of destination. Recently however, investigations by the Toni-
olo Institute and the Migrantes Foundation have revealed that the decision to emi-
grate is no longer considered out of the norm, hence leaving Italy is just one of the 
many options available. For young Italians, moving abroad for long or short peri-
ods of time is simply one of the various opportunities that life has to offer, and not 
an irreversible choice: Europe does not represent a step towards the unknown, but 
a familiar space with shared values, where one can achieve one’s goals and aspira-
tions.  
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Introduction 
In the early morning hours of 16 October 2012, two men, Radu and Adrian, en-
tered through the unlocked fire escape of the Kunsthal, an art museum in Rotter-
dam, the Netherlands, which at that moment was exhibiting artwork from the 
privately-owned Triton Collection, and took with them five paintings and two 
pastel drawings by Picasso, Matisse and Guigan, amongst others.1 A friend in a get-
away car was ready on standby near the museum, and within minutes after entering 
the museum drove them, and the works, away from the museum. After hiding the 
stolen goods in the house of Radu, the three travelled to Carcaliu in eastern Roma-
nia, where Radu and Adrian grew up. After unsuccessful attempts to sell the 
works, the seven “manageable sized” works of art - insured for about 18 million 
Euros2 - were first buried, and later, allegedly, burned by Radu’s mother, Olga, in a 
wooden stove in her home.3 Although it has not been established beyond doubt 
what had happened to the works of art, they have - until now - not yet been locat-
ed, and their incineration remains a probable explanation of their fate so far.4 
                                                     
1 The following works were stolen: Monet’s Waterloo Bridge, London (1901) and Charing Cross 
Bridge, London (1901), Picasso’s Tete d'Arlequin (1971), Gauguin’s Femme devant une fenêtre ouverte (1888), 
Matisse’s La Liseuse en Blanc et Jaune (1919), Meyer De Haan’s Autoportrait, (1898-1891) and Lucian 
Freud’s Woman with Eyes Closed (2002). 
2 The paintings were insured for about double their market value, a standard practice when rare 
pieces in private possession are lent to museums. The theft and the subsequent pay-out by the insurer 
to the owners has been called “a stunning piece of business” (Ed Caesar, “What is the Value of 
Stolen Art?” New York Times Magazine, 13 November 2013). 
3 Lex Boon, “Het kunst van het stelen,” https://www.nrc.nl/kunsthal/ , 2014, accessed 25 June 
2017. See also Andrew Higgins, “A Trail of Masterpieces and a Web of Lies, Leading to Anguish,” 
New York Times, 26 July 2013 (accessed 27 October 2017). 
4 The mother, although having testified that she burned the works of art, later retracted her tes-
timony (Boon, 2014). 
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Three years later, Romanian-Dutch author, Mira Feticu published the novel, 
Tascha, subtitled: “The theft from the Kunsthal”. In this novel, she tells a hitherto 
obscured, second story related to the artwork theft. Whereas the media attention 
focused mainly on the logistics of the theft and the subsequent police investigation 
in the Netherlands and Romania, the much-speculated value of the specific art-
works, and the possibility that Radu’s mother had burned the artworks, the novel 
presents as its main story that of Radu’s young girlfriend, who was one of the sus-
pected accomplices to the crime, kept in custody by the Dutch police, and ques-
tioned in Romania about the whereabouts of the works of arts, rather than that of 
the robbery. The real-life Natasha remained more or less marginal in the media 
reporting on the theft and subsequent police investigation, with minor references 
to her mostly being about the aid she provided to her boyfriend's mother, Olga, to 
bury the artworks, and the fact that she worked in the Dutch sex industry. 
In much of the media reporting on this widely discussed art heist, the coming 
together of crime, prostitution, and Eastern Europeans, got tied together in a pro-
ductive and well-known social imaginary that construes Eastern Europe as a prob-
lem for Western Europe. This case of Balkanism5 functions as a good example of 
the one-sided and stereotypical representation through which Eastern Europeans 
are often homogenized and stigmatized as (one of) Western Europe's criminal and 
problematic others.6 In fact, in the Dutch media the thieves were described as 
offenders who were already known in Romania as “gangsters” before the Kunsthal 
robbery and who, while being involved in criminal activities (dealing in stolen 
goods, drugs and being involved in prostitution), were living and working in parts of 
Western Europe, implicitly referring here to the negative and often criticized ef-
fects of the intra-European free mobility of goods, persons, services and capital.7  
The author, Feticu, however, makes a clear case of the “greater crime” that had 
been perpetrated by the thieves, namely that of sex trafficking.8 However, rather 
than simply confirming and perpetuating the existing circulation of Balkanist repre-
5 See Maria Todorova, Imagining the Balkan, Oxford University Press, 1997 and Barbara Korte, 
Eva Ulrike Pirker, and Sissy Helff, eds., Facing the East in the West: Images of Eastern Europe in British 
Literature, Film and Culture, Rodopi, 2010. 
6 Cf. Laura Moroșanu and Jon E. Fox. “‘No Smoke without Fire’: Strategies of Coping with 
Stigmatised Migrant Identities,” Ethnicities 13, no. 4 (2013): 438-456 p. 442. See also Duncan Light 
and Craig Young. “European Union Enlargement, Post-Accession Migration and Imaginative Geog-
raphies of the ‘New Europe’: Media Discourses in Romania and the United Kingdom,” Journal of 
Cultural Geography 26, no. 3 (2009): 281-303. 
7 See for example Corrb Vos Davidson, “Wie is wie in de Rotterdamse kunstroof?” Algemeen Ne-
derlands Persbureau 11 August 2013. The populist right-wing party, Party voor de Vrijheid (Freedom 
Party) opened a website where Dutch nationals could register their complaints about Central and 
Eastern European living in the Netherlands. (Reuters, “Dutch allow Wilders’ anti-Pole website, EU 
critical,” Reuters, 10 February 2012, http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-dutch-immigrants/dutch-
allow-wilders-anti-pole-website-eu-critical-idUKTRE8191ML20120210, accessed 30 October 2017.  
8 This statement is made not only in the novel itself, but also in interviews given by Feticu to the 
media. See for example Renate van der Zee, “Als je arm bent grijp je alle kansen,” NRC Handelsblad 
20 June 2015.  
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sentations, her novel both documents the theft of the artworks and the official 
police investigation into the case, but also tells the story of a young (ca. 17-year 
old) woman, Tascha, who had been coerced by her pimp boyfriend Radu to move 
from rural Romania (Carcaliu) to urban Netherlands (Rotterdam), where she was 
to work in the sex industry to earn a living for both of them and other dependents 
by providing sexual services advertised on the internet. 
With the question about the visions of Europe and Europeans being the focus 
of this publication, a careful reading of this literary text warrants our attention, not 
only because it tells the story from the unexpected and hitherto more or less “in-
visible” perspective of an accomplice to the crime, but also because the text ren-
ders imaginatively the life of a marginalized European, whose existence is seldom 
symbolically rendered, as it is in this case, through literary and fictional mecha-
nisms employed by the novel.9 The literary text poses important questions about 
the effects European integration or Europeanisation processes have on those who 
are economically vulnerable and exploited, that is: living at the (both literal and 
figurative) margins of European society. In this literary rendition of historical facts, 
a severely exploited migrant woman working in the Dutch sex industry is made 
visible and thereby given subjectivity that transcends the stereotypical, shallow 
representation of her that existed so far. This contribution is an analysis of this 
subjectivity-rendering process in Feticu’s text and questions that were followed in 
the process of analyzing the novel were: How and where and who is visible or 
invisible in this discourse that makes sense of Europe and Europeanization? How 
does Feticu’s text help us ask questions about Europeanness?  
In the remaining part of this chapter, I will, after a brief conceptual exploration 
of the notion “precarity”, turn to the novel’s imaginative engagement with Eu-
rope’s “own” precarious other to investigate how a fictional narrative such as 
Tascha gives voice and agency to the liminal experiences of precarious European 
subjects, whose visibility, if rendered semiotically at all, is oftentimes either as 
“spectacles” of misery or quantified as numbers in the form of numerical data.10 In 
                                                     
9 The field of sociology is better stocked with examples of research that pays attention to the 
lives of such marginalized persons. See for example Anna Triandafyllidou, Irregular Migrant Domestic 
Workers in Europe: Who Cares? Routledge, 2016, Agnieszka Rydzik et al., “Humanising Migrant Wom-
en’s Work,” Annals of Tourism Research 64, no. Supplement C (2017): 13–23. 
10 Examples (albeit problematic ones!) of more qualitative, aesthetic representation exist, of 
course with regard to impoverished Europeans, although the question is to which extent and what 
kind of voice these representations have given the migrant/mobile vulnerable persons. I’m thinking 
here specifically of the 2017 project by Danish artist, Kristian von Hornsleth, entitled Hornsleth Home-
less Tracker in which he fitted homeless people in London with GPS tracking devices which enabled 
them to be followed at about 28.000 euro per person. If they managed to maintain this GPS tracking 
process for a year, they would share in half of the proceeds (see 
https://www.hornslethhomelesstracker.com/). A second example, from 2014, is from Malmö where 
the Swedish collective, Institutet, exhibited two homeless Romani migrants from Romania in the 
Konsthall museum for a “fee” of 150 euro per day, as part of the exhibition “The Alien Within: A 
Living Laboratory of Western Society”. 
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my discussion I will show that what the novel does is to convey the situated 
knowledge of, to use Peter Brown's formulation, an otherwise “eminently forget-
table person”11 living marginally under precarious conditions, and as such stimu-
lates the reader to critically rethink “Europe” and Europeanness. 
Precarity 
The various crises and transformations that Europe has had to face during the past 
years do not need to be recounted here extensively: from the global financial crisis 
of 2008, to the fiscal and Eurozone crisis soon afterward and the migration or 
refugee crisis on the one hand, to the current concerns about European transfor-
mation and possibly even disintegration, the breaking down of the European wel-
fare state, the continued development of neoliberal, flexible labour markets, and 
the rise of illiberal democracy on the other hand. As a result Europe has been per-
ceived to be under siege from all kinds of directions. Although analysts, politicians, 
and commentators pay much attention to the effects of these transformational 
processes on political institutions, attention is also being paid to the often-times 
negative effects (a form of “slow violence”, to speak with Rob Nixen12) of these 
dynamic processes on the lived lives of Europeans, which have led to an increasing 
situation of insecurity, uncertainty, risk, vulnerability and dependence across a 
range of occupations and conventional economic classes. 13 This situation is well 
contained by the notion of “precarity”.14  
It is beyond the purpose of this chapter to provide an extensive discussion of 
the concept's history, and a basic delineation should suffice. Millar, following 
Pierre Bourdieu, traces the concept’s introduction and rise in the social sciences 
and points out its use as a reference to a particular “labour condition”, character-
ized by job insecurity/unemployment, social exclusion and poverty, and caused 
mainly by neoliberalism and the decline of social welfare.15 The concept is, follow-
ing the work done by Judith Butler16, for example, also used in another sense, to 
indicate the existential and ontological condition of vulnerability, exposure to pos-
11 Peter Brown, “Remembering the Poor and the Aesthetic of Society,” The Journal of Interdiscipli-
nary History 35, no. 3 (2005): 513-522. 
12 Rob Nixon, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor, Harvard University Press, 2011. 
13 See for example Donatella della Porta, et al., eds., The New Social Division: Making and Unmaking 
Precariousness, Springer, 2016. 
14 I opt for “precarity” rather than risk or vulnerability, agreeing with Louise Waite that using 
this term precarity enables one to “incorporate the political and institutional context in which the 
production of precarity occurs. (Louise Waite, “A Place and Space for a Critical Geography of Pre-
carity?” Geography Compass 3, no. 1 (2009): 421). For an overview of the concept, see Mike Savage, 
Social Class in the 21st Century, Pelican, 2015.  
15 Kathleen M. Millar, “Toward a Critical Politics of Precarity,” Sociology Compass 11, no. 6 (2017). 
16 Judith Butler, “Precarious Life, Vulnerability, and the Ethics of Cohabitation,” Journal of Specu-
lative Philosophy 26, no. 2 (2012): 134 – 151. 
van der Waal: Making Precarious Lives Visible 
 
 
133 
sible suffering, and risk of losing attachment to those social relationships that 
could provide care and protection.17 
People experiencing or facing precarity (used in the first sense) often find 
themselves in volatile, insecure labour situations, which have received attention in 
scholarship often, although not exclusively, as research on the informal sector.18 
Labour precarity traverses a range of economic practices, but has an evident rela-
tionship with the informal sector. The informal sector includes not only domestic 
work, service sector jobs in hotels and restaurants and the construction sector, to 
name but a few, but also the more shadowy side of the economy that includes 
illegal practices such as women’s trafficking, prostitution and crime, although these 
practices are left outside of consideration in policy-based research, even though 
they constitute economic activity of some form or another. As Anca Parvulescu, in 
her study on trafficked women in Europe makes clear, the existence of such prac-
tices in the shadows of the economy should be understood not as “side-effects of 
Europeanization, but as some of the forms that Europeanization takes”.19 The free 
movement of goods, services, money and persons, introduced by the Maastricht 
Treaty of 1992, has been an important driver of this Europeanization, and has 
become one of the hallmarks of Europe.20  
Given the novel’s treatment of art theft and sex work in a European context, it 
is clear that it is exactly this mobile, informal sector of Europe that is being put 
imaginatively on the table. It might help us, therefore, to think here of Europeani-
zation not exclusively in terms of official political-institutional integration and eco-
nomic growth and development, but as a complex process with less visible and less 
desired (at least for some) dimensions too.  
The novel 
The purpose of my reading of this novel was to examine how literature engages 
with a precarious subject, specifically that of a trafficked Eastern European in a 
Western European context. How does the novel give voice and agency to the ex-
perience of such a precarious person who is economically and socially marginalized 
and vulnerable, and whose symbolic representation as an Eastern European wom-
an seldom overcomes grossly simplified stereotyping? These questions are im-
portant ones to ask, because as Majorie Stone contends, literary and cultural stud-
ies have left the pressing and growing problem of trafficking more or less un-
                                                     
17 For an example of this approach, see Kathleen Stewart, “Precarity’s Forms,” Cultural Anthro-
pology 27, no. 3 (2012): 518-525. 
18 Karin A. Siegmann and Freek Schiphorst, “Understanding the Globalizing Precariat: From In-
formal Sector to Precarious Work,” Progress in Development Studies 16, no. 2 (2016): 111-123. 
19 Anca Parvulescu, The Traffic in Women’s Work: East European Migration and the Making of Europe, 
University of Chicago Press, 2014, 2. For a discussion of the informal sector in Western Europe, see 
Dominique Boels, The Informal Economy: Seasonal Work, Street Selling and Sex Work, Springer, 2016.  
20 Ettore Recchi, Mobile Europe: The Theory and Practice of Free Movement in the EU, Springer, 2015. 
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touched21, while more attention has been paid to this global phenomenon among 
feminist social scientists.22 Furthermore, the attention that has been paid in literary 
and cultural studies to (the lack of visibility of) precarious and impoverished per-
sons and the effects thereof on personhood is also rather scant.23 
In her fictive rendering of the historical facts, Mira Feticu presents in three 
parts the unsuccessful investigation by two Dutch police officers to investigate the 
case of the stolen works of art. For this purpose they travel twice to Romania, 
together with Tascha, the girlfriend of Radu (one of the thieves), who has been 
accused of complicity with the crime because she first hid the artworks in their 
home in Rotterdam, and later aided Radu’s mother, Olga, to bury the paintings in 
the small town of Carcaliu in Romania. The narrative relates the investigation no-
tably through the perspective of Tascha, but not exclusively, to achieve a form of 
polyphony in the narrative. Tascha’s perspective is complemented with, even chal-
lenged by those of other characters, such as, for example, one of the two Dutch 
policemen (“the tall one”, who “looked deep into your eyes when speaking to 
you”, p. 924), Adriana, the curator of European art at Romania’s national art muse-
um who was brought along as expert by a potential buyer to verify the authenticity 
of the artworks, and who only later realized that she had seen with her own eyes 
two of the Kunsthal’s missing artworks, and the uncle of one of the accused, Ome 
(uncle) Trăienica.  
A secondary storyline, however, is also interwoven through flashbacks into the 
story. This story relates the personal history of Tascha: her youth in a rural back-
water in Romania, the death of her sister because of a car accident, her parents' 
divorce, her strong emotional dependence on her father, her falling in love with 
Radu and her growing dependence on him, their move to Rotterdam, where she is 
forced into prostitution by her pimp boyfriend,25 as well as her own decision, after 
she is released from custody in the Netherlands, to return to sex work to secure an 
income, which she was to save in order to pay the medical bills of her ailing father 
in Romania. Although Tascha in the novel has a real-life counterpart, the 19-year 
21 The work of Barbéran Reinares and Parvulescu are clear exceptions (Laura Barberán Reina-
res, Sex Trafficking in Postcolonial Literature: Transnational Narratives from Joyce to Bolaño, Routledge, 2014, 
and Anca Parvulescu, The Traffic in Women's Work: East European Migration and the Making of Europe, 
University of Chicago Press, 2014). 
22 Marjorie Stone, “Twenty-first Century Global Sex Trafficking: Migration, Capitalism, Class, 
and Challenges for Feminism Now,” ESC: English Studies in Canada 1, no. 2 (2005): 31-38, p. 35. 
23 Some exceptions exist, of course. For example, Françoise Král, Social Invisibility and Diasporas in 
Anglophone Literature and Culture: The Fractal Gaze, Springer, 2014 and Barbara Korte and Frédéric 
Regard, eds., Narrating Poverty and Precarity in Britain, De Gruyter, 2014.  
24 In-text references are to the novel, Tascha by Mira Fetica (2015). Citations are translations 
from Dutch by the author (Margriet van der Waal)  
25 The author’s intention to make visible the “greater” crime, that of human trafficking com-
pared to the stealing of the artworks, is echoed in the sentiments of a female police officer: “And she, 
the woman in the uniform, thought human trafficking (to be) worse than robbery, regardless of what 
had been stolen” (p. 42). 
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old Natasha, a migrant from Romania to the Netherlands, she also represents in 
many ways other “Natashas” who cross international borders every year to work, 
willingly or under coercion in the sex industries of Europe and America.26 
Marginal Europe 
It is in this second storyline that the vulnerable and precarious Tascha is given a 
history and background that situates her as a marginal, European subject. The 
flashbacks to the past sketch the context of how Tascha ended up as a prostitute 
against her will in one of Rotterdam’s most impoverished regions, the neighbour-
hood of Rubroek/Crooswijk. These flashbacks create the social, economic and 
cultural context to Tascha the character’s decisions and actions. 
The dual setting of the narrative, both in Rotterdam and Romania, not only 
connects the various locations and suggests meaningful but complex and compli-
cated entanglements with each other, but also demonstrates the importance of 
seeing space as relational to the coming into existence of social subjects.27 By using 
specific literary mechanisms such as flashbacks and focalisation by a specific char-
acter, the novel explores not only the art theft, but also the recent political and 
economic transitions in Romania. Thus, the end Ceausescu’s regime and political 
revolution is seen as a promise of the start of a new life (p. 96), while the contem-
porary dire living conditions in postsocialist, rural Romania suggests that the prom-
ise is yet to be fulfilled for many peasants living in rural areas. The part of Romania 
where Tascha grew up is depicted as a backwater that failed to catch up with 
postsocialist economic developments and socio-political transitions following the 
post-Ceausescu era.28 Rather, the people of Carcaliu seem caught in the hardship 
of social, economic and cultural turmoil. A dire lack of employment (i.e. legal eco-
nomic opportunities) resulted in all of the able-bodied people in the small, rural 
towns to move away to bigger urban hubs in Romania or further away across Eu-
rope (“The big thieves go to you. The real whores too”, says one of the local police 
commissioners to the Dutch police officers, p. 35) in search of “a better life” (per-
forming seasonal labour, such as picking strawberries in Spain, p. 21, for example), 
where life itself might “begin anew” (p. 11). Those who are left behind seldom 
                                                     
26 See in this regard the study by Victor Malarek on the global trafficking of women (Victor Ma-
larek, The Natashas: The New Global Sex Trade, Viking, 2003). For another literary treatment of this 
topic, see Yelena Moskovich, The Natashas, Serpent's Tail, 2016. 
27 In the burgeoning field of “studies on the relationship between space and literature, the notion 
of “spatialization” is used to denote this relationship. See for example Rob Shields, Spatial Questions, 
SAGE, 2013. See also Robert Tally, The Routledge Handbook of Literature and Space, Routledge, 2017. 
28 A factor that also alludes to the vulnerability and marginality of the community from which 
Tascha comes is their Lipovene background. The Lipovenes are a minority group from Russian 
descent living in rural parts of Romania. In a sense Tascha and her community is thus twice marginal-
ized in Romania: not only as impoverished, rural peasants, but also as members of a cultural minority 
group that possesses very few forms of capital. 
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hear anything from these migrants (“how many didn’t hang themselves because of 
loneliness,” says the commissioner, p. 54), who are thought of as being dead: “But 
the ones abroad, once they have tasted from the good life, you never see them 
again in Carcaliu. Dead!”, explains Nicu, the commissioner’s assistant (p. 61). 
These economic migrants are as dead as the town itself (e.g. p. 20): the village is 
now one big graveyard (p. 85), where the dogs left behind die of hunger and des-
pair (p. 54). The novel makes a strong case for the fact that labour migration un-
raveled the social fabric of the community (e.g. parents leaving a child behind to 
find seasonal labour elsewhere in Europe, p. 113), with few more persons remain-
ing in the rural town than a hand full of severely impoverished individuals whose 
own vulnerability and precariousness is painfully evident in the absence of their 
support networks who moved elsewhere in search of income and the promise of a 
better life (e.g. Dănuţ, who left his ill mother behind to earn a living in Hungary. 
Upon his return two years later she is dead, because “no one came by to bring 
food for more than one month”, p. 110). 
Tascha’s hard life is rendered through passages that describe her youth and 
vulnerability as young woman in this rural context where there is little to be had 
except for a relationship with a man such as Radu; a man who, like his peers, has 
nothing beyond a criminal record and claims of ownership over women, their bod-
ies and their lives (p. 48 and 49); bodies that signal the possibility of access to an 
income of some sort and attendant promises of material goods to be consumed 
(cars for example). The narrator makes clear to the reader how pivotal Tascha is 
for Radu’s own economic persistence: “everything, their house and Radu’s car, was 
being paid for by her” (p. 20, see also p. 168). Her own opportunities for an inde-
pendent life were stifled when as a teenager she fell in love with Radu, dropped out 
from school, and was subsequently violently (e.g. p. 66, 88) pressured to go with 
him to the Netherlands, where she was to earn a living for both of them through 
sex work. Tascha complied in search of someone to love her (p. 89), a wish which 
is implicitly related to her experience of her family’s breaking up after the death of 
her sister and split-up of her parents. It is with this given that the precariousness of 
life (the other meaning of the concept, as used by Judith Butler, for example) is 
examined through scenes about the harrowing grief Tascha’s mother after the 
death of her eldest daughter (Tascha’s sister) because of a car accident (see for 
example p. 108) and which leads to the parents’ split-up. 
Despite Tascha’s hardship, she is a naive and simple person, whose knowledge 
is gleaned from “the university of life” (p. 49), rather than higher-level formal edu-
cation (such as Adriana, who also has a rural background, but completed university 
with flying colours, p. 79). Tascha is someone for whom all had to happen the way 
it did “because she still had skin over her eyes” (as one of the policemen had said) 
(p. 187). But, despite Tascha’s simplicity, she manages by the end of the novel to 
create a situation that enables her to earn a living for herself. Being certainly re-
stricted in her range of options, she chooses to return to the sex industry (p. 173) 
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with the meaningful difference now being that the income she generates is her 
own, to spend as she chooses.  The result suggested by the novel is that Tascha is 
now set en route to some kind of better life: “Just a short while and life could start” 
(p. 189), she muses at the end of the novel. The reader understands that her life is 
now, upon release from custody, not really better in a quantitative sense, but there is 
a strong suggestion that Tascha views herself as having more agency.29 She day-
dreams about returning to Romania within a few months with a “few thousand 
euros on her account”, which she would use for the medical treatment of her fa-
ther (p. 184) and of a subsequent blissful, but naive, domestic life together with 
him (p. 185), illustrating painfully the limited range of options available for margin-
alized, socially vulnerable persons like herself. 
This harking back to a peaceful life in Romania is credible, if only because the 
situation in Western Europe is, at times, presented to be hard and relentless too, 
with the effect that easy binaries between here and there, us and them are prob-
lematized. Tascha’s sexual exploitation is not only caused by her own boyfriend, 
but the treatment by other men (in the Netherlands) show a similar disregard for 
women’s bodies: once back in the Netherlands and on the street again, she is 
groped by hairy arms, “thick fake tits” a male voice shouts at her (p. 173). Also 
Trăienica realizes that the “better life” in Western Europe is more of a shimmering 
dream than reality when he experiences severe hardship during his visit to his son 
in Manchester.   
A final literary strategy is the game being played in the novel with “truth”. The 
text questions and problematizes clear-cut, but facile and problematic meaning-
making structures as a strategy to present events not as objective, historical facts, as 
is or was through an omniscient narrator, for example, but as subjective experience. 
One means through which the novel achieves this complicating of knowledge is by 
relating the events of the plot as narrative in narrative. In other words, events are 
presented as specific people’s perspectives on events. In a number of cases charac-
ters relate the events that had happened as second-hand accounts to other charac-
ters, instead of being presented as narrated facts. For example the titular robbing of 
the artworks from the Kunsthal is related as second-hand narrative by an uncle 
(Trăienica) of one of the thieves to the police (p. 168 - 172), and an old woman on 
the ferry tells the art expert Adriana about the initial police investigation in the 
town and provides her perspective on the small community of Carcaliu (p. 66). 
Furthermore, the person Tascha is not only presented by the narrator and through 
thoughts, flashbacks and dialogue, as well as the interactions of other characters 
with her, but also by the problematic, denigrating semiotic representation of her on 
Dutch online discussion forums (p. 174-175), while Tascha’s account to the police 
                                                     
29 For a valuable contribution that critically considers (and deconstructs), through reference to 
the categories of gender, sexuality and critical political theory, the conventions and practices that 
construe the practices through which we understand the sex industry, see Rutvica Andrijasevic, Migra-
tion, Agency and Citizenship in Sex Trafficking, Palgrave MacMillan, 2010. 
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of her involvement with the artworks is presented as the verbatim version of the 
interrogation as written down by Nicu (p. 15).  
Discussion 
Arundathi Roy once said that she thinks of globalization as “a light which shines 
brighter and brighter on a few people and the rest are in darkness, wiped out. Once 
you get used to not seeing something, then, slowly, it's no longer possible to see 
it.”30 This resultant invisibility because of the obscurity that cloaks our social and 
geographical margins is tackled head-on in Feticu’s novel, and makes visible the 
precarity (economic vulnerability) and precariousness (social vulnerability) of one 
particular, socially marginal, European individual. At the same time, the novel also 
asks us who we consider to be Europeans, and if persons such as Tascha (or Radu, 
for that matter) would qualify for this label, as opposed to the obvious Europeans 
such as the two Dutch policemen, representing the rule of law) and Adriana, em-
bodying education and culture (at some point she reminisces about her visit to the 
Venetian Biennale, p. 62). How do the mobility of Tascha and Radu relate to the 
lifestyle movers, student-elite and professionals of all kinds that benefit from the 
intra-European mobility created by the Maastricht Treaty, whom we easily and 
readily designate as Europeans?  
The novel Tascha problematizes a glib and easy success story about Europeani-
zation and formulates questions about the extent to which a single Europe exists 
by suggesting that there are multiple Europes that hold different truths for those 
who live in it.31 This multiplicity also holds for how the notion of “Europeans” is 
being expanded to include marginal and marginalized subjects whose semiotic 
representation is often-times problematic and one-sided if present at all.32 The 
attractive cosmopolitanism embodied by Europe's successful mobile classes is 
juxtaposed here with the more gritty, “vernacular” cosmopolitanism of a different 
kind of mobile class who lives by the “slow knife” of everyday, structural violence 
30 Rob Nixon, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor, Harvard University Press, 2011. 
31 The idea of multiple Europes is from Chris Rumford, “The Strangeness of Europe,” Compara-
tive European Politics 14, no. 4 (2016): 504-522. 
32 In a different context, the South African anthropologist Fiona Ross has used the binary “raw” 
and “respectable” to investigate the means through which marginalized (impoverished) persons in 
South Africa craft their lives in adverse contexts. With reference so Agamben’s notion of “bare life”, 
she concludes that this kind of research enables one to understand the “genealogy of bareness that is 
deeply embedded in local ways of understanding persons, relationships, history's effects, and life's 
possibilities. In other words, rawness and decency are fully social modes of being, produced and lived 
in the ordinariness of everyday worlds as they are shaped under the press (sic) of different political 
regimes, historical processes, cultural models, and the everyday social interactions they make possi-
ble.” (Fiona Ross, “Raw Life and Respectability. Poverty and Everyday Life in a Postapartheid Com-
munity,” Current Anthropology 56, no. S11 (2015): S106). This conceptual pair might be a very useful 
heuristic to investigate the world making of a character like Tascha, but such an enquiry extends my 
purpose here. 
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- so aptly phrased by Das and Kleinman.33 The novel asks us to consider the kind 
of subjecthood that is afforded to someone like Tascha who falls outside of the 
boundaries demarcated by conventional liberal-democratic notions of the individu-
al and individual subjectivity. Apart from the obvious economic and physical hard-
ships that Tascha experiences, there is also the matter of her socio-cultural exclu-
sion. She seems to lack the kind of political agency that we conventionally associate 
with citizens of modern, liberal-democratic states and seem to have very few op-
portunities to participate in public life. Her most “public” participation is on a sex 
website and as the subject of media reports and harrowing, humiliating online 
comments about her involvement in the art theft and work in the sex industry (p. 
174 and 184). Although it is not the topic of my contribution here, the possibility 
of political action, their limitations, and possible alternative political actions for a 
marginalized subject like Tascha to be undertaken is a pressing and urgent matter 
to reflect on further if we want to better understand the political implications of a 
broad range of social subjectivities at the cusp of our current times.  
Aesthetic texts such as literary narratives, documentaries and non-fiction nov-
els about European mobility and intra-European migration are important political 
sites through which we might reflect on the foundational and constitutional princi-
ples of “the social” of Europe. Specifically, critical engagement with such texts 
allow us to investigate the kind of knowledge yielded by the textual and aesthetic 
representation of those marginalized Europeans living in urban and rural precarity, 
and to consider how our cultural archive has captured and processed the effects of 
Europeanization and crises during the past decades. A few years ago, Rita Felski’s 
pessimistically diagnosed the state of European Studies as follows: “Anyone sur-
veying the scholarship on the present and future of Europe cannot help being 
struck by the sovereignty of the social sciences (…) Where, in the debates about 
the present and the future of Europe, are the art historians, the literary scholars, 
the philosophers, the cultural critics? Not entirely absent to be sure, but their role 
remains modest, often marginal.”34 By having turned our attention to the kind of 
knowledge (or at least a set of questions) about marginal and marginalized Europe-
ans in Tascha, Feticu seems to have replied to Felski, by using literary means to 
imagine a life for Natasha, or as she puts it, “to give (Natasha) a voice”.35 
                                                     
33 Cited by Veena Das and Shalini Randeria, “Politics of the Urban Poor: Aesthetics, Ethics, 
Volatility, Precarity. An Introduction to Supplement 11,” Current Anthropology, 56, no. S11 (2015): s11. 
For more on a critical approach to cosmopolitanism in literary studies, see Kristian Shaw, Cosmopoli-
tanism in Twenty-First Century Fiction, Springer, 2017. 
34 Rita Felski, “Introduction,” (special issue, entitled “A New Europe?”) New Literary History, 43 
(2012): v. 
35 A Quattro Mani, “‘Há, ik heb je!’ Mira Feticu schreef roman over de schilderijenroof uit de 
Kunsthal,’ Cultuurpers 3 July 2015. https://www.cultureelpersbureau.nl/2015/07/ha-mira-feticu-
schreef-roman-schilderijenroof-kunsthal/, accessed 23 June 2017. 
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Introduction 
Since its inception at the end of the 1950s, the European Community (EC)1 put a 
lot of effort into defining its own image and shaping its vision of Europe. This 
became particularly evident during the 1970s. The 1970s were a decade of pro-
found changes in Europe and the wider world, and are often defined by historiog-
raphy as the long 1970s,2 for they represented a period of challenge and rupture that 
had its roots in the 1968 protests and lasted until the mid-1980s. Also known as 
the decade of détente between the United States of America and the Soviet Union,3 
the 1970s saw the emergence of many social movements calling for the respect of 
fundamental rights,4 as well as an almost full accomplishment of decolonisation 
and an increasing relevance of newly-independent states on the international are-
na.5 In this period, more than ever before, the EC felt compelled to clarify the 
                                                     
1 This paper speaks about the European Community (EC) to indicate the three European 
Communities, i.e. the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Atomic Energy Commu-
nity and the European Economic Community (which was the most influential), that merged in 1967 
and shared the same set of institutions: the European Commission, the European Parliament (also 
known as Parliamentary Assembly until its direct elections in 1979) and the Council of Ministers.  
2 See, for instance: Poul Villaume, Rasmus Mariager and Helle Porsdam, “Introduction,” in The 
‘Long 1970s’. Human Rights, East- West Détente and Transnational Relations, ed. Poul Villaume, Rasmus 
Mariager and Helle Porsdam (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), 1-11.  
3 On the history of détente: Wilfried Loth, Overcoming the Cold War. A History of Détente, 1950-1991 
(Houndmills: Palgrave, 2002). 
4 Gerd-Rainer Horn, The Spirit of ’68. Rebellion in Western Europe and North America, 1956-1976 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
5 Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 2005), 91-112.  
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values and the principles at the basis of its identity in order to be recognised as an 
independent actor on the global stage.6 
In December 1973, the nine EC member states officially declared their deter-
mination to introduce the concept of European identity into their common foreign 
relations and approved a document entitled Declaration on European Identity.7 Among 
the constituent features of European identity outlined in that declaration were the 
respect of human rights and the need to aid developing countries. Although hu-
man rights had already been brought to the forefront interest before,8 it was mainly 
during the 1970s that they gained an importance that they had hardly experienced 
prior to that moment.9 Human rights became a popular subject that was discussed 
not only in the conference rooms of international organisations, but also in the 
media as well as in the speeches of popstars, actors and musicians.10 They turned 
out to be the «lingua franca»11 of the global moral thought, and they were consid-
ered as such by the EC, too. At the same time, delivering foreign aid became a 
well-established practice among rich countries,12 and the EC committed to help a 
6 Antonio Varsori and Guia Migani, eds., Europe in the International Arena During the 1970s: Entering 
a Different World (Brussels: P.I.E Peter Lang, 2011); Sonia Lucarelli and Ian Manner, eds., Values and 
Principles in European Union Foreign Policy (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007). When it comes to speaking 
about European identity, a fluid and delicate topic on which many researches have been conducted, 
this study bares reference to the historical meaning that was attached to the term, as well as to the 
definition that the European Community provided within its official documents and declarations 
during the 1970s. 
7 To read the document, visit: https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/02798dc9-
9c69-4b7d-b2c9-f03a8db7da32/publishable_en.pdf (Last accessed: January, 8th 2018). 
8 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations in 1948. On this occasion, human rights were set forth in a global arena and recognised as a 
«common standard of achievement for all people and all nations». The concept was not new at that 
point; however, only in 1948 did human rights find the possibility to be listed and presented to the 
international actors. On this, see: Johannes Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Origins, 
Drafting and Intent (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999). 
9 On the breaking of human rights in the 1970s, refer to: Jan Eckel and Samuel Moyn, eds., The 
Breakthrough. Human Rights in the 1970s (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013). 
10 Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann, “Introduction. Genealogies of Human Rights,” in Human Rights in 
the Twentieth Century, ed. Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 20. 
11 Michael Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2001), 53-98.  
12 This practice had largely emerged after the Second World War, when the process of decoloni-
sation made the international community aware that most of the recently independent nations had a 
delay in their economic development and hence needed to receive foreign aid in the form of devel-
opment assistance. While in the 1950s and 1960s foreign aid focused mostly on industrialisation and 
economic development, in the 1970s it started to be associated to what can be called the “human 
dimension” of development.  
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progressively increasing number of poor countries in the so-called Third World as 
a way to foster their development and economic growth.13 
What is interesting to notice, however, is that the promotion of principles such 
as human rights and of practices such as development assistance was perceived not 
only as a part of European identity, but also as a sign of European responsibility 
within world affairs. The EC, indeed, recognised that it had a unique responsibility 
vis-à-vis the international arena, and this realisation no doubt marked a turning 
point when it comes to describing how European identity was perceived and ad-
vertised by the EC. European identity entailed certain commitments, and at the 
same time those commitments were presented as the distinct trait of the EC.  
The purpose of this paper is to investigate to what extent the concept of re-
sponsibility was used by the EC institutions during the 1970s in relation to the 
topics of human rights and development assistance, and how this contributed to 
shape the vision that Europe had of its own identity and that it consequently pre-
sented to the outside world. In particular, this research provides an insight into 
how the interpretation of the concept of responsibility developed throughout the 
decade and how it adapted to different moments of European history. According-
ly, this examination considers a specific timeframe (1970-1979) and is organised in 
three chronological sections: 1970-1974; 1975-1977; 1978-1979.  
While many studies extensively explored the role of the EC on the global stage 
during the 1970s, as well as the importance of European identity in that decade,14 
recent historiography did not consider very deeply the concept of responsibility 
when it comes to the vision that the EC had of itself. Moreover, it appears that no 
investigation focussed on development assistance and human rights in relation to 
European identity in the 1970s.15 Therefore, this paper aspires to offer an original 
analysis on a subject that has not been prominent in recent researches, and thus 
adding a further stone to the construction of European integration history. To do 
so, it bears reference to primary archival sources from various funds of the Histori-
cal Archives of the European Union (Fiesole – Italy), the Historical Archives of the Europe-
an Parliament (Luxembourg Ville – Luxembourg) and the Historical Archives of the 
European Commission (Brussels – Belgium).  
                                                     
13 Marjorie Lister, The European Union and the South. Relations with Developing Countries (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 1997); Karin Arts and Anna K. Dickinson, eds., EU Development Cooperation: From Model to 
Symbol (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004). 
14 For instance: Giuliana Laschi, L’Europa e gli altri. Le relazioni esterne della Comunità dalle origini al 
dialogo Nord-Sud (Bologna: il Mulino, 2015); Elena Calandri, ed., Il primato sfuggente. L'Europa e l'interven-
to per lo sviluppo, 1957-2007 (Milano: Franco Angeli, 2009); Lorenzo Ferrari, Sometimes Speaking with a 
Single Voice. The European Community as an International Actor, 1969–1979 (Brussels: P.I.E Peter Lang, 
2016); Bernard Waites, Europe and the Wider World (Abingdon: Routledge, 1995).  
15 Although some researches tackle the topics of human rights and foreign aid in the 1970s, the 
approach is mainly juridical and legal. In this respect, consult: Karin Arts, Integrating Human Rights into 
Development Cooperation: The Case of the Lomé Convention (Amsterdam: Kluwer Law International, 1998).  
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The responsibility to help (1970-1974)16 
At the beginning of the 1970s, the concept of responsibility was mainly used by the 
EC with reference to its development assistance programmes and its role on the 
international stage. Responsibility was seen as the commitment of the EC to help 
poor countries, and this was the fil rouge that accompanied European discourses in 
those years.  
During a joint meeting between the European Parliament and the Consultative 
Assembly of the Council of Europe in 1970, the EC declared that the best contri-
bution that Europe could give to global development was to go on with its action. 
Helping the so-called Third World was described on that occasion as a priority 
obligation for the EC, whose responsibility should no longer remain regional but 
become global. As many members of the European Parliament (MEPs) pointed 
out during that gathering, the EC wanted to differentiate itself and its foreign aid 
schemes from those of the United States and the Soviet Union. Indeed, according 
to the EC, the two powers in the bipolar confrontation of the Cold War were de-
livering assistance to the less developed nations with the sole aim of seeking he-
gemony worldwide. In contrast, the EC presented itself as truly interested in the 
development of the recipients of aid and responsible in front of them. Moreover, 
the EC wanted to acquire a prominent position on the global arena and the North-
South relations could represent a way to counterbalance East-West hostility.17  
In one of its memoranda on the EC policies for development cooperation, the 
Commission affirmed in 1971 that it was a «necessity and a responsibility»18 to go 
on with foreign aid practice. In particular, it meant that it was important to support 
the Yaoundé Convention, an agreement that had been approved in 1963 to replace the 
association introduced in 1957 with the Treaties of Rome and that was structured 
around the relationship between the EC and eighteen countries (many of them 
being former colonies of some of the EC member states). Before the coming into 
force of the Lomé Convention in 1975, the Commission presented Yaoundé as the best 
model to build international relations around development assistance.19  
16 Sections 2, 3 and 4 of this paper are based on primary archival sources from the Historical Ar-
chives of the European Union (HAEU): funds PE0 1594, PE0 5149, PE0 5150, PE0 5154, PE0 5155, 
PE0 19870, PE0 20138, PE0 20418, PE0 21817, BAC 25/1980 n. 1623, BAC 28/1980 n. 762, BAC 
130/1983 n. 254, FMM n. 33, UWK NS/46; the Historical Archives of the European Parliament (HAEP): 
funds PE 45.750, PE 48.801, PE0 AP DE 1977 DE 1977/05/11, PE0 D/US 1979/04/17.1; and the 
Historical Archives of the European Commission (HAEC): funds BAC 150/1980 n. 44, BAC 154/1980 n. 
888, BAC 51/1991 n. 461.  
17 Federico Romero, Storia internazionale dell’età contemporanea (Roma: Carocci editore, 2012), 79-84; 
Giuliano Garavini, “Il confronto Nord-Sud allo specchio: l’impatto del Terzo mondo sull’Europa 
occidentale (1968-1975),” in Alle origini del presente. L’Europa occidentale nella crisi degli anni Settanta, ed. 
Antonio Varsori (Milano: Franco Angeli, 2007), 74-75. 
18 HAEU, BAC 28/1980 n. 762.  
19 Martin Holland, The European Union and the Third World (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2002). 
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Aid to developing countries was also presented as a moral necessity, and the 
EC admitted feeling morally obliged to safeguard the interests of its associated 
countries. As Franco Maria Malfatti, President of the European Commission, un-
derlined during a meeting with the Council of Europe, Europe needed to change 
its attitude from spectator to active participant, and the natural outcome of this 
transformation would have brought major duties and responsibilities for the EC 
and reinforced its position vis-à-vis other international actors.  
During the 1972 Paris Summit, EC leaders affirmed their political will to re-
spond even more than in the past to the expectations of developing countries and 
to be ready to «cope with the growing world responsibilities incumbent on Eu-
rope»20 from many sides. This attitude remained unchanged in 1973, when the nine 
Heads of state or government of the EC member states met in Copenhagen and 
approved the aforementioned Declaration on European Identity. What is particularly 
interesting about that document is that it mentions European responsibilities on 
the international arena as part of European identity. For the first time, the EC 
stated officially and openly that its role and presence worldwide was one of the 
distinctive features of its own image.  
Later in 1974, European responsibility in the world continued to be seen by 
the EC as a moral obligation, as well as being like an «historically inescapable 
task»21 for the restructuring of international relations and order. The concept of 
morality was often associated with the concept of responsibility, with political im-
plications that went far beyond the call for political action.  
Therefore, European responsibility was perceived and interpreted as both an 
almost transcendent reason to help developing countries as well as a way to justify 
the presence of the EC on the global stage. At the same time, this feeling of re-
sponsibility was affirmed as a distinct feature of European identity and as the pro-
found explanation of European global actions both alongside with, and opposed 
to, other significant players, in order to affirm the vision of itself that the EC 
wanted to offer to other international actors. The most recurrent themes revolving 
around the topic of responsibility were obligation and moral necessity, and this 
gives a clue on how the call for responsibility was not only a political and econom-
ic stance, but also a cultural and ideological claim.  
However, despite the moral connotation attached to the practice of helping 
poor countries, human rights did not find much room within this discourse at this 
point. Whilst the Declaration on European identity affirmed that the respect of human 
rights was one of the principles that all the EC member states had in common, and 
Malfatti underlined in another occasion that «the respect of human rights and fun-
                                                     
20 To read the final document of the 1972 Paris Summit, visit: https://www.cvce.eu/content/
publication/1999/1/1/b1dd3d57-5f31-4796-85c3-cfd2210d6901/publishable_en.pdf (Last accessed: 
January, 11th 2018) 
21 HAEU, UWK NS/46.  
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damental values» was «an indispensable condition for any European action»22 as 
the construction of the EC would have been unthinkable without those principles, 
this issue was not taken into account when considering development assistance. 
Only after 1975 did human rights find their way in considerations relating to for-
eign aid, and this determined a change in the call for responsibility, too.  
The responsibility not to help (1975-1977) 
Around 1975, the call for responsibility drastically modified its target. While help-
ing developing countries had been seen as the way to put into practice European 
responsibility until 1974, protecting human rights became the purpose and reason 
of European responsibility and hence of European identity in the following years. 
This implied not only a change of perspective, for human rights gained an atten-
tion that they had not received before, but also a shift in the attitudes towards the 
developing countries: delivering aid to them could not be accepted when they were 
found guilty of violating human rights. As a consequence, using European respon-
sibility to protect European values such as human rights, it was not admissible to 
help those nations that were not respecting such principles any longer. From the 
responsibility to help, the EC turned to the responsibility not to help in order not 
to finance abuses and infringements of human rights.   
The respect for human rights had been among the purposes of the EC since 
1970, when the European Political Cooperation was approved with the aim of coordi-
nating the foreign policies of the EC member states as well as of expressing com-
mon intentions with a single voice. Indeed, the founding document stated that «a 
united Europe should be based on a common heritage of respect for the liberty 
and the rights of men».23 Moreover, human rights were recalled within the Declara-
tion on European Identity, too.  
Many reasons can be put forward to explain why the 1970s saw this increased 
interest in human rights. Some historians, including Lauren,24 claim that the 1970s 
represented the peak of the evolution of human sensitivity towards the Other. 
Conversely, Moyn maintains that human rights exploded in the 1970s as an alterna-
tive to all prior universalistic schemes and utopias that eventually collapsed.25 Brad-
ley states, however, that human rights were not an alternative to other systems, but 
22 HAEU, FMM n. 33. 
23 European Communities, First Report of the Foreign Ministers to the Heads of State and Government of 
the Member States of the European Community (Luxembourg: European Communities, 1970). 
24 Paul Gordon Lauren, The Evolution of International Human Rights. Visions Seen (Philadelphia: Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Press, 2011). 
25 Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Har-
vard University Press, 2010). 
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rather a further addition to all the stances that were embraced by the global social 
mobilisation that took place in the 1970s.26  
Yet, it was mainly after 1975 that the concept of human rights started to be 
used and referred to by the EC institutions as part of the discourse on European 
responsibility. Although many causes can be listed to understand why the year 
1975 represented a turning point in the decade, it is useful to consider what Snyder 
and Romano wrote about the Helsinki Final Act, i.e. the final document of a series 
of talks that involved between 1972 and 1975 almost thirty-five countries from all 
over the world with the purpose of discussing cooperation and security in Europe. 
The EC played a significant part in the process that finally led to the inclusion of 
human rights in the document, notwithstanding the opposition of the Soviet Un-
ion and the immobility of the United States, and made the other global actors  
accept fundamental rights as one of the principles governing international rela-
tions.27 Furthermore, in 1975 the EC approved a new scheme for delivering for-
eign aid, known as the Lomé Convention, and recognised it as the most advanced tool 
for North-South cooperation because it was based on the principles of equality and 
dialogue among the partners and led to a re-thinking of the relationship between 
the EC and developing countries.28 Although no reference to human rights could 
be found in the first version of Lomé, which was then renewed every five years for 
almost thirty years, its entry into force bore witness to the intention of the EC to 
consider the less developed countries as partners and not only as needy former 
colonies. Moreover, as highlighted in the newspaper Europe, the Lomé programme 
would «benefit the image of the Community worldwide, both in the Third World 
countries and in the European public opinion».29 
In 1976, in a joint report produced by the EC and the Council of Europe with 
the title Europe’s responsibility towards the world and developing countries, it was stated that 
Europe should speak out to publicly condemn the behaviours of those partners 
and nations that were considered as a violation of its founding values. The main 
target of these accusations was Uganda, a country that was part of the Lomé Conven-
tion, yet was alleged guilty of not respecting the human rights of its citizens.30 It was 
                                                     
26 Mark Philip Bradley, “The Origins of the 1970s Global Human Rights Imagination,” in The 
‘Long 1970s’, 15-32. 
27 Angela Romano, From Détente in Europe to European Détente. How the West Shaped the Helsinki 
CSCE (Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2009); Sarah B. Snyder, Human Rights Activism and the End of the 
Cold War. A Transnational History of the Helsinki Network (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2011).  
28 Elena Calandri, Prima della globalizzazione: l’Italia, la cooperazione allo sviluppo e la guerra fredda, 1955- 
1995 (Padova: Cedam, 2013), 210-226. 
29 HAEC, BAC 150/1980 n. 944. Europe, no. 1476, March, 13th 1974, 9.  
30 Lorenzo Ferrari, “The European Community as a Promoter of Human Rights in Africa and 
Latin America, 1970-80,” Journal of European Integration History 21, no. 2 (2015): 217-230.  
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also specified that Europe must be ready to stand up for the philosophical ideas it 
supported.  
While development assistance continued to be presented as a moral commit-
ment and the EC felt that it needed to have a leading role with regards to defining 
the various interests related to development issues, new emphasis was put on the 
necessity for the EC to be consistent and coherent with the ideology that it had 
proclaimed. Moreover, later in 1976, during a meeting with the Congress of the 
United States, the European Parliament emphasised that it was a moral obligation, 
for both sides of the Atlantic, to support other parliamentarians in the world that 
were struggling for democracy and human rights.  
The concept of responsibility was used again during 1977 with reference to the 
protection of human rights. In this case, too, the European Parliament proved to 
be very efficient and proactive in introducing human rights into the discourse on 
European identity. Furthermore, it listened more than all the other institutions to 
civil society and represented a sort of megaphone of its stances.31  
The responsibility not to help developing countries that were seriously violat-
ing human rights represented a way for all the EC institutions to put in practice 
what they had affirmed and what they viewed as unique element of European iden-
tity.  
The responsibility not to judge (1978-1979) 
Given the prominence acquired by human rights between 1975 and 1977, and the 
fact that the EC felt it had a certain degree of responsibility to protect them all 
over the globe, it is possible to understand why the EC did not want to provide 
assistance to countries in which human rights were not respected.  
Nonetheless, at the end of the decade the EC realised that it was necessary to 
officially state its intentions. Unofficial declarations could not be sufficient any 
longer. That is why, with the renewal of the Lomé Convention approaching, the EC 
started considering the idea of inserting a human rights clause within the new ver-
sion of the agreement. According to the EC institutions that were in favour of this 
change, i.e. the Parliament and, to a lesser extent, the Commission, declaring hu-
man rights as one of the principles to be respected in order to be granted aid from 
the Community could lead to a major compliance with that norm.  
Thus, around 1978, the EC began discussing the addition of a reference to 
human rights in the second version of Lomé. This proposal was in tune with the 
attention to human rights that the EC aspired to demonstrate. Yet, developing 
31 On the role of the NGOs and on the influence that these informal actors had on the EC insti-
tutions during the 1970s, see: Ilaria Zamburlini, “Human rights and foreign aid in the 1970s. The role 
of three NGOs influencing the European Community,” in The Informal Construction of Europe, eds. 
Mechthild Roos and Lennaert van Heumen (Abingdon: Routledge, forthcoming).  
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countries that were party to the Lomé agreement did not appreciate this move.32 
They argued that it was not fair to be judged on the grounds of the respect for 
human rights, and that it seemed like the EC had a civilising mission in mind with 
regards to the political structure of these nations. As a consequence, a debate start-
ed among the EC institutions on whether it was correct or not to refer to human 
rights in the new Lomé Convention. The Parliament actively pushed for this inclusion, 
and in the end even the Council agreed.  
However, it was during this discussion that another meaning of the concept of 
responsibility began to take shape. Indeed, some MEPs as well as Claude 
Cheysson, Commissioner of the Directorate General of the European Commission 
for Development, while discussing the possibility to insert human rights in the 
Preamble of the revised document, affirmed that the EC had to be careful «not to 
judge what the others do»33 and «not to exercise any moral imperialism».34 The EC 
institutions understood, therefore, that there was a risk of being accused of neo-
colonialism and imperialism. It was responsibility of the EC, then, not to judge 
what other countries were doing and to what extent they were respecting human 
rights, and not to interfere with their political attitudes.   
Enforcing respect for human rights, in fact, could be interpreted as part of a 
moral and civilising mission,35 and could put at risk the relationship between the 
EC and developing nations. It was therefore necessary not to implement any 
judgement or interference, even if human rights were not completely respected and 
protected in the legal framework of many developing, yet independent, nations.  
This change of perspective on the notion of responsibility turned out to be 
even more important when certain developing countries highlighted that, if human 
rights were to be included in the revised version of the document, then reciprocity 
would have to apply: the EC was to respect human rights, too. What countries like 
Barbados had in mind when accusing the EC of applying double standards with 
human rights was the possibility for citizens of developing countries to move freely 
and emigrate within the territory of the EC member states. The EC member states 
were not ready at that point to accept such conditions within the Lomé agreement, 
and so they refrained not only from judging developing countries on their human 
rights record any further, but also from including the human rights clause within 
the Lomé Convention.  
                                                     
32 On this, see: Toby King, “Human Rights in the Development Policy of the European Com-
munity: Towards a European World Order?,” Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 28 (1997): 51-
99. 
33 HAEU, PE0 21817.  
34 Ibid.  
35 Mark Mazower, “The End of Civilization and the Rise of Human Rights: The mid-XX Centu-
ry Disjuncture,” in Human Rights in the Twentieth Century, 29-44. 
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Taking into account the colonial past of some of the EC member states, the 
EC felt that not only did it have the responsibility to help as well as the responsi-
bility to protect human rights in those countries, but also the responsibility not to 
criticise or blame them so as not to transform human rights into a tool of political 
civilisation.  
The responsibility not to judge thus became the third connotation that this 
concept acquired during the 1970s. Even in this case, this development led to a 
definition of European identity, and to an explanation of the vision of Europe that 
the EC wanted to offer to other actors: unlike the United States and the Soviet 
Union, for instance, the EC did not intend to impose its view, yet it wanted its 
character to be well-defined and visible on the global arena.  
However, if the need not to exercise any judgement appears to be true with re-
gards to the relations of the EC with developing countries, the same cannot be said 
for the attitude of the EC with other nations. Exactly in the same period, in fact, 
the EC harshly criticised the Soviet Union for its poor record in respecting human 
rights, and actively committed to support Soviet dissidents fighting for civil liber-
ties and fundamental freedoms in the name of the Helsinki Final Act.36  
In the end, human rights did not appear in the renewal of Lomé that was ap-
proved in 1979, thus somehow establishing a hierarchy among the three types of 
responsibility that the EC recognised during the 1970s: the responsibility to help 
and the responsibility not to judge proved to be, in the end, much more important 
and realistic than the responsibility not to help in order to protect human rights.  
Conclusion 
As this paper sought to demonstrate, the concept of responsibility was continuous-
ly used by the EC institutions during the 1970s. However, the direction that the 
call for responsibility undertook in that period drastically transformed and 
changed. What emerged from this examination is the following.  
First, it is possible to state that the idea of responsibility intersected with two 
issues that gathered significant attention in the 1970s: the possibility to deliver 
development assistance to the developing countries with the aim of fostering their 
growth, and the need to respect and protect human rights.  
Second, it clearly appears that European responsibility experienced three differ-
ent and successive connotations: the responsibility to help developing countries – 
in the first years of the decade; the responsibility to protect human rights, and 
hence not to help those countries that were seriously violating such principles – 
during the mid-1970s; the responsibility not to judge the behaviour of developing 
countries with regards to their human rights record in order not to be accused of 
36 Aurélie Élisa Gfeller, “Champion of Human Rights: The European Parliament and the Hel-
sinki Process,” Journal of Contemporary History 49, no. 2 (2014): 390-409. 
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moral imperialism and neo-colonialism – at the end of the 1970s. Whilst the third 
definition could be interpreted as the confirmation of the willingness of the EC to 
support those countries with which it had previously established an agreement of 
assistance and cooperation, it is undeniable that this choice represented somehow a 
reversal of the trend on the respect of human rights, which reached its peak 
around 1975 but was then put aside.  
Third, although the concept of responsibility for the EC went through various 
interpretations during the 1970s, a few elements persisted throughout the decade: 
being seen to carry out certain obligations and commitments towards the interna-
tional community; the sensation of having a moral requirement to help developing 
countries; the certainty to feel a universal vocation to speak out to defend some 
specific values and principles.  
Fourth, the European Parliament was the most proactive EC institution when it 
came to the issues of human rights and foreign aid. The connection that MEPs had 
with civil society may partially explain why that assembly took a greater interest in 
such themes.  
Fifth, it is possible to suggest that the use of the concept of responsibility con-
tributed to and had a role in shaping the vision that Europe was constructing both 
for itself and for its identity – and this mainly concerns the elaboration of a specific 
set of values and practices – as well as for other international actors, with the aim 
of affirming the presence of the EC as a distinct player on the global arena. There-
fore, it seems that the call for responsibility was both influenced by and has an 
impact on European identity. Indeed, the EC sought to define its own identity by 
means of responsibility, yet responsibility was at the same time part of the self-
proclaimed identity of the EC.   
In the end, while it can be highlighted how the call for responsibility shaped 
the vision of Europe, through following visions and revisions of attitudes and 
priorities, it is not possible to consider the concept of responsibility as the only 
reason behind the construction of the European identity. Indeed, many other 
causes contributed to this process. Further research may be conducted on this 
process, and this would certainly encourage and sustain the study of European 
integration history.  
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